Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas was recruited to play on the women’s soccer team at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), played on the team during her freshman year and, in the spring of that year, was released from the team. She sued UCB, the team’s head coach (McGuire), and the Director of Athletics (Knowlton), alleging that she turned down a scholarship to another school based on McGuire’s recruitment efforts and that McGuire failed to disclose his “abusive” coaching style and the team’s culture of intimidation and fear. After her federal suit was dismissed, Thomas sued in state court, alleging claims against McGuire and Knowlton for violation of the Unruh Act and negligence; against McGuire for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud; and against UCB under Government Code section 815.2.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, reinstating only a claim of sexual harassment (Civil Code section 51.9) against McGuire and UCB. Thomas failed to state a negligence claim against McGuire, Knowlton, or UCB. Thomas cites no authority imposing on a university a duty to protect students from harm of a non-physical nature. Nor did Thomas establish a breach of fiduciary duty. The court also rejected claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. View "Thomas v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court directing that while Plaintiff may pursue his claims against Ball State University based on its response to the COVID-19 pandemic on his on behalf, he may not pursue a class action on behalf of other students, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a university student, sued the University for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after the university switched to providing only online instruction for the 2020 spring semester, seeking to recover tuition and fees for in-person instruction and services allegedly promised by the university. Plaintiff sought to litigate his claims as a class action, but after he filed his action, Public Law No. 166-2021 was signed into law, prohibiting class action lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract and unjust enrichment claims arising from COVID-19. The trial court denied class certification based on this new law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the law was constitutional and precluded a class action in this case. View "Mellowitz v. Ball State University" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees - School Administrative Unit 8 and the Concord School District - under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) in this action alleging that Appellees exhibited deliberate indifference in their response to Appellant's allegations of sexual harassment, holding that there was no error.In granting summary judgment for Appellees, the district court found that Appellant could not show that Appellees were deliberately indifferent in their handling of Appellant's complaint. At issue was whether the District's response to Appellant's allegations of sexual harassment constituted deliberate indifference. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for Appellees, holding that genuine issues of material fact did not exist as to deliberate indifference so as to preclude summary judgment. View "M.L. v. Concord School District" on Justia Law

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gracie Ann Forth appealed the grant of summary judgement entered in favor of Defendant-Appellee Laramie County School District Number 1 (“LCSD1”) on Forth’s claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”). Forth alleged that while she was a student at Johnson Junior High School (“JJHS”), a school within LCSD1, one of her seventh-grade teachers, Joseph Meza, sexually abused her over several years beginning in 2014. Forth alleged principals at JJHS had actual notice that Meza posed a substantial risk of abuse and were deliberately indifferent to these risks, thereby violating Title IX. On LCSD1’s motion, the district court concluded LCSD1 did not have actual notice Meza posed a substantial risk of abuse before it learned that Forth had reported him to the police. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded after review, that the district court erred in finding Forth failed to establish such notice by LCSD1 during the period before LCSD1 learned of her police report, and erred in concluding LCSD1 (in lacking such notice) was not deliberately indifferent during that period. The summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the district court to address in the first instance. View "Forth v. Laramie County School District" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court reversing a decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board and finding that Respondents, educational sign language interpreters who worked with students in high school classrooms, qualified for the pay increase provided by W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) as full-time special education teachers, holding that the circuit court erred.In reversing, the circuit court concluded that the Grievance Board's decision was clearly erroneous and that Respondents qualified as full-time special education teachers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Legislature intended the 2021 amendment of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) to have retroactive effect; and (2) even in the absence of the 2021 amendment, Respondents were not "classroom teachers" under any version of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e), and therefore, they did not qualify for the salary increase provided therein. View "Kanawha County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the circuit court's decision concerning public comment at some of the board meetings held by Rapid City Area School District 51-4 (RCAS) and affirmed the court's decision not to review a determination made by a state's attorney concerning an alleged violation of a separate open meeting statute, holding that the first issue was nonjusticiable.Plaintiffs commenced this action against RCAS seeking a declaration that RCAS was acting contrary to South Dakota's open meeting law by not allowing public comment at some of its board meetings. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of RCAS and concluded that it could not review the state's attorney's determination. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the circuit court's decision concerning public comment, holding that there was no longer a live controversy regarding the interpretation of "regularly scheduled official meeting" as used in S.D. Codified Laws 1-25-1, and therefore, the issue was moot; and (2) affirmed the court's decision not to review the state's attorney's determination, holding that S.D. Codified Laws chapter 1-25 did not confer jurisdiction upon circuit courts to review the actions of a state's attorney taken under S.D. Codified Laws 1-25-6. View "SD Citizens For Liberty, Inc. v. Rapid City Area School" on Justia Law

Dr. William Morgan, Dr. Carol Zippert, Morris Hardy, Leo Branch, Sr., and Carrie Dancy, each of whom is or was a member of the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the individual-capacity claims asserted against them by Dr. Rhinnie B. Scott. Scott had been an employee of the Board for over two decades. For most of that time, she served as "Vocational Director." During the 2007-2008 school year, Scott was asked by the president of the Board at that time, Elzora Fluker, to serve as "Acting Principal" at Greene County High School ("GCHS"). During a search for a school principal in the 2010-2011 school year, Scott was tapped to serve as "Instructional Leader" for GCHS in addition to her regular function of Vocational Director. The purpose of such designation was for Dr. Scott to serve as the leader of the school until a principal was selected. At the time of that decision, the period of time of the designation was thought to be only a few weeks at most. Problems arose, however, with the selection, and Dr. Scott ended up having to serve in the position for the entire 2010-2011 school year. Scott filed a grievance with the Board in 2014 concerning her claim that she had not been compensated for her service as "Instructional Leader," which she deemed to be service as the de facto acting principal, at GCHS during the 2010-2011 school year. Additionally, Scott presented a claim that she had been "underpaid by approximately $1,664.00" each year since 2007 because, she asserted, the Board had "inadvertently reduc[ed] the annual pay for the Vocational Director." The Board denied Scott's grievance claims. Because Scott conceded that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be decided with respect to her individual-capacity claims against the Board members, the Board members were entitled to summary judgment concerning those remaining claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the Board members' petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Morgan, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal as moot and vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case arising from the Covid-19 pandemic, holding that the public interest was best served by vacatur of the court of appeals' opinion and that the State was prevented from challenging on the merits due to mootness.When the San Antonio Independent School District (ISD) required that its employees take a Covid-19 vaccine by October 15 2021, the State sued, seeking a temporary injunction arguing that the vaccine requirement violated a gubernatorial executive order. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied the ensuing appeal as moot, holding that neither the enforceability of the ISD's vaccine mandate, which was barred by Senate Bill 29, nor the enforceability of executive order GA-39, which had expired, left a live controversy between the parties. View "State v. San Antonio Independent School District" on Justia Law