Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A South Carolina budget provision, known as the “Proviso,” prohibits public schools from using state funds to teach certain concepts related to race and sex. Several Black students, the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (SC NAACP), and author Ibram Kendi challenged the Proviso, alleging it led to the removal of an Advanced Placement African American Studies (AP AAS) course and one of Kendi’s books from school libraries. The students and SC NAACP asserted that eliminating the AP AAS course infringed upon students’ First Amendment right to receive information, while Kendi claimed the book’s removal constituted viewpoint discrimination. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Proviso was void for vagueness and violated the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. The court concluded that the individual students did not allege a concrete injury as they had not actually enrolled in AP AAS, and found that even a student who had enrolled failed to establish that her injury was traceable to the Proviso rather than an unrelated curriculum review. The district court also held that Kendi’s injury was not redressable because the school district cited an alternative, unchallenged rationale for removing his book.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It affirmed dismissal with respect to a student who had graduated and another who had not taken concrete steps to enroll in AP AAS. However, it held that SC NAACP adequately alleged standing for at least one member with an ongoing injury, and Kendi sufficiently alleged standing for his viewpoint discrimination claim. The court vacated dismissal of other claims and remanded for the district court to address unresolved standing and merits questions. View "South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Florida enacted a law prohibiting public university professors from endorsing or promoting certain ideas related to race, color, sex, and national origin in classroom instruction. The law, known as the Individual Freedom Act, identifies eight specific concepts that professors are barred from espousing, such as claims of moral superiority based on race or sex, inherent racism or oppression, and the idea that virtues like merit or colorblindness are themselves racist or sexist. The law allows professors to discuss these concepts in a neutral way, but not to advocate for them, and imposes severe penalties on both individual professors and universities for violations, including the loss of significant funding and potential termination of employment.Groups of professors and students from several Florida public universities filed lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, arguing that the Act violated their First Amendment rights by restricting viewpoint-based expression and was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted preliminary injunctions in both cases, enjoining enforcement of the Act’s classroom restrictions against the plaintiffs, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge each prohibited concept. The court concluded the Act was likely unconstitutional as applied to public university professors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Act’s restrictions amount to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court distinguished between permissible curricular control by universities and the broad, legislative ban imposed by the state’s political branches. It concluded that neither public-employee speech doctrine nor government speech doctrine justified the law’s suppression of disfavored ideas in the university classroom, and that the Act impermissibly infringed on academic freedom and open inquiry. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Pernell v. Commissioner of the FL State Board of Education" on Justia Law

A former superintendent of a California school district, who later became an elected member of the district’s Board of Trustees, was subject to a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) requested by the district on behalf of three employees. These employees, who worked closely with the superintendent, reported that he engaged in a persistent course of conduct that included angry outbursts, threats of termination, intrusive and inappropriate text messages, stalking behaviors, and unsolicited photographs. The conduct caused substantial emotional distress and fear among the employees, leading them to seek mental health treatment and report his actions to the police. After his termination, the superintendent continued to interact with the employees in ways they perceived as intimidating, including the placement of campaign signs near their homes and the publication of internal documents on social media.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted a temporary restraining order and, after a multi-day hearing, issued a WVRO prohibiting the superintendent from harassing, disturbing the peace of, or contacting the three employees. The WVRO imposed restrictions on his proximity to the employees and their workplace, allowed his attendance at board meetings only under specific conditions, and included a provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO at board meetings. The order was set to last four years, subject to early termination if he was no longer associated with the district.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that an employer’s right to seek a WVRO on behalf of employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, rejected arguments concerning insufficient evidence and violation of parental rights, and found sufficient evidence of a future threat of harassment. However, it determined that the WVRO’s prohibition on comments at board meetings was overbroad and violated First Amendment rights, and that the order’s four-year duration exceeded the statutory maximum. The court modified the order to remove the speech restriction and limit its duration to three years, then affirmed the WVRO as modified. View "Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on whether the U.S. Department of Education may constitutionally rely on private educational accreditors in disbursing federal education funds. Under the Higher Education Act, colleges and universities must be accredited by a recognized accreditor for their students to be eligible for federal financial aid. Accreditors are private, voluntary organizations funded by the schools they accredit. Florida challenged this arrangement, alleging that it unconstitutionally delegates government power to private accreditors and violates both the Appointments Clause and the Spending Clause, claiming the accreditation requirement is an unascertainable condition for federal funds.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the suit after Florida brought four claims: a private nondelegation doctrine challenge, an Appointments Clause challenge, a Spending Clause challenge, and a now-abandoned Administrative Procedure Act challenge. The federal government moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court found no unlawful delegation of government power, noted that Title IV funds are directed to students and not institutions, determined the accreditation requirement is unambiguous, and dismissed the Appointments Clause claim because accreditors do not determine eligibility for federal funds.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Court held that private accreditors do not exercise government authority that could violate the Vesting Clauses or the Appointments Clause. The Court also determined that the accreditation requirement is an ascertainable condition for federal funds, as it is a well-understood, longstanding practice and does not amount to an ambiguous or novel restriction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Florida’s suit. View "State of Florida v. Secretary, US Department of Education" on Justia Law

