Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred when it applied the plurality’s analysis in Easton Area School District v. Miller, 232 A.3d 716 (Pa. 2020) (Easton Area II) and ordered redaction and disclosure of the school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). In 2016, Valerie Hawkins, on behalf of Fox 43 News (collectively, Requester), submitted a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) request to Central Dauphin School District (the District), seeking a copy of school bus surveillance video which captured an incident between a 17-year-old member of a District high school basketball team (the student), and a parent of another player (the adult), who allegedly grabbed the student’s wrist during their interaction. The incident occurred in a parking lot outside the high school’s gymnasium, while the players and school staff were boarding the school bus following a basketball game. The adult involved received a summary citation for harassment related to the incident. Requester attached a copy of the citation notice from the magisterial district court record to the record request; the notice identified the adult and student by name as the defendant and victim, respectively. Karen McConnell, the District’s open records officer, denied the request for access to the video, explaining it was an education record containing “personally identifiable information directly related to a student or students,” which, according to the District, protected the video from release under FERPA, and consequently precluded its disclosure under the RTKL as well. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err when it applied the analysis articulated in Easton Area II and ordered the mandatory redaction and disclosure of a school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to FERPA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order with instructions to the District to reasonably redact the students’ personally identifiable information prior to disclosure. View "Central Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Hawkins, et al." on Justia Law

In the fall of 2015, D.T. enrolled as a freshman at Cherokee Trail High School in Aurora, Colorado. During his time at Cherokee Trail, he suffered from depression and a general decline in academic performance. His mother regularly communicated with school officials regarding his well-being and coordinated in-school support. During the first semester of his junior year, D.T. was reported for making a school shooting threat. As a result, he was expelled from Cherokee Trail and the Cherry Creek School District (“the District”) initiated a special education assessment. In December 2017, the District concluded D.T. suffered from a Serious Emotional Disability and approved an individualized education program (“IEP”) to assist his learning. D.T. appealed a district court's judgment finding the District did not deny him access to a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). D.T. asked the Tenth Circuit to conclude the District violated its obligation to identify, or “child find,” students with disabilities who required supplementary academic supports. The Tenth Circuit declined D.T.'s request, finding the District acted reasonably to preserve his access to the benefit of general education. "The District’s duty to assess and provide D.T. with special education services did not begin until his emotional dysfunction manifested in the school environment by way of his shooting threat." View "D.T. v. Cherry Creek School" on Justia Law

The parents believe their son, D.R., should spend most of the school day being educated in a regular classroom with his non-disabled peers. School officials believed D.R. would be better served spending more of his school day in a special education classroom receiving instruction with other disabled students. As permitted under the IDEA, D.R.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the California Office of Administrative Hearings. The district agreed with the ALJ’s analysis and affirmed the decision denying relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s decision denying relief. Reversing in part, the panel held that, given the IDEA’s strong preference for educating children with disabilities alongside their non-disabled peers, the law supported the parents’ position. The panel held that D.R.’s parents met their burden of proving that the school district’s proposed individualized education program (IEP) failed to comply with the IDEA’s requirement that children with disabilities be educated in the “least restrictive environment,” alongside their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.   Affirming in part, the panel held that D.R.’s parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses they incurred after unilaterally removing their son from school and hiring a private instructor to educate him in a one-on-one setting. The panel concluded that D.R.’s parents showed that the IEP offered by the school district violated the IDEA, but they did not show that the alternative private placement they chose was proper under the Act. View "D. R. V. RBUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs L.E., B.B., A.Z., and C.S., are students who have respiratory disabilities (“Students”). They appealed the denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Students sued Defendants, the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District, individual members of the Cobb County School Board, and the Cobb County School District (collectively, “CCSD”), in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Students claim that CCSD’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for access to in-person schooling constitutes a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”).   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for analysis under the correct scope: access to the benefits provided by in-person schooling. The court held this claim presents a live controversy that survives mootness and the district court erred in its review of the Students’ discrimination claims. The Students argue that CCSD ignored those recommendations and continues to disregard CDC guidance in this respect. Therefore, this remains a live controversy. A judgment in their favor would grant the Students meaningful relief by requiring CCSD to follow the guidance on accommodating students with disabilities under the ADA and Section 504 as it is updated—a practice the Students claim CCSD refuses to do. Thus, this claim remains a live controversy. Further, the court wrote that the district court erred in holding the Students must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on a disparate treatment claim. View "L.E., et al v. Superintendent of Cobb County School District, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals ruling that the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing the admission of testimony describing certain information provided by the State's principal witness as "rock solid", holding that the admission of the challenged portion of the testimony did not constitute plain error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and first-degree burglary. The court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the convictions, holding that the challenged portion of the testimony was inadmissible, but it was not reasonably probable that Defendant would have been acquitted had the challenged portion of the testimony not been admitted. View "State v. Caballero" on Justia Law

