Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs in consolidated cases are the parents of disabled children, challenging the procedural and substantive adequacy of Individualized Education Plans that the New York City Department of Education, developed for their children pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 8 Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. They also sought reimbursement of funds spent on private-school tuition for their children. In one case, the Second Circuit held that the district court properly agreed with the determinations of the hearing officer who initially considered the matter and properly rejected the subsequent determinations of the state review officer. In the other case, the Second Circuit found that the magistrate judge, who recommended granting the Department's motion for summary judgment, overstated the extent to which federal courts must defer to the findings of state administrative officers, but that the Department's motion was properly granted. View "M.H. v. NY City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Medlock was a student at Indiana University, living in a single room in a dormitory. As part of a routine “health and safety inspection,” two University resident assistants searched Medlock’s dormitory room for safety hazards. Medlock was not present at the time. When the resident assistants entered the room, they discovered marijuana in plain sight, and notified University police, who later entered Medlock’s room and seized the drugs. The Dean summarily suspended Medlock for one year. After exhausting internal appeals, Medlock sought a preliminary injunction, citing violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the suspension had expired. View "Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment." View "Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7" on Justia Law

After a school district (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, a union (UTLA) claimed that the District failed to comply with collective bargaining agreement provisions (CBPs) concerning charter school conversion. UTLA petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the collective bargaining provisions (CBPs) regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the Education Code, and therefore, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce CBPs between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the CBPs at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code; and (2) because UTLA had not identified with sufficient specificity which CBPs the District allegedly violated, the case was remanded for identification of those specific provisions and to address whether the provisions conflicted with the Education Code. View "United Teachers of L.A. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Ekstrand taught kindergarten from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, she was reassigned to teach a first-grade class at her own request. She was relocated to a classroom with no exterior windows in a busy, loud area of the school. Ekstrand repeatedly requested a change of classroom. The principal worked to make the classroom more hospitable, but denied requests to switch rooms. After the school year began, Ekstrand experienced symptoms of seasonal affective disorder, a form of depression. Both her psychologist and her primary care physician recommended a leave of absence. Her initial leave was only three months, but the following winter, her doctor advised that Ekstrand would be unable to return to teach for the remainder of the 2005-06 term. The leave of absence was later extended to include the 2006-07 term. The district court granted the district summary judgment, but on remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ekstrand under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that Ekstrand was a qualified individual with a disability and that the school district knew of that disability, but failed to accommodate her with a new classroom. View "Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset" on Justia Law

When Appellant Amanda Tatro was a junior in the mortuary science program at the University of Minnesota, she posted statements on Facebook which she described as "satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience." Following a hearing, the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (CCSB) found Tatro had violated the student conduct code and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human cadavers, which prohibited "blogging" about cadaver dissection. CCSB imposed sanctions, including a failing grade for an anatomy laboratory course. The University Provost affirmed the sanctions. Tatro appealed, arguing that the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech. The court of appeals upheld the disciplinary sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the University did not violate the free speech rights of Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated academic program rules where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards. View "Tatro v. Univ. of Minn." on Justia Law

This case was a public-records action in which relator, ESPN, Inc., sought certain records from respondent, Ohio State University. Ohio State rejected ESPN's requests because the university deemed them to be "overly broad per Ohio's public record laws." EPSN then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to provide access to the requested records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ for limited records that should have been disclosed because they were not exempt from disclosure based on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); but (2) denied the writ for the rest of the records because Ohio State established that FERPA and the attorney-client privilege prohibited the disclosure of the requested records. View "State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Relator brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that appellees defrauded the United States Department of Education by knowingly making fraudulent claims by engaging in various non-economic transactions to inflate their loan portfolios eligible for Special Allowance Payments (SAP), a federal student loan interest subsidy. The district court granted appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that they were "state agencies" and therefore not subject to suit under the FCA as interpreted in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens. Because the district court did not employ the arm-of-the-state analysis in determining whether each of the appellees was a state agency subject to suit under the FCA, the court vacated its judgment and remanded the case for the court to apply this analysis in the first instance. View "US ex rel. Jon H. Oberg v. Kentucky Higher Ed., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were high school football players that earned scholarships to play for National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I football programs. Both suffered career-ending football injuries at college. Their athletic scholarships were good for one year. When injuries prevented them from playing football, their scholarships were not renewed. Plaintiffs challenge two NCAA regulations as having an anticompetitive effect, in violation of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 1: the cap on the number of scholarships given per team and the prohibition of multi-year scholarships. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege a relevant commercial market on which NCAA Bylaws had an anticompetitive effect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not clear whether plaintiffs believed that the Bylaws affect an overall market for degrees, which would impact scholarship athletes and non-athletes alike, or some market that only concerns athletes attempting to obtain education in exchange for athletic services. Plaintiffs claimed that they alleged that there was no practical alternative for students wishing to pursue an education in exchange for playing ability, but the complaint explained the lack of practical alternatives for colleges wanting to field teams outside of the NCAA framework, not the lack of alternatives for student-athletes. View "Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n" on Justia Law

Public school students filed complaints with the SDHR, claiming that their respective school districts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" under Article 15 of the Executive Law, Executive Law 290, et seq. At issue on these appeals was whether a public school district was an "education corporation or association" as contemplated by Executive Law 296(4). The court concluded that it was not, and therefore, SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate complaints made against public school districts under that provision. View "Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights" on Justia Law