Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In 1978, Ohio State hired Richard Strauss, M.D., as an assistant professor of medicine. From 1978-1996, Strauss treated students and student-athletes, as the team doctor for multiple sports and as a student health center physician. When Strauss voluntarily, retired in 1998, the university designated him as an Emeritus Professor although he had been “quietly” placed on leave in 1996 following multiple reports of abuse. In 2018, former student-athletes publicly accused the school of covering up Strauss’s abuse. An investigation reported that Strauss had sexually abused at least 177 students. Plaintiffs allege that the school failed to meaningfully investigate numerous complaints, hid or failed to maintain records of abuse complaints, and failed to inform students and some staff of the abuse until 2018. Plaintiffs allege that they could not have known about the school’s knowledge, and cover-up, of their abuse until the 2019 release of the report; 532 plaintiffs brought 37 separate cases. This appeal concerns students who were abused by Strauss from 1978-1998.The district court dismissed the Title IX claims as time-barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations, whether measured by a discovery rule or an occurrence rule; denied motions for recusal based on the judge’s connections and his wife’s connections to Ohio State; and dismissed Title IX retaliation claims that alleged Ohio State employees made public comments, in a retaliatory attempt to “silence” them.The Sixth Circuit vacated in part but affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the dismissal of the retaliation claims. Just when the plaintiffs should have known that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, and when they should have known about Ohio State’s role in causing their injuries are questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. View "Garrett v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law

Jane, a sophomore, reported to Oberlin College’s Title IX office (20 U.S.C. 1681–1688) that she believed her sexual encounters with Doe amounted to sexual misconduct. The office did not inform Doe of the allegations for several weeks and did not investigate. According to Doe, the delay resulted in a failure to preserve exculpatory security-camera footage. Doe alleges that the dearth of information provided to him led him to hire a private investigator. Doe believed that Jane had spoken to other students about the matter and requested that Oberlin protect his privacy. Doe was told that Jane had requested an informal resolution but was later told that Jane had decided to pursue a formal resolution. Doe asserted a retaliation complaint, claiming that the change was prompted by his complaint that Jane was slandering him. Oberlin then provided Doe with the requested reports and complaints.Doe sought a temporary restraining order weeks after learning of Roe’s complaint, before any formal hearing process began, alleging violations of federal due process, Title IX, and state tort laws. Oberlin subsequently officially concluded that Doe had not violated the Sexual Misconduct Policy. The district court dismissed the due process claim with prejudice and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Although the district court did not follow the appropriate process for an on-the-merits, sua sponte dismissal of Doe’s due process claim, Oberlin is not a state actor subject to federal due process requirements. The court remanded in part; the court was correct to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of ripeness, but subsequent factual developments have ripened the claims. View "Doe v. Oberlin College" on Justia Law

Escondido Union School District (“Escondido”) appealed the district court’s ruling that Escondido denied D.O. a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) by failing to timely assess him for autism. An administrative law judge ruled that Escondido’s delay in assessing D.O. for autism was neither a procedural violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) nor a denial of a free appropriate public education, or FAPE. The district court reversed the ALJ in part, holding that Escondido’s four-month delay in assessing D.O. constituted a procedural violation of IDEA and that this procedural violation denied D.O. a FAPE by depriving him of educational benefits.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The panel concluded that Escondido’s duty to propose an assessment in an area of suspected disability was triggered on December 5, 2016, when Escondido was put on notice that D.O. might be autistic by Dr. M.D., who had completed an assessment and report. The panel concluded that Escondido’s subsequent four-month delay in proposing an autism assessment plan did not violate any California statutory deadlines or any federal statutory timeline. The panel held that Escondido’s delay did not constitute a procedural violation of IDEA because Escondido did not fail to assess D.O., and some delay in complying with IDEA’s procedural requirement is permissible. The panel held that the district court erred in determining that Escondido’s delay was due, at least in part, to the subjective skepticism of its staff. The panel also held that even if the delay were a procedural violation of FAPE, it did not deny D.O. a FAPE. View "D.O. V. ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL DIST." on Justia Law

Benner was a 43-year-old high school coach. P.A., 17, hoped to use basketball to obtain a college scholarship. A sexual relationship between the two began after Benner resigned from his position but promised to continue coaching P.A.. Indiana law prohibits anyone who “has or had” a professional relationship with a person under the age of 18 to “use[] or exert[] the person’s professional relationship to engage in sexual intercourse” with that young person. Benner was convicted under Ind. Code 35-42-4-7(n). Indiana courts rejected constitutional challenges and affirmed Benner’s conviction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Benner’s petition for collateral relief. The statutory definition refers to the defendant’s “ability to exert undue influence over the child.” Benner claimed that a person of ordinary intelligence would not understand how he might use a professional relationship to engage in sexual conduct with a child when that professional relationship has ended. The court stated: It is easy to see how a coach can use that position to groom a youngster for sex, even if the coach plans that the sexual activity will follow the basketball season’s end. While Benner never had an official coaching relation with P.A. after the statutory amendment added the word “had,” Indiana did not charge Benner with conduct that preceded July 2013. No Supreme Court holding “clearly establish[es]” a constitutional problem with the present tense or words such as “use” or “exert”. Compared with some statutes that the Supreme Court has upheld, "35-42-4-7 is a model of precision.” View "Benner v. Carlton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and the controversy over whether a mandate should be implemented requiring the state's schoolchildren to wear masks while in school, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction.In June 2020, the state Department of Education, the state Commissioner of Education, and the Governor (collectively, Defendants) undertook to mandate that schoolchildren wear masks in school. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit challenging the legality of Defendants' school mask mandate and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Department repealed the school mask mandate while this appeal was pending, the appeal was moot. View "Conn. Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dep't of Education" on Justia Law

