Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Christopher Teacher filed a complaint seeking a writ of administrative mandate against California Western School of Law (CWSL) challenging the procedures CWSL followed in expelling him from the law school. The trial court denied Teacher’s request for a writ and entered a judgment in favor of CWSL. On appeal, Teacher claimed, among other things, that CWSL failed to provide him with a fair administrative process in expelling him. The Court of Appeal concurred, finding CWSL’s disciplinary procedures expressly provided, “The student or the student’s spokesperson shall have the right to cross[-]examine witnesses.” Notwithstanding this, CWSL did not afford Teacher the opportunity to cross-examine any of the witnesses on whose statements CWSL relied in reaching its decision to expel Teacher. In light of the fact that CWSL deprived Teacher of this important right guaranteed by its own procedures, the Court reversed judgment, emphasizing that it did not reach any conclusion as to Teacher’s commission of the misconduct that CWSL alleged. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Teacher v. Cal. Western School of Law" on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district for negligence and for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA). The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment.The Court of Appeal concluded, consistent with California negligence law, that school administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee's history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's negligence causes of action.The court also concluded that, as a matter of first impression, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under CANRA must prove it was objectively reasonable for a mandated reporter to suspect abuse based on the facts the reporter actually knew, not based on facts the reporter reasonably should have discovered. In this case, plaintiff did not create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether any of the school district's employees knew of facts from which a reasonable person in a like position could suspect abuse. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's CANRA cause of action. View "Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sued a school district for negligently supervising the fourth-grade teacher who molested her in 2010-2011. Before trial, the court admitted evidence that the woman had been sexually abused by someone else in 2013, reasoning that the evidence fell outside of the scope of Evidence Code sections 1106 and 7831 which regulate the admission of “the plaintiff’s sexual conduct” and that its probative value to contradict the plaintiff’s anticipated testimony attributing all of her emotional distress to the teacher’s molestation was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.The court of appeal dissolved a stay of proceedings and directed the trial court to either assess any prejudice flowing from the empaneled jury’s exposure to the mentioning of the 2013 incident during opening statements or begin the trial with a new jury. The term “plaintiff’s sexual conduct” in sections 1106 and 783 (and Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.220) encompasses sexual abuse to which a plaintiff has been involuntarily subjected as well as the plaintiff’s voluntary sexual conduct. Section 783 requires a trial court, after following certain procedures, to engage in a section 352 analysis identical to the one the trial court undertook. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the subsequent sexual abuse was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. View "Doe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

John was a student at the University of California, Davis when fellow student Jane reported that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her in violation of University policy. John agreed they had sex but said Jane consented. Following an investigation, UC Davis found that on the night the two had sex, Jane was incapacitated due to alcohol such that she was unable to consent and that, given her condition, a reasonable person should have known she was unable to consent. John was suspended from all UC campuses for two years.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the suspension. The court rejected John’s claim that he was denied a fair process in UC Davis’s investigation and adjudication because he was denied a live hearing and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses before a fact-finder who was not also the investigator. In university disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct, when the sanction is severe and credibility is central to the adjudication, the university must provide cross-examination at a live hearing before a neutral adjudicator who was not also the investigator. In this case, however, credibility was not central. John’s own account provided substantial evidence of the policy violation. The investigation was thorough, there is no evidence of investigator bias, and John was provided many opportunities to state his version of events and to review and respond to the evidence. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

John Doe was a senior at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), when fellow student Jane Roe reported that he engaged in dating violence against her in violation of University of California policy. John admitted that, after arguing with Jane for hours, he “grabbed her, screamed in her face and shook her” and “eventually dragged her out of the bed to the front door” of his home. Following an investigation, the university found John violated UC policy, and he was suspended for three years, resulting in a three-year hold of his degree and diploma.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of John’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside the disciplinary decision and suspension. John’s written statement alone provided sufficient evidence to establish he engaged in dating violence, including that his conduct caused bodily injury. The court rejected John’s claims he was denied a fair process because the fact finder did not observe the witnesses and John was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, UCSB withheld evidence from him during its investigation, and the review committee failed to follow its own policy requiring an independent review of the disciplinary decision. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment resolving a dispute with the school district concerning the "facilities costs" for which the district may properly charge the charter school.The court concluded that a district must exclude from the facilities costs it charges a charter school all costs of both operations and ongoing maintenance if the charter school pays those costs for its own premises. The court explained that, while the text of the regulations is ambiguous and, in part, self-contradictory, the regulatory history and the statutory scheme, as well as the common understanding of all parties prior to the trial court’s unsolicited ruling, make clear that the state board did not intend such a result. In this case, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, section 11969.7 requires a district to exclude plant maintenance and operations costs from its facilities costs in calculating the pro rata share of a charter school that pays for its own operations and maintenance. Furthermore, section 11969.7 requires a district to exclude from facilities costs any contributions to its ongoing and major maintenance (OMM) account that are ultimately disbursed to pay costs of a type paid by the charter school. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mt. Diablo Unified School District v. Clayton Valley Charter High School" on Justia Law

X.M., a student at Maple Elementary School, sued Hesperia Unified School District (HUSD), claiming he was sexually assaulted on campus by one of their employees. He sought treble damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, alleging his assault resulted from HUSD’s cover up of a prior sexual assault by the same employee. The trial court granted the school district’s motion to strike the increased damages request on the ground that treble damages under section 340.1 were primarily punitive and therefore barred by Government Code section 818. X.M. filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial court’s order and conclude section 818’s immunity did not apply to the treble damages provision at issue here. He argued the primary purpose of the provision is to compensate victims of childhood sexual assault for the additional harm caused by discovering their abuse could have been prevented if those entrusted with their care had responded differently to prior sexual assaults on their watch. In the alternative, he argues the provision’s primary purpose is to incentivize victims to come forward and file lawsuits. The Court concluded the primary purpose of section 340.1’s treble damages provision was punitive because it was designed to deter future cover ups by punishing past ones. "[T]he economic and noneconomic damages available under general tort principles are already designed to make childhood sexual assault victims whole ... It is the rare treble damages provision that isn’t primarily designed to punish and deter misconduct, and nothing in section 340.1 or its legislative history convinces us the Legislature intended the increased award to be more compensatory (or incentivizing) than deterrent." Further, the Court held that section 818’s immunity applied when the defendant was a public agency like HUSD. The Court therefore denied the petition. View "X.M. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law