Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Center for Scientific Integrity (CSI) was an organization that reported on academic retractions and accountability. CSI wrote an article about plaintiff-respondent Constance Iloh, a professor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), after several academic journals retracted articles Iloh had written due to concerns about possible plagiarism or inaccurate citation references. In a follow-up to that article, CSI sent UCI a records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) requesting Iloh’s postpublication communications with the journals and UCI. Iloh petitioned for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against UCI to prevent disclosure of her communications, and later added CSI as a real party in interest. She then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. Meanwhile, CSI filed a motion to strike Iloh’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this case concerned Iloh’s motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that Iloh had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and the Court affirmed that order. In this case, the Court considered CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although protected activity may have led to the petition, it was not the “basis” for the petition. To this, the Court disagreed: in issuing the CPRA request, CSI was engaging in newsgathering so it could report on matters of public interest, such as how a public university funded largely by taxpayer dollars resolved quality or integrity problems in its professors’ publications. CSI was therefore engaged in protected activity when it issued the CPRA request. Iloh filed her petition for mandamus relief to prevent UCI from complying with the CPRA request. “This is the type of lawsuit the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to address, and it should be stricken if Iloh cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her petition.” The Court of Appeal found the trial court had not performed the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion and remanded this case with directions that the trial court consider prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Iloh v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that No. 17-4, 1 of the 2017 Special Acts (S.A. 17-4) was an unconstitutional public emolument in violation of Conn. Const. Art. I, 1 because it did not serve a legitimate public purpose, holding that the appellate court did not err.The State brought this action seeking a judgment declaring that S.A. 17-4, pursuant to which the General Assembly extended the time limitation for Defendants to bring their action against the State for injuries arising from poor air quality at public schools, constituted an unconstitutional public emolument. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State. The appellate court affirmed. Defendants appealed, arguing that the appellate court failed to consider whether the State met its burden of proving that the General Assembly's "sole objective" in acting S.A. 17-4 was to grant a personal gain or advantage to Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that S.A. 17-4 provided an exclusive, private benefit to Defendants that no other similarly situated litigant could enjoy, in violation of the public emoluments clause. View "State v. Avoletta" on Justia Law

The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional. Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so. This case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing. Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short.   The Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court. The court concluded that t Louisiana does not have Article III standing. The court explained that this case is the same “(non) controversy” that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held falls outside of our Article III power. The court explained that federal courts do not sit to resolve intramural disputes among state officials over the bounds of their authority under state law. Louisiana stands fully capable and ready to enforce its laws, and it can do so in its courts, which “are not bound to adhere” to Article III’s requirements. View "LA State v. Jefferson Parish Sch" on Justia Law

Doe, a University of Michigan student, was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded, he sued. alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction preventing the disciplinary process from proceeding. The Sixth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of “Baum,” in which it held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision.The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal was heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate. The Sixth Circuit determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the summary judgment order. Doe then sought attorney fees, which the district court granted.The University appealed again. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due process claim seeking the release of his transcript. View "Doe v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Louisiana State University (“LSU”) (collectively “the Professors”) appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity after Plaintiff alleged that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by conspiring to prevent his continued enrollment in Louisiana State University’s (“LSU”) theatre program.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The court held that the Professors lacked adequate notice that their conduct was violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and because they did not have this notice, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that the clearly established standard requires more than that—there must be a “high degree of specificity” between the alleged misconduct and the caselaw purporting to clearly establish the violation. Without it, the requisite “fair warning” required under the clearly established inquiry is absent. View "Babinski v. Sosnowsky" on Justia Law

Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff acting on behalf of her son, a student who qualifies for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), appealed an order of the district court denying her motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision. The stay-put provision provides that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,” a student “shall remain” in the student’s “then-current educational placement.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, a private residential treatment center in Maryland, and its affiliated school, the Community School of Maryland’s (together, CSAAC) unilateral decision to discharge Plaintiff’s son did not trigger the IDEA’s stay-put mandate because the District did not refuse to provide a similar available placement. Neither the text of Section 1415(j) nor the court’s previous decisions applying the provision impose an affirmative duty on the District to provide an alternative residential environment when a student’s then-current placement becomes unavailable for reasons outside the District’s control. The court explained that Plaintiff’s attempt to bring a substantive challenge on behalf of her son by invoking the stay-put mandate is procedurally improper because Section 1415(j) is not intended to afford parties affirmative relief, on the merits, in the form of an automatic injunction. View "Anne Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their child AMS at a private academy after the Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded Plaintiffs costs associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court affirmed.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Chamberlain argued that Plaintiffs weren’t eligible to remove the case from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). The court explained that while Plaintiffs initially sought to recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain became the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, because Plaintiffs were defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying remand. Further, the court explained that giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, it concludes that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. View "Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that the closure of in-person education due to the COVID-19 pandemic deprived children of the free appropriate public education to which they were entitled and deprived and parents of their right to participate in their children's education, holding that none of Plaintiffs' claims were cognizable in federal court.Plaintiffs, three children with disabilities and their parents on behalf of a putative class, sued the Governor of Massachusetts, the Commissioner of Schools for Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, and several school districts and their superintendents, claiming that the closure of in-person education during the COVID-19 pandemic violated Plaintiffs' rights under the IDEA and that Defendants illegally discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of disability in violation the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed in full either because Plaintiffs lacked standing to request the relief they sought, because the claims were moot, and/or because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Roe v. Healey" on Justia Law