Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Temecula Valley Educators Association and individual students, teachers, and parents from the Temecula Valley Unified School District (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued the District and five members of the District’s school board (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of “Resolution No. 2022–23/21” (the Resolution), which prohibits the use of Critical Race Theory (CRT) or similar frameworks in teaching topics related to race. The Resolution lists specific elements and doctrines of CRT that are banned. Plaintiffs argued that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague and sought a preliminary injunction to halt its enforcement.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Resolution was sufficiently clear and that Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also concluded that the balance of harms favored denying the injunction, as enjoining a government action would cause irreparable injury.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague because it employs ambiguous language, lacks definitions, is unclear in scope, and contains no enforcement guidelines. The court noted that the Resolution’s language leaves teachers uncertain about what is prohibited, leading to self-censorship and fear of arbitrary enforcement. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the significant harm Plaintiffs would face without an injunction and by incorrectly concluding that the Resolution did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying the preliminary injunction as to the Resolution and remanded for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court dismissed the appeal related to the Board’s “Policy 5020.01” as moot, given that the relevant portions of the Policy had been rescinded following changes in the law. View "Mae M. v. Komrosky" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are parents of children with special needs attending public schools in Fairfax County, Virginia. They allege that the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional "taking" of their children's Fifth Amendment property interest in public education. The plaintiffs argue that Virginia law establishes a fundamental right to public education, which they claim is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and, by extension, should be considered private property under the Takings Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that while the right to public education in Virginia may be a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause, it does not necessarily qualify as private property under the Takings Clause. The court noted that federal courts have long interpreted property interests protected by the Takings Clause as narrower than those protected by the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that the right to public education is subject to regulation and revision by the Virginia government and cannot be bought or sold, distinguishing it from private property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' children may have a property interest in public education under the Due Process Clause but held that this does not extend to the Takings Clause. The court emphasized that the Takings Clause applies only to private property and that public education, being subject to government regulation and not possessing the characteristics of private property, does not qualify. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for compensation under the Takings Clause. View "Chollet v. Brabrand" on Justia Law

Holly Lawson, a guidance counselor at Franklin County High School, alleged that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by her coworkers, Kayla Creely and Lori Franke, and by School Superintendent Mark Kopp, along with the Franklin County, Kentucky Board of Education. Lawson claimed that Creely and Franke searched her bag without her consent, discovering a firearm, and that Kopp unlawfully detained and searched her in connection with this incident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Creely and Franke were acting under color of state law but were entitled to qualified immunity. It also determined that Kopp's actions constituted a lawful investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio and that Lawson consented to the search of her bag.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Creely and Franke did not act under color of state law because their actions were not authorized by any school policy or state authority. The court also agreed that Kopp's interaction with Lawson was a lawful investigative stop supported by reasonable suspicion and that Lawson voluntarily searched her own bag, negating any Fourth Amendment violation. Consequently, the court found no basis for municipal liability under Monell against the Board. View "Lawson v. Creely" on Justia Law

John Doe, a high school student with several psychological disabilities, repeated his freshman year at an out-of-state boarding school. Upon returning to Rhode Island, he sought a waiver from the Rhode Island Interscholastic League (the League) to extend his eligibility to play sports into his fifth year of high school, citing his disabilities as the reason for his request. The League denied the waiver, stating that his ineligibility was due to his voluntary decision to repeat the ninth grade, not his disabilities.Doe's parents appealed the League's decision to the Waiver Request Hearing Committee and the Principals' Committee, both of which upheld the denial. Subsequently, Doe filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island, claiming that the League's refusal violated Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted a permanent injunction, allowing Doe to play sports in his fifth year, reasoning that the League's rule was not an essential aspect of its program and that Doe's disability was the but-for cause of his ineligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's injunction. The appellate court concluded that Doe's disability was not the but-for cause of his ineligibility, as his decision to repeat the ninth grade was unrelated to his disability. Additionally, the court held that waiving the eight-semester rule would fundamentally alter the League's interscholastic athletics program, which aims to ensure competitive parity and maximize student participation. Thus, the requested accommodation was deemed unreasonable. View "Doe v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League" on Justia Law

Micayla Augustyn, a student at Wall High School, received special education services under an individualized education plan (IEP). As she neared the end of her fourth year, a dispute arose between her mother and the Wall Township Board of Education regarding her graduation. The Board wanted her to graduate, while her mother believed she needed another year due to the Board's failure to implement required accommodations. Mediation failed, and Augustyn filed a Petition for Due Process before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), claiming the Board failed to provide a free and appropriate education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The ALJ dismissed her grade revision claim, stating it was not suitable for a special education due process hearing. Augustyn appealed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which ruled in her favor, stating that a due process hearing was the appropriate venue for her grade revision claim. The District Court remanded the matter for further proceedings and awarded Augustyn attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA, but significantly reduced the fee amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that Augustyn was a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees, as she successfully vindicated her statutory right to a due process hearing. However, the court found that the District Court erred in reducing the fee award based on improper considerations, such as the Board's financial ability to pay and the procedural nature of Augustyn's victory. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order and remanded for a recalculation of the appropriate lodestar reductions. View "Augustyn v. Wall Township Board of Education" on Justia Law

