Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Speech First, Inc., which identifies itself as a national organization committed to protecting the rights of college students, initiated this action against the President of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or the University). Speech First asserts that two Virginia Tech policies — the Bias Intervention and Response Team Policy (the Bias Policy) and the Informational Activities Policy — violate the First Amendment rights of its student members. Speech First asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin both policies. The district court held that Speech First (1) lacked standing to challenge the Bias Policy because its members had suffered no injury in fact, and (2) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the Informational Activities Policy because the record was, at that time, inadequate as to that policy. Speech First appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Speech First offers only speculation in support of its argument that it has suffered an injury in fact. Because the district court’s factual findings make clear that no record evidence establishes any such injury, the organization has failed to establish an injury in fact and so lacks standing to challenge the Bias Policy. The court explained that once this case is returned to the district court, and after further factual development has taken place, it will be for that court to determine in the first instance whether the Informational Activities Policy complies with the First Amendment. Without a developed record, the district court did not err in determining that Speech First has not yet shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy Sands" on Justia Law

Five University System of Georgia (“USG”) professors filed suit to block a 2017 statutory amendment that removed public colleges and other public postsecondary educational institutions from the statutory definition of “school safety zone.” Before the 2017 amendment, carrying or possessing a weapon on any real property or in any building owned by or leased to any postsecondary educational institution was a misdemeanor, and the 2017 amendment decriminalized that conduct. The professors alleged that, as a result of the 2017 amendment, the Code required the Board of Regents, the USG, and USG institutions to permit persons to carry or possess weapons on the campuses of public postsecondary educational institutions, contrary to longstanding USG policies. The professors sought a declaration that the statutory amendment was unconstitutional as applied because it usurped the Board’s constitutional authority to govern, control, and manage the USG and its member institutions. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the professors’ request for declaratory relief, ruling that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on three alternative grounds, including mootness. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because the complaint showed that the Board adopted gun-carrying policies consistent with the 2017 statutory amendment, the question of whether the amendment usurped the constitutional authority of the Board to govern, control, and manage the USG and its member institutions became moot. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the professors’ as-applied challenge, and the judgment dismissing the professors’ complaint on that basis was affirmed. View "Knox v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2017, when Plaintiff was in elementary school, he was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, language disorder, and anxiety. Between 2017 and 2021, Plaintiff's parents asked Defendant School District at least four times to allow Plaintiff to be accompanied at school by an ABA therapist, at no cost to the school district. The school district denied the first three requests and did not respond to the fourth request.Plaintiff's father filed a three-count complaint against the school under the Rehabilitation Act on behalf of his child. The complaint did not mention the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The district court denied Plaintiff's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff needed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before bringing this suit because his complaint was not brought under the IDEA. View "Z. W. v. Horry County School District" on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

At issue is whether the admissions policy (hereinafter the “challenged admissions policy” or the “Policy”) adopted by Virginia’s Fairfax County School Board (the “Board”) in 2020 for use at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science & Technology (“TJ”) purposefully discriminates against Asian American students, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In March 2021, the Coalition for TJ (the “Coalition”) — an advocacy organization of Fairfax County public school parents — commenced this litigation against the Board in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have the challenged admissions policy invalidated as unconstitutional. In February 2022, following the submission by the parties of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the challenged admissions policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court held that it is satisfied that the challenged admissions policy does not disparately impact Asian American students and that the Coalition cannot establish that the Board adopted its race-neutral policy with any discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court wrote that it is satisfied that the policy passes constitutional muster under a rational basis standard of review. Accordingly, it is the Board — not the Coalition — that is entitled to summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim. View "Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice” or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-contract claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim but reversed its summary judgment in favor of the University with respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in evaluating Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual rights and the University’s intent to be bound, the court held that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. Moreover, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on the grounds that the record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to whether Plaintiff has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the University. View "Doe v. William Marsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees (CCASAPE)'s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a so-called "teacher lottery," holding that the district court properly rejected CCASAPE's interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 388G.610.CCASAPE, a school administrators' union, filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief alleging that Clark County School District (CCSD) violated section 388G.610 by implementing a policy under which certain teachers were unilaterally assigned to local school precincts without the consent of each precinct. The district court denied relief because CCASAPE failed to demonstrate that any assignment was inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complained-of policy did not run afoul of section 388G.610 because it was implemented to ensure compliance with collective bargaining agreements and allow for as much selection authority as the school district held. View "Clark County Ass'n of School Administrators v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law