Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A high school student, who is a transgender girl but was assigned male at birth, played on a varsity girls’ softball team in Minnesota under a 2016 state athletic bylaw permitting students to participate in sporting activities consistent with their gender identity. Female Athletes United (FAU), an organization advocating for women’s sports, sued Minnesota officials and local school boards, alleging that permitting the student’s participation violated the rights of its members under Title IX by denying them effective accommodation and equal treatment. FAU claimed its members suffered various harms, such as lost athletic opportunities and emotional distress, and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit “male athletes” from competing against its members in girls’ sports involving contact or competitive skill.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that FAU had standing because one member’s team was scheduled to play against the transgender athlete’s team. However, the district court denied the preliminary injunction on two grounds: first, that FAU lacked a private right of action for its Title IX claims, because they were based on a disparate impact (rather than intentional discrimination) theory, and second, that FAU failed to satisfy the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that, under Title IX and controlling Supreme Court precedents, there is only a private right of action for claims of intentional discrimination, not for disparate impact. It found FAU’s claims were based on allegations of negative effects rather than intentional disparate treatment or deliberate indifference. The court concluded that FAU’s allegations did not support a claim of intentional discrimination. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that FAU lacked a private right of action for its Title IX claims. View "Female Athletes United v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

A nursing student was required to complete clinical rotations at local hospitals as part of her coursework in 2017. She alleged that her supervisor, the director of the nursing program, subjected her to severe sexual harassment and retaliated against her when she rejected his advances by giving her a failing grade and refusing to discuss it. After the student reported these incidents, the district placed the supervisor on administrative leave and initiated an independent investigation. The investigation confirmed inappropriate conduct by the supervisor, who did not return to his position. The student later withdrew from the program and completed her degree out of state. Through counsel, she notified the district of her intent to pursue claims and sought damages.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment for the community college district, holding that the student lacked standing under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), failed to comply with the Government Claims Act for her non-FEHA claims, and that the district was not deliberately indifferent under the Education Code. The court also excluded the student’s attorney’s declaration due to a technical omission, and entered judgment for the district on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the judgment. The court found the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the attorney’s declaration to be corrected, which was a curable procedural defect. The appellate court held that a postsecondary student serving in a clinical capacity qualifies as an “unpaid intern” under FEHA, conferring standing. The court further found the student’s notice to the district satisfied the Government Claims Act requirements, and concluded that triable issues existed regarding whether the district acted with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed summary adjudication for the district only on the Civil Code cause of action, but otherwise denied summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District" on Justia Law

A former student at the University of Southern Indiana was accused of sexual assault during the 2020–21 academic year. After a hearing, a university panel found the alleged victim’s account more credible than the student’s, noting her consistency over time, and concluded that the student committed rape and forcible fondling. The student was suspended for three semesters and did not return to the university. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against the university and other defendants, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, deprivation of due process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During discovery, the student learned of undisclosed records that suggested his account may have been consistent over time, contrary to the panel’s finding.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. In the course of the litigation, a magistrate judge ordered the student to proceed using his real name, not a pseudonym. The student objected, but the district judge overruled the objection, though the district court stayed its order pending this appeal. The student filed multiple appeals, which were consolidated for argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the student’s use of a pseudonym. The court reaffirmed the strong presumption that adult parties litigate under their real names in federal court and found that the student did not present sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of physical harm or retaliation to justify use of a pseudonym. The court declined to broaden the standard to include mental health risks or to consider the merits of the underlying claims in deciding the pseudonym issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. View "Doe v University of Southern Indiana" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old male student at a Virginia Beach middle school received a sexually explicit photo from a female classmate and, several months later, showed the image to other students during the school day. After teachers reported the incident, the assistant principal removed the student from class, questioned him, and searched his phone’s photo gallery. The school resource police officer was notified and began a criminal investigation. The student ultimately showed the explicit photo to the officer, was read his Miranda rights, arrested, and charged in juvenile court with possession of child pornography. The juvenile court found sufficient evidence for guilt but deferred disposition; the charge was dismissed after the student completed court-imposed conditions.The student, through his mother and later counsel, sued the assistant principal, the school resource officer, the Virginia Beach School Board, and the City of Virginia Beach in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. He alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as conspiracy and Monell claims. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the phone search reasonable under New Jersey v. T.L.O., the confession voluntary, no evidence of unlawful conspiracy, and no underlying constitutional violations to support Monell liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the assistant principal’s search of the student’s phone was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope under T.L.O., and that Riley v. California did not displace this standard in the school context. The court also held the student’s confession was voluntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, found no evidence of a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and determined Monell liability could not attach absent an underlying constitutional violation. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. View "O.W. v. Carr" on Justia Law

