Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. View "Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. CA Dept. of Educ., et al" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals regarding continuing school desegregation efforts in the Little Rock, Arkansas area, NLRSD and PCSSD each appealed the district court's denial of their petitions for a declaration of unitary status. In addition, NLRSD and PCSSD joined with LRSD, several local teachers' unions, and a union member in appealing the district court's decision to terminate certain funding obligations of the State arising from a previous settlement agreement in this case. The court reversed the denial of unitary status for NLRSD in the area of staff recruitment where NLRSD had maintained levels of black teacher employment that exceeded the percentages in the relevant labor market, when viewed in light of NLRSD's good-faith efforts, which suggested that the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable in the area of recruitment. The court affirmed, however, the denial of unitary status for PCSSD in the area of student assignment, advanced placement, discipline, school facilities, scholarships, special education, staff, student achievement, and monitoring. The court vacated the portion of the district court's order terminating the State's funding obligations under the 1989 Settlement Agreement. View "Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. State of Arkansas, et al.; Joshua, et al. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist.; Armstrong, et al. v. North Little Rock Sch. Dist.; North Little Rock Classroom Teachers Assoc., et al. v. State of Arkansas, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the Dean of the University of Iowa's College of Law. Plaintiff alleged that the Dean discriminated against her in violation of her First Amendment rights of political belief and association when plaintiff was not hired to be a full-time instructor or part-time adjunct instructor. The court held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a fact finder to infer that the Dean's repeated decisions not to hire her were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected First Amendment rights of political belief and association; the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff were sufficient to establish a violation of her First Amendment rights where it was apparent that a dispute existed regarding a material issue of fact, namely whether the Dean would have made the same hiring decisions in the absence of plaintiff's political affiliations and beliefs; the Dean had not shown that a reasonable university dean in her position would have believed that failing to hire plaintiff was lawful in light of clearly established law; and the district court erred in finding that qualified immunity protected the Dean from liability in her individual capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wagner v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a minor who had been diagnosed with autism, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) hearing officer's decision that plaintiff's free and appropriate public education placement complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff also claimed that his tuition reimbursement request for the 2007-2008 school year was timely, and that Loveland Academy was his "stay put" placement. The court held that Loveland Acadamy was not plaintiff's stay put placement because the DOE only agreed to pay tuition for the limited 2006-2007 school year and never affirmatively agreed to place plaintiff at Loveland Academy. The court also concluded that plaintiff's tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school year was time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 individualized education programs complied with IDEA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "K. D. v. Dept of Education" on Justia Law

Parents disagreed with the school system's assessment of appropriate services for their four-year-old, who had suffered traumatic brain injuries. The Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals affirmed on most points, concluded that the parents failed to show that any procedural violation significantly impeded their opportunity to participate in the decision-making process or caused a deprivation of educational benefits, and confirmed that the child did not require a full-time kindergarten program in order to receive a free appropriate public education. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The child's rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491 were not affected by any procedural errors. The record supports the conclusion that the child was making progress toward his Individual Education Plan goals Because the school conducted its evaluation of the child within 60 instructional days of receiving parental consent, it fully complied with its "child find" obligations. The parents were not entitled to reimbursement for their costs of placing the child in a private school or for attorney fees. View "Damian Berns, et al v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged his expulsion from Weston High School for allegedly possessing and distributing a "marijuana cookie" on school property. The court held that the judge abused his discretion where the record did not suggest that the judge either considered the proper legal standards for the allowance of a motion for a preliminary injunction or evaluated the factual circumstances relevant to plaintiff's alleged misconduct. Therefore, the order regarding plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was vacated in its entirety and the matter remanded. View "Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Weston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University-defendant, was arrested by campus police and charged with stalking and disorderly conduct after unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket. Plaintiff was temporarily banned from campus, removed as department head, and required to attend an anger-management class. Although the charges were later dismissed, Collins sued for false arrest, defamation, and violation of his due process rights. The district court granted judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the arrest was illegal because the "violation" was civil in nature. The warrant was supported by probable cause. Suspension with pay for two months was a minimal deprivation that did not entitle plaintiff to pre-deprivation process. Plaintiff was allowed to visit campus several times during the ban and was given adequate process for the minimal deprivation of liberty. An email indicating that plaintiff's presence on campus should be reported was not defamatory. View "Collins v. Univ. of NH" on Justia Law

The District, which operates six elementary schools and two very highly-rated high schools set goals for redistricting, including: equalizing enrollment of the high schools and middle schools; operating elementary schools at or under capacity; not increasing the number of buses required; giving 2010 graduates the choice to either follow the redistricting plan or stay at the high school of their previous year; and basing decisions on current and expected future needs, not on past practices. The district court concluded that the plan required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that strict scrutiny did not apply, simply because decision-makers discussed race. The plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose. The plan met the rational basis test.View "Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arab Muslim, served as an associate professor at a state from 2001 to 2006. His performance record was consistently sub-par, and he frequently sparred with policy decisions made by his supervisor. Informed that his contract would not be renewed, he filed suit, alleging that that the school refused to renew his contract based on his race, national origin, and religion, and in retaliation for several claimed instances of complaining about discrimination, all in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment for the school. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no direct or circumstantial evidence that plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated individuals outside his protected class, nor did plaintiff establish retaliation. View "Abuelyaman v. IL State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants had retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that the speech on which plaintiff based her claim was not protected under the First Amendment and that the individual defendants had qualified immunity from suit. The district court held, alternatively, that summary judgment would have been appropriate if the speech had been protected, because the school district would have fired plaintiff even in the absence of the speech. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; that appellees' rebuttal was subject to credibility questions and hence could not be resolved as a matter of law; and that appellees were not, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to qualified immunity. View "Nagle v. Marron" on Justia Law