A state law in West Virginia prohibited male students, as determined by biological sex, from participating on female sports teams. A student who is a biological male but identifies as female and has taken puberty blockers and hormones sought to participate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams and brought suit against West Virginia officials, alleging violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, Idaho passed a law barring male students from female sports teams; a transgender woman who is a biological male but identifies as female and had taken hormones challenged Idaho’s law after trying out for collegiate women’s sports. Both states justified their laws by referencing inherent physical differences between the sexes and concerns for safety and competitive fairness in women’s sports.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment for the state, finding no violation of Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling on the Title IX claim and remanded for further factual findings on the Equal Protection claim. Meanwhile, in Idaho, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute; the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision, finding a likely violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed both appellate court decisions. It held that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate men’s and women’s sports teams determined by biological sex and does not require exceptions for transgender athletes, regardless of puberty blockers or hormone use. The Court further held that the Equal Protection Clause does not bar states from limiting female sports teams to biological females, finding the sex-based classification substantially related to important government interests in safety and competitive fairness. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "West Virginia v. B. P. J." on Justia Law

Two individuals—a student enrolled in a nursing program and a prospective paramedic student—challenged a community college’s policy requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination for participation in certain clinical programs. The student alleged she was removed from the nursing program after failing to provide proof of vaccination and not receiving a clear response to her request for a medical exemption. She also claimed that the college placed her in clinical rotations at facilities with strict vaccination requirements, while other students were placed at locations accommodating the unvaccinated. The prospective paramedic student did not complete the vaccination requirement, did not seek an exemption, and was told that proof of vaccination or a successful exemption was necessary for acceptance.The District Court for Lancaster County allowed amendment of the initial complaint, but ultimately dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court found that the contract and negligence claims were barred by sovereign immunity, that the due process and equal protection claims lacked sufficient factual allegations to proceed, and that the “ultra vires” claim was not cognizable. The court denied further leave to amend, finding amendment would be futile. A timely postjudgment motion to alter or amend was denied, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court, after reviewing for plain error due to briefing deficiencies, found no plain error in the lower court’s dismissal of the case. The Court concluded that the district court properly dismissed all claims and that the appeal was timely. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Fischer v. Southeast Community College" on Justia Law