Defendants, Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (the "CIAC") and its member high schools (together, "Defendants"), have followed the "Transgender Participation" Policy (the "Policy"), which permits high school students to compete on gender specific athletic teams consistent with their gender identity if that is different from "the gender listed on their official birth certificates."   Plaintiffs are four cisgender female students who allege that the policy disproportionally disadvantages cisgender girls as compared to boys. Plaintiffs allege that the Policy violates Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"), because the participation of transgender females in girls' high school athletic events results in "students who are born female" having materially fewer opportunities for victory, public recognition, athletic scholarships, and future employment "than students who are born male."   The district court dismissed the claims on grounds that (1) Plaintiffs' request to enjoin future enforcement of the Policy was moot; (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claim for an injunction to change the record books; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages were barred under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.   The Second Circuit affirmed writing that it was unpersuaded, with respect to the claim for an injunction to alter the records, that Plaintiffs have established the injury in fact and redressability requirements for standing; both fail for reasons of speculation. And because the court concluded that the CIAC and its member schools did not have adequate notice that the Policy violates Title IX Plaintiffs' claims for damages must be dismissed. View "Selina Soule et al. v. Connecticut Association of Schools et al." on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire petitioned for original jurisdiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge a circuit court order that granted respondent’s motion to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition. The trial court ruled that the State failed to comply with RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) (2022) because no “manifestation review” had occurred prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. The Supreme Count found the term “manifestation review,” in the context of a juvenile delinquency petition resulting from conduct in a school setting by a student with a disability, referred to a process whereby a school, the student’s parents, and other parties review the student’s individualized education plan (IEP) and other relevant information to determine whether the alleged misconduct stemmed from the student’s disability or the school’s failure to implement the student’s IEP. The Court affirmed and held that whenever a delinquency petition is to be filed pursuant to RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) and the legally liable school district has determined that the child is a child with a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I, then a manifestation review must be performed prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. "Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction of RSA 169-B:6, IV, it is free, within constitutional limits, to amend the statute accordingly." View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the circuit court that HB 503, codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. 141.500-.528 and known as the "Education Opportunity Account Act" (EOA Act), is unconstitutional, holding that the EOA Act violates section 184.In 2021, the General Assembly passed the HB 563, which, as codified, established the Education Opportunity Account Program. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the EOA Act, arguing that it impermissibly redirects state revenues to nonpublic schools. The circuit court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims involving sections 59 and 184 of the Kentucky Constitution and granted the requested injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the EOA Act violates the plain language of section 184 and the prohibition on raising or collecting funds for nonpublic schools. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Cameron v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff, then a women’s soccer player at the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) and recipient of a one-year athletic scholarship, raised her middle finger to a television camera during her team’s post-game celebration after winning a tournament championship. Although she initially was suspended from further tournament games for that gesture, Plaintiff was ultimately also punished by UConn with a mid-year termination of her athletic scholarship. She brought this lawsuit against UConn (through its Board of Trustees) and several university officials alleging, inter alia, violations of her First Amendment and procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”), in connection with the termination of her scholarship. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the decision of the district court granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's procedural due process and First Amendment claims and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to UConn on the Title IX claim. The court explained Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence, including a detailed comparison of her punishment to those issued by UConn for male student-athletes found to have engaged in misconduct, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to a more serious disciplinary sanction, i.e., termination of her athletic scholarship, because of her gender. View "Radwan v. Manuel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a tenured theology teacher at a Roman Catholic high school in Staten Island, appealed from the dismissal of his complaint against his labor union, the Federation of Catholic Teachers (the “FCT”), for allegedly breaching its duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”), and for assorted violations under the New York State and New York City human rights laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s duty-of-fair representation claim with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), reasoning that the NLRA and LMRA are inapplicable to disputes between parochial-school teachers and their labor unions under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded, as a matter of first impression, that Catholic Bishop does preclude Plaintiff’s duty-of-fair-representation claim, but that dismissal was warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, rather than for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court also concluded that Plaintiff has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of his state and municipal-law claims. View "Jusino v. Fed'n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc." on Justia Law