Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Education of the Jefferson City Public School District to terminate Tammy Ferry's contract with the District, holding that the Board had the authority to terminate the contract.The Board decided to terminate Ferry's contract after she transferred confidential student information from the District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision, finding that Ferry had not "disclosed" confidential student information, as that term is defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the Board's findings that Ferry violated the Board's policies and procedure and did so willfully were supported by competent and substantial evidence; and (2) the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the Board to terminate Ferry's indefinite contract with the District. View "Ferry v. Board of Education of Jefferson City Public School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Missouri's Legal Expense Fund had no obligation to satisfy a default judgment against Allen Merry, an employee of the St. Louis Public School District.S.M.H., a student in the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis, sued Merry, a former teacher, and obtained a default judgment against him for $4 million. Because the Transitional School District had lost its state accreditation, the Special Administrative Board (Board) of the Transitional School District governed the district and employed Merry. S.M.H. subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking satisfaction of the judgment from the Legal Expense Fund. The circuit court granted summary judgment for S.M.H. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board was not an "agency of the state" for purposes of the Legal Expense Fund, and therefore, the Fund was not liable for damages against employees of the Transitional School District; and (2) S.M.H. was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "S.M.H v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of prohibition it issued barring the circuit court from taking any further action other than to vacate an order overruling Relator's motion for summary judgment and to enter judgment for Relator, holding that Relator was entitled to official immunity.Israel Mariano, a student at Independence Academy, filed a negligence suit against Relator, an in-school suspension teacher, in his individual capacity for injuries Mariano sustained when Relator physically restrained him and broke his arm. The circuit court overruled Relator's motion summary judgment claiming he was entitled to official immunity. Relator sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Relator was entitled to official immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Alsup v. Honorable James F. Kanatzar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice R.M.A.’s petition alleging that Defendants, a school district and school board, unlawfully discriminated against him on the grounds of his sex in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.065, holding that R.M.A.’s petition alleged facts that, if taken as true, established the elements of a claim under section 213.065.R.M.A. filed suit alleging that his “legal sex is male” and that, by denying him access to the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms, Defendants discriminated against him in the use of a public accommodation “on the grounds of his sex.” The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding that R.M.A. stated a claim under section 213.065.2. View "R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District" on Justia Law

Byrne & Jones Enterprises, Inc. filed an action against Monroe City R-1 School District alleging that it was denied a fair and equal opportunity to compete in the bidding process for a public works contract to build an athletics stadium. The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that Byrne & Jones, as an unsuccessful bidder, lacked standing to challenge the school district’s award of the contract to another bidder because it did not bring the action in the interest of the public or as a taxpayer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Byrne & Jones had standing to challenge the award of the contract to another bidder; but (2) the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition because Byrne & Jones was not entitled to the relief requested in the petition. View "Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist." on Justia Law