Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, includes administrative procedures for resolving disputes concerning a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) for a child with a disability. “Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict” the ability of individuals to seek “remedies” under “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,” section 1415(l), “except that before the filing of a civil action under such [other federal] laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” Those subsections establish the right to a “due process hearing” followed by an “appeal” to the state education agency.Perez, who is deaf, attended Sturgis public schools and was provided with aides to translate classroom instruction into sign language. Perez alleges that the aides were either unqualified or absent from the classroom. Sturgis allegedly promoted Perez regardless of his progress. Perez believed he was on track to graduate from high school. Months before graduation, Sturgis revealed that it would not award him a diploma.Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education. Before an administrative hearing, the parties settled. Sturgis promised to provide Perez with forward-looking equitable relief, including additional schooling at the Michigan School for the Deaf. Perez then sought compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court dismissed the suit based on Sixth Circuit precedent.The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that compensatory damages are unavailable under IDEA. Although Perez’s suit is premised on the denial of a FAPE, the administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that “see[k] relief … also available under” IDEA. View "Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools" on Justia Law

M.Q., a student attending public school in Knox County, Tennessee, was diagnosed with autism. M.Q. is largely nonverbal and has developmental delays in communication skills, social/emotional behavior, and pre-vocational skills. A suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleged that M.Q. was improperly excluded from the general education classroom setting and placed him in a self-contained classroom for students with disabilities for nearly all his kindergarten academic instruction.The district court held that this placement violated the IDEA but rejected claims that also it also violated Section 504 and the ADA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that the district complied with the statutory requirements with respect to including a general education teacher on M.Q.’s individual education plan (IEP) team— albeit under their most literal interpretation. The IEP cannot stand because it placed M.Q. in a more restrictive educational setting than his disability required. View "Knox County, Tennessee v. M.Q." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were three sets of parents of schoolchildren who resided in school districts which maintained a public school for at least some grades and did not provide the opportunity for children to attend the public or independent school of their parents’ choice for all grades at the state’s expense. They raised a facial constitutional challenge to Vermont statutes that allowed school districts to choose whether to maintain a public school, permit children to attend an out-of-district public school or an independent school at the state’s expense, or some combination of both. The civil division dismissed parents’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vitale et al. v. Bellows Falls Union High School et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

Based on nominations, UC awarded “triumph cords” to graduating students who had overcome adversity. UC did not vet the nominees and unintentionally awarded a cord to a convicted sex offender. Goldblum, UC’s Title IX coordinator, told her supervisor, Marshall, that she would investigate how UC evaluated admissions applications from convicted sex offenders and address the controversy in the student newspaper. Goldblum forwarded a letter to Marshall, who ordered Goldblum not to submit anything until Marshall coordinated with other University officials. The administration had authorized Dean Petren to address the controversy. Marshall told Goldblum that Petren would issue UC’s response. Marshall also identified problems with the letter’s content. Goldblum texted Marshall that she intended to submit the letter and accept “any repercussions.” Marshall texted: “Please do not send.” Goldblum sent the letter, which was never published. Marshall reported Goldblum’s insubordination. During an investigation, UC discovered additional infractions: Goldblum repeatedly ignored Title IX complaints, criticized her colleagues in front of her staff, and missed reporting deadlines. UC allowed Goldblum to resign in lieu of termination.Goldblum sued UC for unlawful termination under Title VII and Title IX. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. UC had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons to fire Goldblum, who has not produced “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” UC’s proffered reasons. Her letter was not “protected activity.” No reasonable juror could conclude that UC’s work-performance rationale was not based in fact. View "Goldblum v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Xiong is Hmong and speaks English as a second language. He joined the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh as its Director of Affirmative Action in 2018, reporting to Kuether, Associate Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. Kuether found Xiong’s work to be of poor quality. Xiong gave Kuether a self-assessment as part of his annual performance review in which he claimed he was being paid less because he is Hmong. Kuether canceled his review meeting, declined to reschedule it, and did not share the final written performance review with him.When Xiong wanted to hire a compliance officer who had a law degree and would add diversity to the HR department, which was primarily white, Kuether questioned Xiong’s judgment. Xiong recalls Kuether saying “people of color are not a good fit.” Kuether denies saying anything like that. After multiple cross-accusations, Xiong demanded that he no longer report to Kuether. Xiong says he also raised concerns about the HR department’s hiring and promotion policies. The next day, Xiong was terminated for insubordination and poor work performance.Xiong sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the University. Because the University fired Xiong one day after his whistleblowing, a reasonable jury could infer that his termination was retaliatory. Employers often have mixed motives for adverse actions against employees. The existence of both prohibited and permissible justifications reserves the question for a jury. View "Xiong v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

