Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two former faculty members at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), who were accused of serious misconduct. An independent law firm was hired to investigate the allegations, and the resulting report concluded that the professors had engaged in improper activities. The professors resigned their positions as part of a settlement agreement, with no findings of misconduct or admissions of liability. A former UCLA employee requested the report under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), and the professors objected, leading to a series of legal actions known as "reverse-CPRA" actions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the professors' petitions to withhold the report, concluding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the professors' privacy interests. The court found that the allegations of misconduct were serious and substantial, and that the public had a strong interest in knowing how the university handled such complaints. The professors appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the Los Angeles Times made its own CPRA request for related documents, including the investigation report and the settlement agreements. The professors sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of these documents, but the trial court denied their request. The court found that the professors were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, as the analysis for the disclosure of these documents was the same as for the investigation report. The professors appealed this decision as well.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's analysis and found no reason to delay a decision on a matter concerning public transparency. The court concluded that the professors had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim and were therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves two students, Chad Ayach and Joseph Nofal, who were expelled from the University of California Riverside (UC Riverside) following an administrative hearing. The university's Student Conduct and Academic Integrity Programs office (SCAIP) initiated an investigation into the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity (PGD) after receiving a report expressing concern for the health of a member of the fraternity's pledge class. During the investigation, it was revealed that the fraternity engaged in activities that appeared to meet UC Riverside's definitions of hazing. Ayach and Nofal, who held leadership roles in the fraternity, were subsequently expelled.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after Ayach and Nofal filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging their expulsions. They argued that the university's administrative hearings did not afford them due process because the charging documents and evidence presented used pseudonyms to identify witnesses, and they were purportedly denied the opportunity to confront or cross-examine these witnesses at the hearing. The court denied the petition, and Ayach and Nofal appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the administrative proceedings afforded Ayach and Nofal the process they were due, given the nature of the charges and their response. The court found that the hearings before the committee provided Ayach and Nofal with a full opportunity to present their defenses, which is what due process requires. The court also noted that the credibility of the witnesses was not central to the disciplinary decision, and therefore, the lack of cross-examination, lack of witness confrontation, and the use of pseudonyms in the description of witness statements did not prejudice Ayach's and Nofal's ability to present a meaningful defense. View "Ayach v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by an adult, John Doe D.Y., alleging childhood sexual assault while in elementary school. The plaintiff used fictitious names for all defendants and did not serve any at the time of filing, as required by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case was assigned to Judge Katherine A. Bacal. In October 2023, the superior court allowed the plaintiff to serve and name Doe defendants under section 340.1. In November 2023, the plaintiff named Doe 1 as Defendant and Petitioner San Diego Unified School District. The District was served with the complaint in December 2023.The District made its first appearance in January 2024, seeking an automatic extension of time to demur and filed a peremptory challenge under section 170.6 against the judge. The superior court denied the challenge as "untimely" without further explanation. The District then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that it had timely filed the challenge within 15 days of its first appearance.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, concluded that the superior court's review of the certificates under section 340.1 did not constitute a "determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits" under section 170.6(a)(2), and thus did not preclude a subsequent peremptory challenge. The court found that the superior court had erred in ruling the District's peremptory challenge as untimely. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying the District's peremptory challenge, and to enter an order granting the challenge and reassigning the case to a different judge. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

John Sandy Campbell, a Resource Specialist Teacher at Chavez Social Justice Humanitas Academy from 2015 to 2017, was dismissed from her employment with the Los Angeles Unified School District due to excessive absences and other issues. The Commission on Professional Competence upheld her dismissal, and Campbell challenged this decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The superior court, exercising its independent judgment, denied Campbell’s petition and upheld her dismissal.The proceedings to adjudicate Campbell’s dismissal were extensive, with the administrative hearing spanning 11 days. Campbell contended that the superior court erred in affirming her dismissal because the Commission miscited and applied the wrong statutory subdivisions at her dismissal hearing, and the court failed to apply “new” precedent when determining Campbell’s fitness to teach. The superior court recognized that the Commission cited incorrect subdivisions of section 44932 in its legal conclusions but noted that the Commission accurately listed, by name, the correct section 44932 causes for Campbell’s dismissal in these legal conclusions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the superior court's decision. The appellate court found that Campbell had not demonstrated error in the lower court's decision. The court also rejected Campbell's insufficiency challenge due to her failure to present all the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the court found Campbell's argument that the