Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

John Sandy Campbell, a Resource Specialist Teacher at Chavez Social Justice Humanitas Academy from 2015 to 2017, was dismissed from her employment with the Los Angeles Unified School District due to excessive absences and other issues. The Commission on Professional Competence upheld her dismissal, and Campbell challenged this decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The superior court, exercising its independent judgment, denied Campbell’s petition and upheld her dismissal.The proceedings to adjudicate Campbell’s dismissal were extensive, with the administrative hearing spanning 11 days. Campbell contended that the superior court erred in affirming her dismissal because the Commission miscited and applied the wrong statutory subdivisions at her dismissal hearing, and the court failed to apply “new” precedent when determining Campbell’s fitness to teach. The superior court recognized that the Commission cited incorrect subdivisions of section 44932 in its legal conclusions but noted that the Commission accurately listed, by name, the correct section 44932 causes for Campbell’s dismissal in these legal conclusions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the superior court's decision. The appellate court found that Campbell had not demonstrated error in the lower court's decision. The court also rejected Campbell's insufficiency challenge due to her failure to present all the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the court found Campbell's argument that the superior court erred by not applying a more recent case law unconvincing. The court concluded that Campbell failed to overcome the presumption that the result was correct and affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the District. View "Campbell v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of disabled students who sued the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Washington State. The students claimed that the state's practice of discontinuing special education services at the end of the school year in which a student turns 21 violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA generally requires states to provide special education to disabled students until their 22nd birthday, but allows states to discontinue services as early as age 18 if providing special education to older students would be inconsistent with state law or practice. The students argued that because Washington offers certain adult-education programs to 21-year-olds, it should also be required to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the students' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the students had not shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court also concluded that the students were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the adult-education programs in Washington charged a tuition fee, and therefore did not constitute "free public education."The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the students had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim because the availability of the adult-education programs in Washington triggered an obligation under the IDEA to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The court also found that the students would suffer irreparable harm from the denial of access to special education. The court concluded that the balance of hardships tipped in the students' favor and that an injunction would be in the public interest. View "N. D. V. REYKDAL" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the question of whether a board of cooperative education services (BOCES) can locate a school within the geographic boundaries of a nonmember school district without the district's consent. The petitioner, Education reEnvisioned BOCES (ERBOCES), had entered into an agreement with the Colorado Literacy and Learning Center’s School for Dyslexic Learners (CLLC) to operate a school within the boundaries of respondent Colorado Springs School District 11 (District 11), which is not a member of ERBOCES. Neither ERBOCES nor CLLC sought or obtained District 11’s permission to do so.The district court initially ruled in favor of ERBOCES and CLLC, interpreting the language of section 22-5-111(2) of the Boards of Cooperative Services Act of 1965 (the BOCES Act) to permit ERBOCES to operate a school at any appropriate location, whether inside or outside of a district providing funding for the facilities. District 11 appealed this decision.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that section 22-5-111(2) does not allow a BOCES to open and operate schools within the geographic boundaries of nonmember school districts that do not consent. The court of appeals found that the district court’s interpretation did not give effect to the qualifying language 'within or without a school district providing the money for the facilities.' The court of appeals also noted that the BOCES Act’s statutory framework did not grant a BOCES unrestricted extraterritoriality.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of section 22-5-111(2), when read in context, does not permit a BOCES to locate a contract school within a nonmember school district without that district’s consent. The court did not need to decide whether article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which pertains to local control of education, prohibits a BOCES from doing so. View "Education reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colorado Springs School District 11" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and the Cato Institute (Plaintiffs) who sued the U.S. Department of Education and its officials (Defendants) over a one-time account adjustment announced by the Department. The adjustment was intended to count months or years that student-loan borrowers spent in excessive forbearance status towards debt forgiveness. The Plaintiffs, being nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations and qualified public service employers under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, argued that this adjustment would harm their ability to recruit and retain employees.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where the court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact, a requirement for establishing standing. The court rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments that they had competitor standing and that they were deprived of a procedural right. The court found that the Plaintiffs' claims were speculative and unsupported by specific facts. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Mackinac Center for Public Policy v. Cardona" on Justia Law

The case involves two public school districts, Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) and Grossmont Union High School District (GUHSD), located within the boundaries of the former El Cajon Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in San Diego County. In 1988, the districts entered into “pass-through” agreements with the RDA, which agreed to provide the districts a portion of its annual property tax increment revenue up to a specified dollar cap. After the RDA was dissolved in 2012, the San Diego County Auditor-Controller continued to make payments according to the agreements. The districts sought a writ of mandate to compel the Auditor-Controller to make statutorily defined pass-through payments to them after the caps in their respective agreements were reached. The Auditor-Controller responded that she would not make further pass-through payments to the districts once their respective caps were reached.The trial court denied the requested relief. The court found that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, when the RDA adopted an amendment lifting the time limit to establish loans, advances, and indebtedness, it triggered a statutory obligation to pay one or the other of two things to affected taxing entities, depending on whether the RDA had entered into a pass-through agreement with any particular entity before January 1, 1994, that required pass-through payments to that entity. If such an agreement did exist, the RDA would need to make the contractually defined pass-through payments. If such an agreement did not exist, the RDA would need to make statutorily defined pass-through payments. The court concluded that the statute does not require other payments and it would not read such a requirement into the plain language of the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and found that the districts were not entitled to receive statutorily defined pass-through payments once the payment caps in the agreements were reached. View "Cajon Valley Union School District v. Drager" on Justia Law

