Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d). View "Emeldi v. University of Oregon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maria Rosales filed this wrongful death action against LaPorte Community School Corporation after her son choked to death on food while eating lunch at his elementary school. The jury returned a $5 million verdict for Plaintiff, and judgment was entered in the sum of $500,000, the maximum amount then permitted under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The School Corporation appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions. The Supreme Court granted transfer and agreed that the giving of the instruction, which could have reasonably been interpreted and applied by the jury in a way that substantially misstated Plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to establishing negligence on the part of the School Corporation, required reversal, but the error created by the instruction related only to the issue of liability and did not affect the jury's assessment of damages. Remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability only. View " LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Rosales " on Justia Law

Dwight Trumble owned property in Sarpy County and paid two levies for the support of school districts in the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties (Learning Community). Trumble subsequently brought suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1735 against the school districts in the Learning Community, claiming the levies were unconstitutional. The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a suit to recover unconstitutional taxes cannot be brought under section 77-1735; (2) Trumble filed suit outside the tax year in which the challenged taxes were levied or assessed, so the district court did not have jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,149; and (3) since the district court lacked jurisdiction, it properly dismissed the action. View "Trumble v. Sarpy County Board" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Carol Perdue, individually and as next friend and guardian of her daughter, Anna; William D. Motlow, Jr.; and Shane Sears (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the objectors"), all of whom were objecting class members in class-action litigation related to the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition ("PACT") Trust Fund a/k/a The Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Tuition Trust Fund, appealed the trial court's judgment that approved a class-action settlement concluding the litigation. The objectors largely complained that as contributors or beneficiaries of the PACT fund, it was being mismanaged and underfunded to their detriment. While the case was pending, the Alabama Legislature changed the laws directly impacting the management and funding of the PACT program. The PACT Board responded to the change in the law by moving to dismiss the objectors' suit as moot. The issues on appeal before the Supreme Court involved terms of the settlement agreement: the objectors contended that the trial court permitted language in the agreement that ran afoul of the changed laws and disregarded objections of the complaining members of the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case: "[t]he scope of the objections in the trial court was not the narrow question whether the order should bind only the objectors, but, on the contrary, the issue presented [was] the broader question whether the trial court's judgment approving the settlement agreement [was] due to be affirmed. . . . the objectors are allowed to appeal that aspect of the trial court's order that affects them - 'the [circuit court's] decision to disregard [their] objections.' If the judgment [was] affirmed, the settlement agreement affects them in that it binds them, as members of the class, to terms of a settlement agreement inconsistent with 16-33C-19." View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.View "Hannemann v. S. Door Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Jordan Danielle King-Willmann filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Webster Groves school district to enroll her in the district pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131.2. The school district contested certain material facts alleged by King-Willmann and asserted several defenses, including a claimed violation of Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 21, the Hancock amendment. The school district requested an evidentiary hearing, which the trial court did not hold. The court issued the writ granting King-Willmann relief. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded because contested issues of fact existed. On remand, the Court instructed the trial court not to consider the Hancock amendment claim as the school district had no standing to bring such a claim. View "King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC, with Martha Altman, Eric Mote, and John Davis (collectively, Students), filed a complaint against the University of Colorado's Board of Regents alleging that the Board's Weapons Control Policy 14-I (which prohibits the carrying of handguns on campus by all persons but certified law enforcement personnel) violates the Colorado Concealed Carry Act (CCA) and the Colorado Constitution's right to bear arms. The Board filed a motion to dismiss which the district court granted. The Students appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Students stated a claim for relief because the CCA expressly applied to "all areas of the state." The court further concluded that the Students had stated a claim for relief under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, which affords individuals the right to bear arms in self-defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the CCA's comprehensive statewide purpose, broad language, and narrow exclusions show that the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of Regents of its authority to regulate concealed handgun possession on campus. Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that, by alleging the Policy violated the CCA, the Students stated a claim for relief. View "Regents of the University of Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus" on Justia Law

Su, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, was accepted by the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) after attending high school in Minnesota. At the time Su matriculated at VCU, he was classified as an out-of-state student for tuition purposes. Su subsequently sought to change his classification to in-state status and filed an application for in-state tuition benefits. VCU's residency appeals officer denied Su's application, finding that federal law prohibited an F-1 visa holder to establish Virginia domicile. VCU's residency appeals committee denied Su's appeal. The circuit court reversed, holding (1) VCU was incorrect in asserting that Su had no domicile and that he was an V-1 visa holder, rather than a permanent resident, when he matriculated; and (2) Su had established that he was domiciled in Virginia and had abandoned any previous domicile for at least one year prior o the date of entitlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in reversing VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-state tuition benefits and that VCU's decision could not reasonably be said to be contrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law. View "Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Su" on Justia Law

This case arose from two civil investigative demands (CIDs) issued to the University of Virginia and the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (collectively, UVA) by the attorney general, pursuant to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA). The CIDs sought information relating to the research of a climate scientist that had taught at UVA, received a series of grants to fund his research, and, with other climate scientists, had allegedly falsified data to indicate an upturn in the earth's surface temperatures due to the use of fossil fuels. UVA petitioned the circuit court to set aside the CIDs, arguing that the attorney general had no statutory authority to serve CIDs upon agencies of the Commonwealth and that the CIDs were defective because they failed to state the nature of the conduct alleged. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the CIDs, without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, but, unlike the circuit court, set aside the CIDs with prejudice, holding that the University of Virginia, as an agency of the Commonwealth, did not constitute a "person" under the FATA and therefore could not be the proper subject of a CID. View "Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law