Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Sinan Cingilli, a student at the University of Minnesota, and TCA, a non-profit corporation that provided information about the nation of Turkey and Turkish-Americans, appealed the district court's dismissal of their respective First Amendment claims and TCA's state-law defamation claim for failure to state a claim. Defendant Professor Chaouat directed the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the university. The Center's website displayed a list of "Unreliable Websites" which included websites that disputed the factuality of the Nazi genocide of Jews during World War II. The first "Unreliable Website" on the list was that of TCA. The court held that, because Cingilli failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate an objectively reasonable chilling effect, he had not established standing to pursue a First Amendment claim under these circumstances; TCA had pled a cognizable injury and had standing to pursue its First Amendment claim; in light of the absence of the allegations that the challenged actions posed obstacle to students' access to the materials on TCA's website or made materials substantially unavailable at the university, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of TCA's First Amendment claim was affirmed; and because the challenged statements at issue either were true or could not reasonably be interpreted as stating facts, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of TCA's defamation claim was also affirmed. View "Turkish Coalition of America, et al. v. Bruininks, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of Troup's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681. The facts of this case stemmed from circumstances surrounding the sexual molestation of a 12-year-old boy by his 45-year-old seventh grade homeroom teacher. The court held that the district court combined Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., workplace discrimination standards with Title IX teacher-on-student harassment standards when it articulated plaintiff's burden. However, the district court's reliance on the wrong standard did not necessarily mandate that the court must now reverse its decision and remand the case. After considering the factual record and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the court found that the information of which the school principal had knowledge was not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had actual notice sufficient to alert him to the possibility of sexual harassment of the 12-year-old by his teacher. Accordingly, although for different reasons than the district court, the court granted summary judgment. View "J.F.K., et al. v. Troup County Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

T.B.'s parents, on behalf of their autistic child, appealed the district court's finding that the school district did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., by failing to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to T.B., making the parents ineligible for reimbursement for the costs of T.B.'s home-based program. Given the parents' decision to ultimately settle the issue of the adequacy of the proposed individualized education program (IEP), the court questioned whether they could claim, much less successfully show, that the school district failed to provide a FAPE to T.B. Nonetheless, based on the record, the court could not say that T.B.'s home-based program was "reasonably calculated to enable [him] to receive educational benefits." The program was therefore not "proper" within the meaning of the IDEA and the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "T.B., et al. v. St. Joseph School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants. View "Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, students or parents of students who attended Iowa public schools, filed a petition contending that Iowa's educational system was inadequate and urging the courts to impose additional public school standards, stating that such action was both constitutionally and statutorily required. Plaintiffs named as defendants the State, Governor, Department of Education, and Director of the Department. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' petition, concluding (1) Plaintiffs had stated claims for relief under the equal protection and due process clauses, but their constitutional claims presented a nonjusticiable political question; and (2) their statutory claim under Iowa Code 256.37 failed because that provision did not afford a private right of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' challenges were properly directed to Plaintiffs' elected representatives, rather than the courts; but (2) Plaintiffs did not state claims for relief under the Iowa Constitution or section 256.37. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department. View "Petit, et al. v. US Dept. of Education, et al." on Justia Law

The Pascagoula School District (which contains a Chevron crude oil refinery and a Gulf liquified natural gas terminal) brought suit, seeking a declaration that a new law that mandated that revenue the District collected from ad valorem taxes levied on liquified natural gas terminals and crude oil refineries be distributed to all school districts in the county where the terminals and refineries were located was unconstitutional and requesting injunctive relief. All parties filed for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the law was constitutional, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision. Because the Supreme Court found the contested statute violated the constitutional mandate that a school district's taxes be used to maintain "its schools," it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pascagoula School District v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Dass, born in India, was first hired as a teacher in 1991. In 2002, Dass was hired at Casals. Donaldson was the principal and rated Dass's overall performance through 2005 as excellent, but never recommended Dass for tenure based on concern that Dass was not a strong disciplinarian. Donaldson retired in 2005 and non-renewed Dass for the 2005-2006 school year. Dass was rehired for the year, but because of an error, was displaced after that school year when Casals lost teaching positions due to budget constraints. Dass won a grievance and was reinstated. Dass received medical leave in December 2006. She did not return the rest of the school year. In 2007, the principal recommended non-renewal. The Board accepted the recommendation. Dass filed suit, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101.; and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assignment to teach seventh grade was not an adverse employment action and there was no evidence of discrimination based on national origin. View "Dass v. Chicago Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Appellants, who are current and former certified educators employed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) in the Palmetto Unified School District (PUSD), collectively appealed the Administrative Law Court's (ALC's) order that affirmed the State Employee Grievance Committee's decision denying their grievances regarding the SCDC's Reduction-in-Force (RIF) implemented in 2003. On appeal, Appellants contended the ALC erred in failing to enforce: (1) the plain language of the RIF policy; (2) the controlling legislation applicable to the PUSD and the RIF policy; (3) Appellants' constitutional rights with respect to employment; and (4) Appellants' rights as "covered employees" with respect to the RIF policy. Based on these alleged errors, Appellants asserted they were entitled to reinstatement to employment as well as back pay and benefits. Because the RIF was deemed "procedurally correct," the Supreme Court concluded the ALC correctly affirmed the Committee's decision regarding the inclusion of the PUSD in the RIF. However the Court concluded that the SCDC violated statutory law in precluding Appellants from exercising their priority right to recall as to the positions vacated by retirees. Because the "Retirement Opportunity" offered by the SCDC required a fifteen-day break in service before rehiring, the Court found that "window" constituted a vacancy for which Appellants should have been offered the opportunity for employment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the Committee to determine the appropriate relief. View "Bell v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Antonio Alaniz, Jr., appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to justify the search of his person and the exception to the probable cause requirement for warrantless searches by school officials did not apply. Troy Vanyo was a police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department and was assigned to work as a school resource officer at a high school in Grand Forks. Vanyo had received information about possible drug use involving students in an area approximately a block and a half from the high school. One of the students was later identified as Defendant. The students walked to a town square area and Vanyo followed in his patrol car. Vanyo testified the students were seated when they saw him, stood up, and quickly walked toward a stage area in the town square. Later, Vanyo observed Defendant waiting to talk to the attendance secretary and he informed the school principal that Defendant was the other individual he observed in the town square and suspected was involved in drug activity. The principal took Defendant into a detention room and Vanyo followed them. Vanyo testified the principal questioned Defendant, Vanyo testified he told Defendant something like "if you have anything on you, you need to lay it on the table now." Defendant emptied his pockets, which contained a glass pipe and synthetic marijuana. In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant argued the police failed to advise him of his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), there was not probable cause justifying the search of his person, and the exception to the probable cause requirement for searches by school officials did not apply. The district court denied the motion, ruling the reasonableness standard for searches by school officials applied and the search was reasonable. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Defendant's age, gender, and nature of the suspicion. View "North Dakota v. Alaniz" on Justia Law