Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The "borrower defense" cancellation of federal student loans is allowed in certain cases of school misconduct, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). After DeVos became the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Department used a new methodology to decide borrower defense claims. The Department was preliminarily enjoined from using that methodology. From June 2018-December 2019, the Department issued no borrower defense decisions. Individuals with pending applications sued. The parties negotiated a proposed settlement that included an 18-month deadline to resolve outstanding claims. Before the class fairness hearing, the Department sent out form letters denying borrower defense applications at a rate of 89.8%. The district court denied final approval of the settlement and ordered updated written discovery. Plaintiffs took four depositions of Department officials and received about 2,500 documents. In 2021, after DeVos resigned as secretary, the district court authorized class counsel to take her deposition. Plaintiffs then served a subpoena for a nonparty deposition on DeVos under FRCP 45.The Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoena. Compelling the testimony of a cabinet secretary about the actions she took as a leader in the executive branch is allowable only in extraordinary circumstances. The party seeking the deposition must demonstrate agency bad faith and that the information sought from the secretary is essential to the case and cannot be obtained in any other way. There was no indication that DeVos held information that was essential to the case or that it was otherwise unobtainable. View "In re: United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Before the end of the 2019–20 academic year, MSU had several Division I sports teams: men’s baseball, basketball, cross country, football, golf, ice hockey, soccer, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and wrestling; and women’s basketball, cross country, field hockey, golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and volleyball. In October 2020, MSU announced it would no longer sponsor the men’s and women’s swimming-and-diving teams after the 2020–21 school year. During the 2019–20 school year, the teams had 29 men and 33 women. Women student-athletes sought a preliminary injunction to prevent MSU from eliminating the women’s swimming-and-diving team, arguing that MSU failed to provide women with substantially proportionate athletic opportunities, as required by Title IX. In the 2018–19 school year, 48.8% of undergraduate students were male and 51.2% were female; and, in the 2019–20 school year, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were female.The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated, first finding that MSU did not inflate its number of women athletes. The correct inquiry focuses on the number of participation opportunities, not the gap as a percentage of the athletic program. . A school may fail to achieve substantial proportionality even if its participation gap is only a small percentage of the size of its athletic program View "Balow v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Brown, who suffered physical abuse at the hands of her former boyfriend and fellow University of Arizona student at his off-campus residence, brought a Title IX action, 20 U.S.C. 1681, against the University.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University. Title IX liability exists for student-on-student harassment when an educational institution exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. The control-over-context requirement was not met based on Brown’s theory that the university had substantial control over the context of Brown’s former boyfriend’s abuse of other victims and failed to take proper action. The court rejected a theory that the boyfriend, a university football player, had to have university approval to live off-campus and his housing was paid for with scholarship funds that he received from the university. View "Brown v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Arc of Iowa and Iowa parents whose children have serious disabilities that place them at heightened risk of severe injury or death from COVID-19, filed suit to enjoin enforcement of Iowa's law prohibiting mask requirements in schools. The district court concluded that the law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, granting a preliminary injunction completely enjoining the law.After determining that it has jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because mask requirements are reasonable accommodations required by federal disability law to protect the rights of plaintiffs' children. However, the court concluded that the injunction imposed by the district court sweeps more broadly than necessary to remedy plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded to allow the district court to enter a tailored injunction prohibiting defendants from preventing or delaying reasonable accommodations and ensures that plaintiffs' schools may provide such reasonable accommodations. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Education of the Jefferson City Public School District to terminate Tammy Ferry's contract with the District, holding that the Board had the authority to terminate the contract.The Board decided to terminate Ferry's contract after she transferred confidential student information from the District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision, finding that Ferry had not "disclosed" confidential student information, as that term is defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the Board's findings that Ferry violated the Board's policies and procedure and did so willfully were supported by competent and substantial evidence; and (2) the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the Board to terminate Ferry's indefinite contract with the District. View "Ferry v. Board of Education of Jefferson City Public School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

Crofts requested that the School District evaluate her daughter, A.S., for special-education services after she received an outside evaluation indicating that A.S. might have dyslexia. The District evaluated A.S. under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(30). enumerated “specific learning disability” category, which encompasses conditions like dyslexia. It determined that she was eligible for services in reading and writing and created an individualized education plan (IEP) targeting A.S.’s deficiencies in those areas. Crofts argued that the District should have evaluated A.S. specifically for dyslexia and used her preferred teaching method for dyslexia, and that it improperly denied her request for an independent educational evaluation.A Washington State ALJ found that the District did not violate the IDEA. The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed. The ALJ properly discounted expert witness testimony. The District satisfied the IDEA by evaluating A.S. under the “specific learning disability” category and did not violate its obligation to evaluate the student in “all areas of suspected disability” when it did not formally evaluate her for dyslexia. The District’s IEPs were reasonably calculated to help the student progress; the District did not deny a FAPE by failing to use the parents’ preferred teaching method. View "Crofts v. Issaquah School District" on Justia Law

Doe, a Chinese national graduate student, alleged that UCLA violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), when it discriminated against him on the basis of sex in the course of a Title IX disciplinary proceeding instituted after a former student accused him of misconduct. Doe was just months away from completing his Ph.D. in chemistry/biochemistry when he was suspended for two years after a finding that he violated the University’s dating violence policy by placing Jane Roe “in fear of bodily injury.” Doe lost his housing, his job as a teaching assistant, and his student visa. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal of Doe’s suit. Doe stated a Title IX claim because the facts he alleged, if true, raised a plausible inference that the university discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Doe’s allegations of external pressures impacting how the university handled sexual misconduct complaints, an internal pattern and practice of bias in the University of California and at UCLA in particular, and specific instances of bias in Doe’s particular disciplinary case, when combined, raised a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of sex sufficient to withstand dismissal. At "some point an accumulation of procedural irregularities all disfavoring a male respondent begins to look like a biased proceeding." View "Doe v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law