Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Two blind individuals, after enrolling at a community college in Los Angeles, were approved for disability accommodations, including accessible course materials and technology. Despite these approvals, they faced repeated barriers in accessing required textbooks, online platforms, library resources, and other educational tools. They also experienced difficulties in receiving their approved accommodations, such as accessible test-taking and note-taking support. These obstacles led to their inability to participate fully in their courses and, in one case, being steered away from certain classes due to their disability.After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the jury found the college district liable on multiple counts and awarded damages for intentional violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court, however, reduced the damages to only out-of-pocket expenses, concluding that the jury’s award could only be for emotional distress or lost educational opportunities—both of which it believed were not recoverable. The district court also issued injunctive relief. The plaintiffs appealed the reduction of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, under Supreme Court precedent, emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA because the statute’s remedies are coextensive with those of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which do not permit such damages. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for loss of educational opportunities resulting from ADA violations. The court found that the jury’s award was supported by evidence and the instructions given. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s remittitur, vacated its judgment as to damages, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the original jury awards. View "PAYAN V. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Several individuals brought lawsuits against New Jersey public school districts, alleging that they were sexually abused by teachers when they were high school students. One plaintiff alleged that a science teacher sexually abused him at the teacher’s home when he was fifteen years old, and claimed the school board was vicariously liable for the abuse and had breached a fiduciary duty. Three other plaintiffs alleged that a different teacher sexually assaulted them during and after school hours, including on school property, and sought to hold the school district vicariously liable under the Child Victims Act.In the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, the trial court denied the school board’s motion to dismiss the vicarious liability and fiduciary duty claims in the first case, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding the claims could not proceed. In the three consolidated cases, the trial court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the statute did not allow for vicarious liability for sexual abuse outside the scope of employment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the cases. It held that the relevant provision of the Child Victims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1), does not categorically bar vicarious liability claims against public entities for sexual abuse by employees outside the scope of employment, and such claims should not be dismissed at the pleading stage. The Court adopted a new standard for determining such liability, requiring a fact-specific inquiry. However, it also held that a public school does not owe a fiduciary duty to a student. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division’s decision in the first case, and reversed in the three consolidated cases, remanding all matters for further proceedings under the new standard. View "Simpkins v. South Orange-Maplewood School District" on Justia Law

A university student faced disciplinary action after three fellow students reported separate incidents in which, while intoxicated, he allegedly engaged in nonconsensual and increasingly violent sexual conduct. Following these reports, the student was placed on interim suspension and criminally charged with multiple felonies. The criminal proceedings included a preliminary hearing where two complainants testified under oath and were rigorously cross-examined by the student’s attorney. The criminal case concluded with a plea agreement.While the criminal case was ongoing, the university initiated its own disciplinary process. This included a multi-stage investigation and hearing pursuant to university policy. At the fact-finding hearing, the complainants chose not to testify or participate. The hearing officer relied on the prior sworn testimony from the criminal proceeding and other evidence, ultimately finding the student responsible for violating university policies with respect to two complainants. The student was expelled, and his university appeal was denied.The student then sought review in Alameda County Superior Court, arguing that he was denied due process because he could not cross-examine the complainants at the university hearing and that the university’s delay prejudiced his defense. The superior court denied his petition, finding that due process was satisfied by the opportunity for cross-examination at the criminal proceeding and that the delay was justified and not prejudicial.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The court held that due process does not require live cross-examination of complainants at a university disciplinary hearing when such an opportunity was provided during prior criminal proceedings, and that any procedural delay was supported by good cause and did not result in prejudice to the student. The judgment for the university was affirmed. View "Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of California" on Justia Law