Two elementary school students attending a private school in East St. Louis, whose homes are more than 1½ miles from their school and located along a public school bus route, sought to compel the local public school district to provide them with bus transportation. Previously, the district had provided this service, but stopped due to a shortage of bus drivers. The students’ parents argued that the district’s refusal to transport their children violated a state law requiring districts to provide transportation to nonpublic school students under certain conditions.The Circuit Court of St. Clair County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, concluding that the relevant section of the Illinois School Code only required the district to provide transportation for nonpublic schoolchildren along its existing regular bus routes, and did not require the district to modify or create new routes to accommodate these students. The court found that the plaintiffs had not identified an existing route they could use. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the statute required the district to treat qualifying nonpublic schoolchildren the same as public schoolchildren, including modifying routes if necessary to provide transportation to and from their school.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The court held that, under section 29-4 of the School Code, a local school district’s obligation to provide transportation to nonpublic schoolchildren living at least 1½ miles from their school is limited to points along the district’s existing regular bus routes. The statute does not require the district to modify its routes or establish separate routes to serve nonpublic school students. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the district. View "E.W. v. The Board of Education of East St. Louis School District No.189" on Justia Law

A male freshman football player at a public high school in Alabama was subjected to repeated acts of harassment by older teammates, including physical and verbal abuse with sexual overtones and an attempted sexual assault known as “keying,” where a car key is forced into a player’s anus. The harassment was meant to emasculate him and included slurs and other conduct suggesting hostility toward his perceived failure to conform to masculine stereotypes. The student reported these incidents to school officials, including the head coach, but the school’s response was minimal and did not stop the harassment. The student ultimately transferred to a different school as a result.Afterward, the student, through his representative, sued the school district and the head coach in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. He alleged violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as state tort claims. The district court dismissed the federal claims, concluding that the harassment was motivated by anti-freshman bias rather than sex, that the conduct did not qualify as actionable same-sex sexual harassment under Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause, and that the coach was entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that the student plausibly alleged sex-based harassment actionable under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause because the alleged conduct targeted him for failing to conform to sex stereotypes and involved inherently sexual acts. The court concluded that the allegations supported a finding of deliberate indifference by the school district and the coach and that the coach was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "C. W. v. Smith" on Justia Law

At a school board meeting in Xenia, Ohio, a member of the public sought to use her allotted time during the public comment period to criticize the school district’s handling of alleged critical race theory instruction, as well as the conduct of the superintendent and board. Although her remarks were calmly delivered, board president Mary Grech interrupted her, threatened to cut her microphone, and eventually did so, recessing the meeting amid disruptions from the audience. The speaker was not permitted to complete her five-minute comment, nor was she allowed additional time after the meeting resumed.The individual who was silenced brought a lawsuit against the school board and its president under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that her First Amendment rights were violated. She sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the board’s public comment policy against her in the future. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a hearing and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and found the facts and motives for the board president’s actions to be equivocal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the matter and reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s speech—critical of school officials—was protected by the First Amendment and did not fall into any unprotected category. The court found that the board president engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination by curtailing speech because of its critical content, and also ratified a heckler’s veto by silencing the speaker rather than the disruptive audience. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm to constitutional rights was presumed. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. View "Boddy v. Grech" on Justia Law

A mother sought to enroll her disabled child, D.H., in a public Montessori academy operated by a school board in St. James Parish, Louisiana. The school board’s policy required both the child and parent to reside in the parish for enrollment eligibility. Although the mother initially provided an affidavit stating both she and D.H. lived in St. James Parish, it was later discovered that she resided in neighboring St. John the Baptist Parish. After confirming this, the school board disenrolled D.H., citing violation of its residency requirement.The mother filed administrative requests with the Louisiana Department of Education, seeking a due process hearing, a “stay-put” order to keep D.H. enrolled during proceedings, and an independent educational evaluation. The administrative law judge granted a temporary stay-put order but, after an evidentiary hearing, determined D.H. was not a resident of St. James Parish and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The mother then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and requested reversal of the residency finding, reinstatement of the stay-put order, and compensatory education. The district court denied her preliminary injunction, dismissed her claims with prejudice, and held that she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the school board was not obligated to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to D.H. because residency was an essential eligibility requirement under both Louisiana and federal law. The court also found that the mother’s claims of disability discrimination and requests for equitable remedies lacked sufficient factual support. View "Herbert v. St. James Parish School Bd" on Justia Law