A married couple, acting on behalf of their minor child, challenged West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law after their daughter was disenrolled from a public virtual school because she was not fully vaccinated. The parents sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement, but were informed that only medical exemptions—based on specific medical contraindications or precautions certified by a physician—are permitted under state law. After being denied a religious exemption, the parents filed suit, claiming that the absence of a religious exemption violated their First Amendment right to freely exercise their Christian faith. They requested a preliminary injunction to allow their daughter’s re-enrollment in the virtual academy during the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the parents were likely to succeed on their free exercise claim. The district court applied the test from Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, concluding that the vaccination law was not generally applicable, and thus subject to strict scrutiny, which it found the law did not survive.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of preliminary relief. The Fourth Circuit held that West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law is a neutral and generally applicable measure enacted under the state’s police power to protect public health, as recognized in longstanding Supreme Court precedent including Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Prince v. Massachusetts. The court found that the medical exemption process does not constitute a “mechanism for individualized exemptions” that would undermine general applicability under cases such as Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the law is subject to rational basis review, which it easily satisfies, and that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions simply because medical exemptions exist. The court reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "Perry v. Marteney" on Justia Law

Several educators, parents, students, and a nonprofit organization challenged two provisions of an Iowa law affecting public schools. The law restricts classroom instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation for students in kindergarten through sixth grade and requires school officials to notify parents if a student requests accommodations affirming their gender identity, such as using a different pronoun. The plaintiffs, asserting facial constitutional challenges, argued the provisions were overbroad and vague, infringing on First Amendment and due process rights.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted a preliminary injunction against these provisions. The district court found that the terms “program” and “promotion” in the instruction restriction were overly broad and infringed on protected speech, and determined that the parental notification law was impermissibly vague due to the undefined use of “accommodation.” The district court severed what it considered unconstitutional portions of the statutes and enjoined their enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the statutes, when read with the canon of constitutional avoidance, could reasonably be interpreted in a way that avoided constitutional problems and that the statutory language was sufficiently clear. The appellate court found the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the laws substantially outweighed constitutional ones in their facial challenge. It further determined that the term “accommodation” was not unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and vacated that injunction as to all challenged provisions, remanding the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Iowa Safe Schools v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including publishers, authors, educators, and a parent of a student, challenged provisions of an Iowa law (Senate File 496) requiring public school libraries to remove books containing “descriptions or visual depictions of a sex act.” The law also imposed penalties on educators who failed to comply. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions violated their First Amendment rights, both as to students’ access to information and as to the right of authors and publishers to communicate with their intended audience.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa initially granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the challenged provisions. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail, holding that the unconstitutional applications of the law substantially outweighed constitutional ones. It declined to apply the standard set out in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, instead relying on the obscenity standard from Ginsberg v. State of New York and the “substantial and reasonable government interest” test from the plurality in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the Hazelwood standard—whether the restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—applies to school library curation. The court determined that the Iowa law’s book restrictions addressed legitimate pedagogical concerns and were neither amorphous nor unreasonable. Because the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of success on the merits under the correct standard, the Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Penguin Random House, LLC v. Robbins" on Justia Law