Before 2017, B. lived in Illinois; he had no formal mental health diagnoses. B.’s school records reflected that he was meeting academic and behavioral expectations with no safety plan, individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2), or section 504 plan. The family moved to Tennessee. There were disciplinary referrals during the first several weeks of school. B. was admitted to a medical center. His discharge papers listed: unspecified disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. His parents and the school discussed the possibility of an IEP or section 504 plan. B. received additional disciplinary referrals and was arrested by a school resource officer for disorderly conduct. B. was suspended pending a hearing. His parents withdrew B. from school before the hearing and enrolled B. in a private school for the 2018–2019 school year.B.’s parents alleged B. had been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failure to identify and evaluate him for special education services and failing to implement an IEP. The district initiated an evaluation and determined that B. was eligible for services. An ALJ found that the district did not deny B. a FAPE and that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for B.’s private school education.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the parents’ IDEA suit. B. had no history of receiving special education services and attended the school for a very brief time. It is contested whether the school was aware of B.’s formal diagnoses. Expert witnesses testified that they did not believe a special education referral had been necessary. While the district was not as communicative or responsive as it could have been, it did not overlook “clear signs of disability” and was not negligent in failing to order testing. View "Ja. B. v. Wilson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

Objectors challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the long-range development plan for the University of California, Berkeley through the 2036-2037 academic year and the university’s immediate plan to build student housing on the site of People’s Park, a historic landmark and the well-known locus of political activity and protest.The court of appeal remanded. The court rejected arguments that the EIR was required to analyze an alternative to the long-range development plan that would limit student enrollment; that the EIR improperly restricted the geographic scope of the plan to the campus and nearby properties, excluding several more distant properties; and that the EIR failed to adequately assess and mitigate environmental impacts related to population growth and displacement of existing residents. However, the EIR failed to justify the decision not to consider alternative locations to the People’s Park project and failed to assess potential noise impacts from student parties in residential neighborhoods near campus, a longstanding problem. The court noted that its decision does not require the abandonment of the People’s Park project and that the California Environmental Quality Act allows an agency to approve a project, even if the project will cause significant environmental harm if the agency discloses the harm and makes required findings. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

In 1978, Ohio State hired Richard Strauss, M.D., as an assistant professor of medicine. From 1978-1996, Strauss treated students and student-athletes, as the team doctor for multiple sports and as a student health center physician. When Strauss voluntarily, retired in 1998, the university designated him as an Emeritus Professor although he had been “quietly” placed on leave in 1996 following multiple reports of abuse. In 2018, former student-athletes publicly accused the school of covering up Strauss’s abuse. An investigation reported that Strauss had sexually abused at least 177 students. Plaintiffs allege that the school failed to meaningfully investigate numerous complaints, hid or failed to maintain records of abuse complaints, and failed to inform students and some staff of the abuse until 2018. Plaintiffs allege that they could not have known about the school’s knowledge, and cover-up, of their abuse until the 2019 release of the report; 532 plaintiffs brought 37 separate cases. This appeal concerns students who were abused by Strauss from 1978-1998.The district court dismissed the Title IX claims as time-barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations, whether measured by a discovery rule or an occurrence rule; denied motions for recusal based on the judge’s connections and his wife’s connections to Ohio State; and dismissed Title IX retaliation claims that alleged Ohio State employees made public comments, in a retaliatory attempt to “silence” them.The Sixth Circuit vacated in part but affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the dismissal of the retaliation claims. Just when the plaintiffs should have known that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, and when they should have known about Ohio State’s role in causing their injuries are questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. View "Garrett v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law