The California Public Employment Relations Board (Board) refused to file an unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of plaintiff Rebecca Wu, a substitute teacher representing herself in propria persona, against real party in interest Twin Rivers United Educators (Union), a teachers’ union. In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged the Union breached its duty to represent her in her claim against Twin Rivers Unified School District (School District), wherein she claimed to be misclassified as a substitute teacher. The Board declined to file a complaint against the Union based on Wu’s charge because Wu, as a substitute teacher, was not entitled to union representation given that substitute teachers were excluded from representation by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District. Wu argued she had a constitutional right to union representation as a misclassified teacher and as a substitute teacher. She further argued she had a statutory right to representation by the Union that could not be circumvented by a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Wu that she had a constitutional or statutory right to representation by the Union as an alleged misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Wu v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the mother of a minor child with special needs, brings this action for attorney’s fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The IDEA allows parents who prevail in state administrative proceedings challenging their children’s individualized education programs to recover attorney’s fees in federal court. But Plaintiff did not file her claim for fees until almost two years after her administrative hearing, and the district court dismissed her case as untimely. The district court concluded that a standalone fees action like Plaintiff’s is most comparable to an IDEA claim for substantive judicial review of an adverse administrative determination. And because Virginia, where Plaintiff lives, sets a 180-day limitations period for such substantive IDEA claims, the court deemed her claim time-barred.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the IDEA contains no express statute of limitations for attorney’s fees actions, so courts must “borrow” an appropriate limitations period from state law. The court wrote that Va. Code Section 22.1-214(D), by allowing parties 180 days to seek substantive judicial review of IDEA due process hearings, provides an appropriate – even generous – analog to attorney’s fees actions under 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). The court also agreed with the district court that his 180-day limitations period does not begin to run until after the aggrieved party’s time to seek substantive review has expired, meaning that a party has 360 days from the date of the administrative decision to commence a fees action. View "Jemie Sanchez v. Arlington County School Board" on Justia Law

An assistant professor at a California public university submitted four articles on topics in her field of study to various academic journals unaffiliated with her university. All four of those articles were later either retracted or corrected by the journals, at least in part due to inaccurate references or text overlap from uncited sources. Soon after that, the professor left her position at the university. A third party investigating the article retractions sent the university a request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) seeking certain postpublication communications between the professor, the university, and the journals regarding the retracted articles. The university determined the requested documents were subject to disclosure; the professor disagreed, filed a petition for writ of mandate, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. The trial court denied the professor’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding she had not met her burden of establishing a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the requested communications qualified as public records under the CPRA, and the professor did not establish the records are otherwise exempt from disclosure. View "Iloh v. The Regents of the U. of Cal." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to grant a temporary injunction in favor of the Houston Independent School District prohibiting the Texas Education Agency Commissioner and his appointed conservator from continuing to supervise the school district pending a final trial, holding that the District was not entitled to injunctive relief.While law permits the Commissioner to assist in improving a school district's performance through a variety of remedial measures, in question in this case was under what circumstances the Commissioner may supervise the Houston Independent School District (the District). Based on the results of an accreditation investigation, the Commissioner notified the District that it planned to appoint a board of managers for the District. The District filed petition seeking a temporary injunction barring the Commissioner from taking regulatory actions against it because the Education Code did not authorize the planned remedial measures. The trial court granted the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed the trial court to consider the Commissioner's plea to the jurisdiction, holding that the District's claims did not support a temporary injunction against the Commissioner and his conservator. View "Texas Education Agency v. Houston Independent School District" on Justia Law

Baro was an ESL teacher for Waukegan Community School District in 2019 when she signed a union membership form—a contract to join the union that represents teachers in the District. The form authorized the District to deduct union dues from her paychecks for one year. Baro alleged she learned later that she was not required to join the union. She tried to back out of the agreement. The union insisted that her contract was valid. The District continued deducting dues from her paychecks.Baro filed suit, arguing that the dues deduction violated her First Amendment rights under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Janus: decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Baro voluntarily consented to the withdrawal of union dues. The enforcement of a valid private contract does not implicate her First Amendment rights. The “First Amendment protects our right to speak. It does not create an independent right to void obligations when we are unhappy with what we have said.” View "Baro v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT" on Justia Law