Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist. & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher, filed this action against defendants, a superintendent and principal, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and whether plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that plaintiff failed to present any precedent, and the court was aware of none, to suggest that a reasonable principal and superintendent armed with the knowledge they possessed, to include the unsatisfactory performance reviews, would know they could not recommend and/or adopt a recommendation to terminate plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and the court need not address the res judicata issue. View "Sherrod v. Johnson; Sherrod v. Crutchfield" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff Helen Barton was injured while watching a high school football game in Barrow when a player ran out of bounds during a play and collided with her, breaking her leg. Plaintiff sued the North Slope Borough School District, alleging in part that the football field had not been designed or built with a proper "run-off" area along the sidelines and that spectators had improperly been allowed to stand in the run-off area during the game. Plaintiff retained expert landscape architect Juliet Vong who proposed to testify that she used a particular manual in designing sports fields "to help ensure the appropriate dimensions and design criteria are met for a given sport and level of play." The School District filed a motion in limine to exclude Vong's testimony because it did not provide an admissible expert opinion. The superior court agreed with the District and excluded Vong's report and testimony. At a jury trial in August 2010, the District was found not negligent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court should not have excluded Vong's testimony and that doing so was prejudicial to Plaintiff's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that although it was error to exclude Vong’s testimony, the error was harmless. View "Barton v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Hosanna-Tabor, a member congregation of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, operated a small school in Michigan offering a "Christian-centered education" to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. The Synod classified its school teachers into two categories: "called" and "lay." "Called" teachers, among other things, were regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible to be called from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements. "Lay" or "contract" teachers, by contrast, were not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. "Called" teacher, Cheryl Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened. Invoking what was known as the "ministerial exception," Hosanna-Tabor argued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. The Court held that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment barred suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment required dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer. View "Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC" on Justia Law

In an underlying civil case, Appellant filed a notice of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the case without prejudice. Minutes later, a deputy clerk responsible for processing the queue of electronically transmitted documents clicked on the court of common pleas judge's journal entry granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents, which had been transmitted earlier that day. The judge subsequently struck Appellant's notice of dismissal and held that the summary judgment was the final judgment on the merits of the case. Appellant requested a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in denying Appellant's request for (1) a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding on the merits of the underlying case where the judge lacked jurisdiction because, pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 58(A), the entry of summary judgment was not effective until after Appellant's notice of dismissal; and (2) a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to vacate her entry striking the notice of dismissal and her entry of summary judgment in the underlying case and to compel the judge to reinstate her notice of dismissal. View "State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this proceeding in the district court alleging that the Board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., by failing to reasonably accommodate her hearing disability. Plaintiff's complaint sought back pay, future pay, compensatory damages of $1,000,000, punitive damages of $1,000,000, plus attorney's fees and costs. The Board subsequently appealed the district court's partial rejection of the Board's assertion of immunity. The court held that the district court properly adhered to the Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert decision in ruling that the immunity provision effected a waiver of the Board's Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims of $100,000 or less. View "Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's County Public Sch." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the overall adequacy of state funding for K-12 education under the Washington State Constitution. "The legislature must develop a basic education program geared toward delivering the constitutionally required education, and it must fully fund that program through regular and dependable tax sources." The Court found that the State failed to meet its duty under the constitution by consistently providing school districts with a level of resources that fell short of the actual costs of the basic education program. The legislature enacted reforms to remedy the deficiencies in the funding system, and the Court deferred to the legislature's chosen means of discharging its duty. However, the Court retained jurisdiction over the case to help ensure progress in the State's plan to fully implement education reforms by 2018. The Court directed the parties to provide further briefing to the Court addressing the preferred method for retaining jurisdiction. View "McCleary v. Washington" on Justia Law

This case involved a longstanding dispute over who bore the burden of paying the educational costs for the children of St. Basil, a child car institution located within the boundaries of the school district and housed primarily Greek Orthodox children whose parents were unable to care for them due to certain circumstances. The court concluded that the Education Law specified that children living in such institutions were not deemed residents of the school district in which the institution was located purely by reason of their presence in the institution; the issuance of a license to operate a child care institution did not change the residence of the children living there; and there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended the local school district to bear the entire financial burden for those children living in a child care institution. Therefore, the court held that a school district was not obligated to provide a tuition-free education to those children determined to be nonresidents of the school district. View "Board of Educ. of the Garrison Union Free School Dist. v Greek Archdiocese Inst. of St. Basil" on Justia Law

The Association sought extraordinary writ relief from the court, arguing that two measures intended to stabilize school funding by reducing or eliminating the diversion of property tax revenues from school districts to the state's community redevelopment agencies, was unconstitutional. At issue was whether the state Constitution (1) redevelopment agencies, once created and engaged in redevelopment plans, have a protected right to exist that immunized them from statutory dissolution by the Legislature; and (2) redevelopment agencies and their sponsoring communities have a protected right not to make payments to various funds benefiting schools and special districts as a condition of continued operation. Answering the first question "no" and the second "yes," the court largely upheld Assembly Bill 1X 26 and invalidated Assembly Bill 1X27. The court held that Assembly Bill 1X 26, the dissolution measure, was a proper exercise of the legislative power vested in the Legislature by the state Constitution. The court held that Assembly Bill 1X 27, the measure conditioning further redevelopment agency operations on additional payments by an agency's community sponsors to state funds benefits schools and special districts, was invalid. View "Cal. Redevelopment Assoc., et al. v. Matosantos, et al." on Justia Law