Minor Doe, Father Doe, and Mother Doe filed a lawsuit against the Western Dubuque Community School District and several school officials after Minor Doe was assaulted by another student during class. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and loss of consortium. The school did not contact medical personnel or the parents after the incident, and Minor Doe was later diagnosed with a concussion.The Iowa District Court for Dubuque County dismissed the case on four grounds: failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), improper use of pseudonyms, failure of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as a matter of law, and the consortium claim failing without the underlying causes of action. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case based on the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provision and the use of pseudonyms. The court held that the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provision does not apply to common law claims and that pseudonymous petitions are generally disfavored but may be allowed in certain circumstances. The court found that the plaintiffs should have been given an opportunity to amend their petition to use their real names. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, stating that schools and their officials do not generally have fiduciary relationships with students.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the negligence and consortium claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. View "Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District" on Justia Law

Z.M., a non-verbal autistic child, attends the Center for Autism at Kiln Creek Elementary School. Through his father, he filed a lawsuit alleging that while being transported on a school bus, Newport News Public Schools employees struck him with a wet sock, verbally abused him, and allowed him to leave the bus partially unclothed. The complaint also mentioned previous verbal insults by school employees. Z.M. sought $15 million in compensatory and punitive damages, alleging negligence and gross negligence by the School Board and its employees.The Newport News School Board filed a plea in bar, claiming sovereign immunity. The Circuit Court of Newport News denied the plea regarding claims of simple and gross negligence but granted it concerning punitive damages, citing sovereign immunity. The School Board then filed an interlocutory appeal under Code §§ 8.01-626 and 8.01-670.2, which allow appeals from decisions on sovereign immunity pleas.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Code § 22.1-194, which waives sovereign immunity when a vehicle is "involved in an accident," did not apply because the bus was not involved in an accident. The court held that the alleged acts did not relate to the operation of the bus as a vehicle. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that while the School Board is protected by sovereign immunity, the employees accused of gross negligence are not, allowing the lawsuit to proceed against them. View "Newport News School Board v. Z.M." on Justia Law

Libby Hilsenrath sued the Board of Education of the School District of the Chathams, claiming that the inclusion of instructional videos about Islam in her son's seventh-grade World Cultures and Geography class violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The class covered various world regions and their predominant religions, including Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. The specific lessons on Islam included PowerPoint presentations and two YouTube videos, "Intro to Islam" and "The 5 Pillars of Islam," which Hilsenrath argued were proselytizing.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment to the Board, finding no Establishment Clause violation. The court applied the Lemon test and later, following a remand due to the Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, applied a historical analysis. The District Court concluded that the curriculum did not resemble any traditional hallmarks of religious establishment, such as coercion or preferential treatment of one religion over others.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit held that the curriculum did not constitute proselytization or coercion, as the videos were part of a secular educational program covering multiple religions. The court also found no evidence of favoritism towards Islam, noting that the curriculum included teachings on various world religions. The court emphasized that the curriculum did not bear any hallmarks of religious establishment and upheld the District Court's decision. View "Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles College Faculty Guild, AFT Local 1521, sought to reverse the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of three grievances against the Los Angeles Community College District. The grievances involved safety-related construction projects at Los Angeles City College, the termination of a faculty member at Pierce College, and the miscalculation of retirement benefits for a faculty member at Los Angeles Trade-Technical College.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County partially granted the motion to compel arbitration for the grievance related to backpay for the retirement benefits issue but denied the motion for the other grievances. The court found that the grievances were beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and were preempted by the Education Code and other statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the grievances related to construction projects and employment termination were not arbitrable because they were preempted by the Education Code and the Construction Bonds Act. The court also found that the grievance related to retirement benefits was partially arbitrable only concerning the backpay issue, as the Public Employees’ Retirement Law governed the reporting of service credits to CalPERS, and the arbitrator could not order injunctive relief beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.The appellate court concluded that the Guild failed to demonstrate that the grievances were within the scope of representation as enumerated by the Educational Employment Relations Act and affirmed the trial court’s mixed ruling. View "L.A. College Faculty Guild v. L.A. Community College District" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a sixteen-year-old, applied to the Mountaineer Challenge Academy (MCA) as an alternative to public high school. During the acclimation period, he injured his knee after exiting his bunk improperly. He was evaluated by medical personnel, placed on restricted duty, and later cleared for full duty. Subsequently, he was discharged from the program for noncompliance. Petitioner sued MCA and the West Virginia Army National Guard, alleging that their failure to enforce safety policies caused his injury and led to his unjust dismissal.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents, citing qualified immunity. The court found that the actions of the MCA staff involved discretionary functions and did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the cadre’s supervision fell within discretionary actions and that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to an education or any statutory duty to supervise.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the cadre’s actions were discretionary and protected by qualified immunity. It found no violation of clearly established rights or laws, as MCA is not part of the public school system and thus not subject to the same constitutional protections. The court also concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondents acted fraudulently, maliciously, or oppressively. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, upholding the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents. View "Moorhead v. West Virginia Army National Guard" on Justia Law