superior court erred by not applying a more recent case law unconvincing. The court concluded that Campbell failed to overcome the presumption that the result was correct and affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the District. View "Campbell v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves two public school districts, Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) and Grossmont Union High School District (GUHSD), located within the boundaries of the former El Cajon Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in San Diego County. In 1988, the districts entered into “pass-through” agreements with the RDA, which agreed to provide the districts a portion of its annual property tax increment revenue up to a specified dollar cap. After the RDA was dissolved in 2012, the San Diego County Auditor-Controller continued to make payments according to the agreements. The districts sought a writ of mandate to compel the Auditor-Controller to make statutorily defined pass-through payments to them after the caps in their respective agreements were reached. The Auditor-Controller responded that she would not make further pass-through payments to the districts once their respective caps were reached.The trial court denied the requested relief. The court found that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, when the RDA adopted an amendment lifting the time limit to establish loans, advances, and indebtedness, it triggered a statutory obligation to pay one or the other of two things to affected taxing entities, depending on whether the RDA had entered into a pass-through agreement with any particular entity before January 1, 1994, that required pass-through payments to that entity. If such an agreement did exist, the RDA would need to make the contractually defined pass-through payments. If such an agreement did not exist, the RDA would need to make statutorily defined pass-through payments. The court concluded that the statute does not require other payments and it would not read such a requirement into the plain language of the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and found that the districts were not entitled to receive statutorily defined pass-through payments once the payment caps in the agreements were reached. View "Cajon Valley Union School District v. Drager" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status for sexually abusing a fellow academic at an off-campus academic conference and a UCSC student whom he volunteered to walk home from an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the decision, arguing that the university lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not university students, the university misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, he did not receive notice of all charges, and the sanctions were excessive.In the lower courts, Balakrishnan filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the findings and decision of the Regents of the University of California to terminate his employment and deny him emeritus status. The trial court denied his petition, upholding the university's decision.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the court rejected Balakrishnan's contentions and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the university had the authority to discipline Balakrishnan for his off-campus behavior based on its internal policies, rules, and regulations. The court also found that Balakrishnan had received notice of the charges and that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of his conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Matthew Boermeester, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, who was expelled from USC for engaging in intimate partner violence. Post-expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied, leading to an appeal. Initially, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at the live hearing. However, the California Supreme Court granted USC’s petition for review, reversed the opinion, and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.In the remanded case, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports USC’s decision and found no denial of fair process in USC’s use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process. Boermeester claimed USC’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC’s use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The court found that the combined investigator-adjudicator process, without more, does not deny fair process and that Boermeester received considerable, adequate appellate process. Hence, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by a student, Matthew Boermeester, who was expelled from the University of Southern California (USC) for intimate partner violence. Following his expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied. He then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which initially ruled in his favor, concluding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.After the case was remanded back to the Court of Appeal, Boermeester argued that USC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC's use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that substantial evidence supported USC's decision and there was no denial of fair process in USC's use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process.The court also noted that Boermeester's claims of investigator bias were unsupported and that he was provided a substantial amount of process, including multiple layers of review. Boermeester's argument that the investigator's conduct of phone interviews contravened USC's policy was also rejected. The court concluded that there was nothing inherently unfair about USC's combined investigator-adjudicator model or the specific procedures followed in this case. Therefore, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status following an investigation into allegations of sexual abuse. The allegations involved a fellow academic, identified as Jane Doe, who was sexually harassed by Balakrishnan at an off-campus academic event, and a UCSC student that Balakrishnan harassed after an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the University's decision, arguing that the University lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not University students, that the University misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, that he did not receive notice of all charges, and that the sanctions were excessive.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Balakrishnan's petition. The appellate court rejected the professor's jurisdiction argument, stating that the University's sexual harassment policy applied to both incidents. The court also found that the professor had notice of the charges against him. Lastly, the court held that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of the professor's conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law