A fifth-grade student, J.S., attended a local Oklahoma elementary school where, in August 2022, the administration implemented a policy segregating fifth-grade students into all-boys and all-girls homerooms. J.S. was placed in the boys’ class, taught by Mr. McClain. During the initial weeks, Mr. McClain allegedly targeted J.S. with severe discipline, derogatory language, and inappropriate sexual comments. After J.S. and his parents complained about this treatment and the sex-segregated policy, J.S. was removed from his classroom and placed on a modified schedule, then ultimately withdrawn from the school by his parents, who cited ongoing retaliation and lack of safety. The parents also filed a Title IX complaint, but alleged that the school’s investigation was inadequate and retaliatory actions followed, including public shaming and further mistreatment of J.S.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part various defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding some claims barred by qualified immunity but allowing others to proceed. The court found that school district officials and Mr. McClain could not claim qualified immunity on certain equal protection and retaliation claims, but dismissed some due process and conspiracy claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that school officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim but not on the equal protection claim related to sex-based class segregation. Principal Anderson and Mr. Blair were properly denied qualified immunity on retaliation claims, while others were dismissed. Mr. McClain was granted qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim but not on the equal protection claim for alleged sexual harassment. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stepp v. Lockhart" on Justia Law

Parents and teachers in California challenged state policies that require schools to keep information about students’ gender transitioning confidential from parents unless the students consent. The parents objected to being excluded from knowledge and decisions regarding their children’s gender presentation at school, especially when those actions conflicted with their religious beliefs or their desire to participate in their children’s mental health care. Several parents described situations in which they were not informed about their children’s gender identity at school until after significant mental health crises occurred. Teachers objected to being compelled to use students’ preferred names and pronouns contrary to the wishes of parents and their own beliefs.The case was initiated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, where two teachers first challenged district policies. As litigation unfolded, the case expanded to include state officials as defendants and parents as additional plaintiffs. The District Court certified parent and teacher classes, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and entered a permanent injunction that prohibited schools from withholding information from parents and required adherence to parental directions on names and pronouns. The District Court also ordered state-created instructional materials to include notice of the rights protected by the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal, expressing procedural concerns about class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and skepticism regarding the merits of the constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Ninth Circuit’s stay as to the parent plaintiffs, concluding that the parents seeking religious exemptions are likely to succeed on their Free Exercise and Due Process claims. The Court found the parents face irreparable harm and that equities favor them. The procedural objections raised by the Ninth Circuit were deemed unlikely to prevail. The application to vacate was otherwise denied. View "Mirabelli v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Scott Williams was elected to serve on the Addison Community School Board for a six-year term and was chosen by his fellow board members to act as president for one year. During his presidency, Williams had a dispute with a staff member, leading to allegations that he harassed staff and improperly requested confidential information. Following an investigation and resolution drafted by board members, the Board voted to censure Williams and remove him from the presidency. Williams was not informed of the allegations against him before the meeting where his removal was voted upon.Williams filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging, among other claims, a violation of the Fair and Just Treatment clause of the Michigan Constitution and asserting that the school district was liable under respondeat superior. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, including the federal constitutional claims, and denied Williams’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Fair and Just Treatment claim. The district court chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court abused its discretion by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’s Fair and Just Treatment claim. The appellate court found that the state law claim presented a novel and complex issue under Michigan law, particularly because Michigan courts have not yet determined whether a private right of action exists under the Fair and Just Treatment clause. The court held that, given the dismissal of all federal claims and the complexity of the remaining state constitutional issue, the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the Fair and Just Treatment claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss this claim without prejudice. View "Williams v. Addison Community Schools" on Justia Law

