Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, the Arc of Iowa and Iowa parents whose children have serious disabilities that place them at heightened risk of severe injury or death from COVID-19, filed suit to enjoin enforcement of Iowa's law prohibiting mask requirements in schools. The district court concluded that the law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, granting a preliminary injunction completely enjoining the law.After determining that it has jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because mask requirements are reasonable accommodations required by federal disability law to protect the rights of plaintiffs' children. However, the court concluded that the injunction imposed by the district court sweeps more broadly than necessary to remedy plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded to allow the district court to enter a tailored injunction prohibiting defendants from preventing or delaying reasonable accommodations and ensures that plaintiffs' schools may provide such reasonable accommodations. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Education of the Jefferson City Public School District to terminate Tammy Ferry's contract with the District, holding that the Board had the authority to terminate the contract.The Board decided to terminate Ferry's contract after she transferred confidential student information from the District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision, finding that Ferry had not "disclosed" confidential student information, as that term is defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the Board's findings that Ferry violated the Board's policies and procedure and did so willfully were supported by competent and substantial evidence; and (2) the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the Board to terminate Ferry's indefinite contract with the District. View "Ferry v. Board of Education of Jefferson City Public School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

Crofts requested that the School District evaluate her daughter, A.S., for special-education services after she received an outside evaluation indicating that A.S. might have dyslexia. The District evaluated A.S. under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(30). enumerated “specific learning disability” category, which encompasses conditions like dyslexia. It determined that she was eligible for services in reading and writing and created an individualized education plan (IEP) targeting A.S.’s deficiencies in those areas. Crofts argued that the District should have evaluated A.S. specifically for dyslexia and used her preferred teaching method for dyslexia, and that it improperly denied her request for an independent educational evaluation.A Washington State ALJ found that the District did not violate the IDEA. The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed. The ALJ properly discounted expert witness testimony. The District satisfied the IDEA by evaluating A.S. under the “specific learning disability” category and did not violate its obligation to evaluate the student in “all areas of suspected disability” when it did not formally evaluate her for dyslexia. The District’s IEPs were reasonably calculated to help the student progress; the District did not deny a FAPE by failing to use the parents’ preferred teaching method. View "Crofts v. Issaquah School District" on Justia Law

Doe, a Chinese national graduate student, alleged that UCLA violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), when it discriminated against him on the basis of sex in the course of a Title IX disciplinary proceeding instituted after a former student accused him of misconduct. Doe was just months away from completing his Ph.D. in chemistry/biochemistry when he was suspended for two years after a finding that he violated the University’s dating violence policy by placing Jane Roe “in fear of bodily injury.” Doe lost his housing, his job as a teaching assistant, and his student visa. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal of Doe’s suit. Doe stated a Title IX claim because the facts he alleged, if true, raised a plausible inference that the university discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Doe’s allegations of external pressures impacting how the university handled sexual misconduct complaints, an internal pattern and practice of bias in the University of California and at UCLA in particular, and specific instances of bias in Doe’s particular disciplinary case, when combined, raised a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of sex sufficient to withstand dismissal. At "some point an accumulation of procedural irregularities all disfavoring a male respondent begins to look like a biased proceeding." View "Doe v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The Halls sued Millersville University under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, after their daughter, Karlie, was murdered in her dorm room by her boyfriend, Orrostieta. Orrostieta had previously been removed from campus at Karlie’s request and, on the night of the murder, a resident assistant heard Karlie scream but did not follow up. Despite finding genuine issues of material fact, the district court granted Millersville summary judgment, holding that Millersville lacked notice it could face liability under Title IX for the actions of a non-student guest.The Third Circuit reversed. Millersville had adequate notice it could be liable under Title IX for its deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment perpetrated by a non-student guest. Title IX’s plain terms notify federal funding recipients that they may face monetary liability for intentional violations of the statute; it is an intentional violation of Title IX’s terms for a funding recipient to act with deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment where the recipient exercises substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs and the harasser, even if they are a third party. Millersville’s own Title IX policy thus contemplated Title IX liability could result from the actions of third parties such as “visitors” like Orrostieta. The court agreed that factual disputes preclude summary judgment. View "Hall v. Millersville University" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Camille Sturdivant sued her former coach on a high school dance team, Carley Fine, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Fine moved for summary judgment, urging qualified immunity based on the absence of: (1) an act under color of state law; and (2) a denial of equal protection. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Fine had acted as head coach and “intentionally deprived [Camille] of educational benefits based on [her] race.” Fine appealed, presenting two alternative arguments for qualified immunity: (1) She did not act under color of state law because she was no longer employed as the head coach when she allegedly violated Camille’s rights; and (2) She did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Fines first argument; the Court's jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal did not extend to the applicability of section 1983. Thus, this portion of the appeal was dismissed. The Court did have jurisdiction on Fine's section argument, and found that a reasonable factfinder could find the violation of a clearly established right to equal protection. So the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Sturdivant v. Fine, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's judgment declaring 2021 Senate Bill 40 invalid and unenforceable based on certain infirmities the court observed, holding that the district court erred by ignoring the constitutional avoidance doctrine and failing to abide by it.This case arose from a dispute regarding public school policies mandating face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the Legislature passed S.B. 40 imposing substantive limits on COVID-19 mitigation measures adopted by other governmental entities Plaintiffs sued the Shawnee Mission School District challenging the district's mask policy. Plaintiffs asserted S.B. 40 as the only legal authority for their lawsuit. The district court dismissed the claims as moot and then ruled that S.B. 40 was unenforceable because it violated both due process and separation of powers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its analytical diversion into S.B. 40's constitutionality. View "Butler v. Shawnee Mission School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an ALJ's decision in favor of student B.W. The panel held that goals (as opposed to services) in B.W.'s first grade Individualized Education Program (IEP) were not inadequate; Capistrano did not have to file for due process to defend the first grade IEP; and Capistrano did not have to have an IEP in place for the second grade. The panel remanded for the limited purpose of considering attorneys' fees. The panel addressed other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Capistrano Unified School District v. S.W." on Justia Law