Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Christopher Teacher filed a complaint seeking a writ of administrative mandate against California Western School of Law (CWSL) challenging the procedures CWSL followed in expelling him from the law school. The trial court denied Teacher’s request for a writ and entered a judgment in favor of CWSL. On appeal, Teacher claimed, among other things, that CWSL failed to provide him with a fair administrative process in expelling him. The Court of Appeal concurred, finding CWSL’s disciplinary procedures expressly provided, “The student or the student’s spokesperson shall have the right to cross[-]examine witnesses.” Notwithstanding this, CWSL did not afford Teacher the opportunity to cross-examine any of the witnesses on whose statements CWSL relied in reaching its decision to expel Teacher. In light of the fact that CWSL deprived Teacher of this important right guaranteed by its own procedures, the Court reversed judgment, emphasizing that it did not reach any conclusion as to Teacher’s commission of the misconduct that CWSL alleged. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Teacher v. Cal. Western School of Law" on Justia Law

John and Jane attended Princeton University where they began a volatile relationship, including physical altercations. When they broke up Jane spread rumors about John on campus and threatened John: “take a year off and nothing will happen to you.” John complained that he did not “feel safe.” The Director of Student Life recommended mental health services and did not recommend a Title IX complaint. Jane told Princeton’s Director of Gender Equity and Title IX Administration, that she was a victim of “Intimate Relationship Violence” but that she was not interested in pursuing further action. She was advised to press charges. Despite a no-contact order, Jane approached John on campus. Princeton told Jane not to let it happen again. Princeton barred John—but not Jane—from campus during its investigation. John accidentally “liked” one of Jane’s social media posts and self-reported the mistake. Princeton launched another disciplinary process. Princeton expressed no interest in pursuing John's counterclaims and ultimately found evidence to support Jane's allegations of physical abuse but nothing to confirm John’s claims, resulting in John’s expulsion. Jane tweeted about “boy problems that were never real problems just things I created.”The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of John’s Title IX discrimination complaint. On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” View "Doe v. Princeton University" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court issued under the stay-put provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), ordering Portland Public Schools to pay for John Doe's placement at a private school during the pendency of these proceedings, holding that the district court erred.During Doe's fourth-grade year, his parents unilaterally placed him at a private school. The Does subsequently filed for a due process hearing alleging that Portland violated the IDEA by previously finding Doe ineligible for special education services. The district court ordered Portland to pay for Doe's tuition for the duration of this litigation at Aucocisco School, where his parents had unilaterally placed him despite the fact that the hearing officer whose decision was being reviewed had determined that the individualized education plan issued by Portland would provide a free appropriate public education. Portland appealed, arguing that the district court impermissibly ordered it to pay for Doe's placement at the private school during the pendency of these proceedings. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the purposes of the IDEA were not served by having Portland continue to pay for Doe's tuition at Aucocisco. View "Doe v. Portland Public Schools" on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish directly appealed a trial court’s judgment finding that Jefferson Parish ordinance, Section 36-320, et seq., titled, “School Bus Safety Enforcement Program for Detecting Violations of Overtaking and Passing School Buses” (“SBSEP”), was unconstitutional. After receiving notices of alleged violations of Section 36-320, et seq., of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances, petitioners filed a class action Petition for Damages and Declaratory Judgment. They asserted multiple arguments against the SBSEP, including arguments based on violations of the Jefferson Parish Home Rule Charter and violations of Louisiana statutory law. Petitioners sought a judgment declaring Section 36-320, et seq. unconstitutional and the return of the fines they paid pursuant to the violations. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding Section 36-320, et seq., unconstitutional because it violated Article VI, Section 5(G) and Article VIII, Section 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. View "Mellor, et al. v. Parish of Jefferson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against University officials, alleging that the University's policy requiring a permit to engage in public speech on the University's sidewalk violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit previously concluded, among other things, that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case and agreed with the district court that the sidewalk at issue is a limited public forum and thus the University's permit requirement needed to be only reasonable and view-point neutral.In this appeal, after careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument—and even assuming that the City of Tuscaloosa owns the sidewalk at issue—the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that any facts material to its analysis have changed. Accordingly, the court again concluded that the sidewalk is a limited public forum. The court also reviewed the permitting requirement and found that the policy provisions on leafletting were reasonable, and that plaintiff's actions do not fall within the "casual recreational and social activities" exception. The court concluded that the University's advance-notice requirement was reasonable where the University phrases the ten-day advance-notice period in terms of "should," not "must," and the record contains no evidence that the University has rejected an application simply because it was not submitted ten days before the event. Furthermore, the University's reasons for the advance-notice requirement are also reasonable, and the sidewalk is a limited public forum. Moreover, the policy permits the fast-tracking of a permit if an event relates to a current issue or responds to another event. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keister v. Bell" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court denying in part Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the case must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.Parents brought this case alleging dissatisfaction with the individualized education plan offered to their son by the Puerto Rico Department of Education. Rather than file an administrative appeal, which was available to them, Parents brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. After issuing orders during a period of several years the district court issued an amended opinion and order denying in part Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, holding that the district court erred in finding that Parents did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Valentin-Marrero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

Keles was admitted into Rutgers’s Civil and Environmental Engineering (CEE) Department’s graduate program and received his M.S. degree in 2014. While pursuing this degree, Keles expressed his interest in continuing his studies as a Ph.D. student. To continue their studies as Ph.D. students, M.S. students in the CEE Department must submit a “Change-in-Status” form, identifying advisors and describing their research plans. At the end of the M.S. program, Keles submitted an incomplete Change-in-Status form. Keles disputed that he needed to submit a completed Change-in-Status form due to his claimed enrollment as an M.S.-Ph.D. student. Members of the CEE Department and the University’s administration informed him that he needed to satisfy the admission prerequisites. Keles neither found an advisor nor submitted a completed form but sought to register for classes in 2015. Rutgers’s Administration informed Keles that his lack of academic standing prevented him from registering.Keles sued, alleging contract, tort, statutory, and due process claims. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit, finding that Rutgers adhered to its own policies and did not act in bad faith. All M.S. students were subject to the same departmental requirements. Rutgers afforded Keles sufficient process and did not venture “beyond the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking.” View "Keles v. Bender" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court judge denying a child's motion to dismiss a petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 39E by an assistant school principal, holding that the assistant principle did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by filing and pursuing the petition.In the petition, the assistant principle asserted that the child required assistance because the child had been habitually truant from school. The child moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the assistant principle, a nonattorney, was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the assistant principle did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law under the circumstances of this case. View "Lexington Public Schools v. K.S." on Justia Law

In October 2017, plaintiffs Sadie Boyd (a student at Twin Valley Middle High School in Whitingham, Vermont) Madeleine Klein (a resident and property owner in Whitingham), and the Town of Whitingham filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State of Vermont, arguing that the education funding and property taxation system set forth in 16 V.S.A. ch. 133 and 32 V.S.A. ch. 135 violated the Education Clause, the Proportional Contribution Clause, and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They claimed that the system was unconstitutional because it deprived plaintiff Boyd of an equal educational opportunity, required plaintiff Klein to contribute disproportionately to education funding, and compelled the Town to collect an unconstitutional tax. The civil division granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the alleged inequities were caused by the statutes in question or that the education property taxation system lacked a rational basis. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd, et al. v. Vermont" on Justia Law