A middle school student with significant mental health needs struggled academically and emotionally while enrolled in a public school district during the COVID-19 pandemic, when instruction was provided virtually. His parents, finding that the school’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) was inadequate to address his needs during this period, placed him in two successive out-of-state private residential treatment centers offering in-person education and mental health services. Throughout this time, the parents participated in several meetings with the district’s IEP Team and communicated their concerns about the insufficiency of the educational program provided.Afterward, the parents sought reimbursement from the school district for the costs associated with the residential placements, arguing that the district failed to offer their child a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied their claim, concluding that the district had no duty to offer a FAPE during the relevant period because the parents had not expressly requested a new IEP document, and instead, had only requested IEP meetings. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California affirmed this determination, also reasoning that the parents’ requests for meetings did not obligate the district to develop or offer a new IEP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under both federal and California law, the purpose of an IEP meeting is to develop or revise an IEP that offers a FAPE. The court concluded that it was irrelevant whether the parents had requested an IEP “meeting” or an IEP “document,” and that participation in IEP meetings triggered the district’s ongoing obligation to offer a FAPE. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the IEP offered satisfied the IDEA’s requirements and, if not, whether the student was entitled to reimbursement or other remedies. View "L.B. V. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A teacher who had previously attained tenure in the Montgomery County public-school system resigned from that position in September 2019 after accepting an offer for a probationary teaching job with the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District (DYS). The teacher received an email in mid-September confirming the job offer, with instructions to begin work on October 7, 2019, after completing mandatory training. The teacher’s salary, benefits, and job responsibilities with DYS all began on October 7, and he completed multiple school years in the new role before receiving notice in April 2023 that his contract would not be renewed.The teacher filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking a declaration that he had acquired tenure under the Students First Act of 2011, which would entitle him to due-process protections before dismissal. The trial court held a bench trial and concluded that the teacher was tenured at the time of his nonrenewal, reasoning that his employment was “effective” upon the agreement in September 2019 and, in the alternative, that DYS was estopped from denying him tenure because he relied on the September email when resigning from his previous tenured position.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that, for purposes of the Students First Act, “effective employment” occurs when a teacher is required to report for work and is paid, not at the time of an offer or acceptance. Because the teacher’s employment with DYS became effective on October 7, 2019—after the statutory October 1 cutoff—he did not accrue a “complete” school year for 2019-2020 and did not acquire tenure before his contract was nonrenewed. The Court also rejected the application of equitable estoppel, finding no misleading conduct by DYS. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded. View "Smitherman v. Roberts" on Justia Law

A school administrator responsible for special education at a high school in Texas alleged that his employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting incidents of child abuse by teachers under his supervision and for cooperating with a subsequent Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation. He reported the incidents to his principal, participated in a CPS interview, and raised concerns about disciplinary actions and workplace conduct. After additional workplace conflicts and an EEOC complaint, his contract was ultimately terminated by the district’s Board of Trustees following a hearing, and his administrative appeal was unsuccessful.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the administrator’s claims, which included constitutional violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, retaliation for whistleblowing, and a civil conspiracy to violate his rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, denied leave to amend the complaint, and denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the administrator’s speech—reporting child abuse to his supervisor, participating in the CPS investigation, and refusing to characterize events as his supervisor wished—was made in his official capacity as an employee, not as a citizen, and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. The court also found that he received appropriate procedural due process related to his termination and did not state a claim for substantive due process. The individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and the civil conspiracy claim failed because there was no underlying constitutional violation. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take judicial notice of the administrative record and found other claims waived. View "Castille v. Port Arthur Independent School District" on Justia Law

A student with Down syndrome, C.B., attends school in the Henry County School District in Georgia. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the school district was required to develop an individualized education program (IEP) for C.B. After reviewing C.B.’s progress in fourth grade, the school district’s IEP team decided to move C.B. from an interrelated resource (IRR) class to a mild intellectual disability (MID) class for language arts and math. C.B.’s parents disagreed with this new placement, believing the IRR class was less restrictive and more appropriate. They also objected to the school district’s decision to place C.B. on an alternative assessment track, rather than the regular statewide assessment.Following the school district’s decision, C.B.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge conducted a five-day hearing and found that the school district had complied with IDEA in making the placement decision and that the Georgia Alternate Assessment was appropriate for C.B. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the administrative law judge’s findings regarding the placement, concluding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA did not apply to the choice between different types of special education classes. The district court also found C.B.’s claim regarding the alternative assessment moot, since C.B. was no longer required to take the alternative assessment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the placement in the MID class, holding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA does not apply to placement decisions among special education classes. However, the court reversed the district court’s mootness determination on the assessment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "C.B. v. Henry County School District" on Justia Law