A group of students, their parents or guardians, and local school boards from several low-wealth and urban school districts in North Carolina brought suit against the State and the State Board of Education in 1994. They claimed that the State’s method of funding education deprived students in their districts of their constitutional right to the opportunity for a sound basic education, focusing on perceived inadequacies in the implementation and funding of the Basic Education Program (BEP) as it then existed. The plaintiffs did not allege that the statewide education system was unconstitutional on its face, but rather that it was unconstitutional as applied to their specific districts due to disparities in resource allocation.After various procedural developments, including intervention by additional parties and the dismissal of some claims, the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which previously clarified that the right at issue belonged only to students, not school boards. The Supreme Court held in Leandro v. State that the constitution guarantees every child the opportunity for a sound basic education, and remanded the case for as-applied determinations regarding whether that right was denied in the named districts. In Hoke County Board of Education v. State, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court finding that at-risk students in Hoke County had been deprived of their right, but otherwise found the statewide education system generally constitutional as then structured. The Supreme Court remanded for further as-applied proceedings in the other named districts, but no further trials occurred.Over time, the case’s subject matter shifted, and the trial court, with the parties’ acquiescence, began addressing a statewide, facial challenge to the current education system, including ordering the implementation of a statewide remedial plan without a new or amended complaint raising such a claim. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, reviewing an order entered on 17 April 2023, held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a facial challenge to the statewide education system, since no party had properly invoked jurisdiction over such a claim by amending the pleadings or following the statutory procedure. The Court vacated the trial court’s order and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that any orders entered after 24 July 2017, when the litigation’s nature changed, were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State" on Justia Law

Four teachers working at three schools in a public school district with high poverty and significant staffing challenges filed formal complaints under California’s “Williams Uniform Complaint Procedure.” Their complaints alleged that the district was unlawfully filling persistent teacher vacancies with rolling substitutes and failing to utilize all lawful options for recruiting and assigning permanent, authorized teachers, including credential waivers and intern programs. The district acknowledged it was out of compliance with state law but claimed it could not comply due to a systemic teacher shortage beyond its control.The teachers’ complaints were denied by the school district’s Board of Education. Subsequently, the teachers filed a petition for writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, seeking an order to compel compliance with statutory teacher assignment requirements. The district argued it had exercised all reasonable efforts to fill vacancies, including broad recruitment and use of alternative credential paths, but that hiring qualified teachers remained impossible. The trial court denied the writ, finding the district was not refusing to comply with the law and was doing its best under the circumstances.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, converted the appeal to an extraordinary writ proceeding due to the absence of an appealable order. The appellate court concluded that the district had not demonstrated it exhausted all statutory options for filling vacancies, such as seeking waivers from the Commission on Teacher Credentialing or the State Board of Education. The court held that unless and until the district exhausts these options, it cannot invoke the defense of impossibility. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its prior ruling and to grant the teachers’ petition for a writ of mandate. View "Cleare v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A teacher employed by a school district in a remote Alaska village rented housing from the district. After the district removed a railing from the stairs of the teacher’s residence and did not repair it despite complaints, the teacher fell while taking out the trash and was injured. The teacher notified the school principal of his injury, but she declined to assist or allow him to seek medical help. There were additional conflicts between the teacher and the principal, including disciplinary actions and allegations of policy violations. The teacher later reported the principal to her supervisors and the state’s Professional Teaching Practices Commission. Following these events, the district decided not to rehire the teacher for the following school year.The teacher filed a negligence lawsuit against the district and the principal, later amending his complaint to add claims for whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and workplace safety violations. The Bering Strait School District, after being sued, reported the injury as work-related to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the teacher’s exclusive remedy was through workers’ compensation. The Superior Court for the Second Judicial District, Nome, dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding that the teacher failed to state a claim, and later awarded attorney’s fees to the district.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that, taking the teacher’s allegations as true, it was not clear that his injury was within the course and scope of his employment or that workers’ compensation was his exclusive remedy. The court reversed dismissal of the negligence, whistleblower, wrongful termination, IIED, and defamation claims, finding the complaint stated viable claims. The court affirmed dismissal of the workplace safety claim and vacated the attorney’s fees award, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Bering Strait School District" on Justia Law