A group of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, challenged the local school board's decision to include LGBTQ-inclusive books in the English Language Arts curriculum without providing parents notice or the option to opt their children out of exposure to these books. The parents, who held various religious beliefs, argued that the board's decision violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have required the board to provide notice and an opt-out option. The parents appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the parents had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court found that the parents had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the board's decision coerced them or their children to act or believe contrary to their religious faith. The court also found that the parents had not shown that their due process rights were likely to be violated. The court noted that the parents still had the right to instruct their children on their religious beliefs and to discuss the topics raised in the books with their children. View "Mahmoud v. McKnight" on Justia Law

The case involves Charles and Lisa Kass, parents of Brody Kass, who sued the Western Dubuque Community School District (the District) alleging that the District violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and other statutes when it developed Brody’s individualized education program (IEP) for the 2020–21 school year. Brody has epilepsy, autism, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, severe vision impairment, and intellectual disabilities. Despite Brody having enough credits to graduate, his IEP Team determined he had unmet transitional needs and should remain in school. The District proposed that Brody would not enroll in general education courses in the traditional classroom setting. Instead, Brody would spend a half-day focusing on developing his reading and math skills through individualized and practical training. The Kasses objected to the proposed IEP and filed a complaint with the Iowa Department of Education.The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the District on all claims, concluding the District did not violate Brody’s right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the 2018–19 or 2019–20 school years. The ALJ also determined neither the draft IEP nor its development violated any procedural or substantive provisions of the IDEA. The Kasses brought this action in federal district court, alleging violations of the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision on the IDEA claims and dismissed the other claims as subsumed under the IDEA claims.The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that compensatory education may be available beyond a student’s twenty-first birthday. The court also concluded that the District complied with the IDEA’s procedural requirements in drafting the May 2020 IEP. The court found that the May 2020 IEP’s specific and measurable goals were reasonably calculated to enable Brody to progress in light of his circumstances, and thus met the IDEA’s requirements. View "Kass v. Western Dubuque Community School District" on Justia Law

Jason Doherty, a former student at Purchase College, State University of New York, who has Asperger Syndrome, sued several administrators of the college under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for declaratory and injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. The lawsuit was initiated after the college issued no-contact orders against Doherty at the request of three other students during his freshman orientation in August 2017.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Doherty's claims, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief since they were moot, and that Doherty failed to state a claim for damages because emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA. The district court based its decision on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., which held that emotional distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act, a law that Title II of the ADA explicitly tracks.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Doherty's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot given that the no-contact orders were not disciplinary actions, were not part of his permanent record, and expired upon his graduation. The court also agreed that emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA, which explicitly tracks the remedies, procedures, and rights available under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the court ruled that Doherty had forfeited any claims for other damages. View "Doherty v. Bice" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of employees and students at the University of Colorado Anschutz Campus who challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccine mandate. The plaintiffs, identified as Jane Does 1-11 and John Does 1, 3-7, argued that the university's policies regarding religious exemptions from the vaccine mandate violated their First Amendment rights.The university initially allowed individuals to attest to their exemption based on religious beliefs using a simple form. However, in August 2021, the university implemented a new policy that required individuals seeking a religious exemption to provide additional information about their religious beliefs and to demonstrate that their religion opposes all immunizations. The university denied all of the plaintiffs' requests for religious exemptions under this policy and enforced the vaccine mandate against them.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction against the university's policies. The district court denied their motion, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the university's policies were not neutral or generally applicable and were likely motivated by religious animus. The court held that the policies violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and were subject to strict scrutiny, which they did not survive. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and that they were entitled to a preliminary injunction against the university's policies. View "Doe v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado" on Justia Law

John Doe sued the University of Denver (DU) after he was expelled for allegedly engaging in nonconsensual sexual contact with another student, Jane Roe. Doe claimed that DU breached its contract with him by failing to conduct a "thorough, impartial and fair" investigation into Roe's accusation, as promised in DU's Office of Equal Opportunity Procedures (OEO Procedures). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DU, and Doe appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower courts that the promise in DU's OEO Procedures of a "thorough, impartial and fair" investigation, when considered with the specific investigation requirements listed in those procedures, is enforceable under contract law. The court also agreed that the record does not permit the entry of summary judgment for DU on Doe’s general contract claim or on Doe’s contract claim premised on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the court disagreed with the lower courts on Doe’s tort claim, holding that DU does not owe its students an extra-contractual duty to exercise reasonable care in adopting and implementing fair procedures related to the investigation and adjudication of sexual-misconduct claims. Therefore, DU is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Doe’s tort claim. View "University of Denver v. Doe" on Justia Law