Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a district court decision to grant defendant David Pool’s motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw on the grounds that it was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In 2016, a police officer came upon the scene of an automobile accident involving two vehicles, one of which was driven by Pool. Pool had failed to negotiate a turn and his vehicle was hit by oncoming traffic. He was not wearing a seatbelt and his airbag deployed in the crash. As a result, he sustained a head injury and was unconscious when the officer arrived at the scene. Pool’s son, a passenger in the vehicle, informed the officer that Pool had not been staying in his traffic lane prior to the crash. He also asserted that the doctors who had prescribed medication to Pool never told him that he could not drive while taking his medications. When Pool regained consciousness, the officer questioned him and noted that he appeared “very lethargic” and “had a presentation similar to a drunk driver . . . slurred speech and thick tongue and obviously disoriented.” Pool told the officer that he believed he had taken his prescription medications that day. Shortly thereafter, a large “baggy” containing seven bottles of prescription medication was recovered from Pool’s vehicle. The officer recognized several of the medications and suspected that they had caused Pool to be impaired. Around that time, Pool and his son were taken to the hospital. The officer followed to question Pool further. At the hospital, the officer ruled out alcohol as a cause of Pool’s impairment based upon the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The officer did not conduct other field sobriety tests, as he believed Pool’s medical condition rendered it improper for him to do so. Instead, he obtained a blood sample to be used for evidentiary testing. The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on the officer’s justification for obtaining the blood sample without a warrant. The State maintained that pursuant to Idaho’s implied consent law, I.C. 18-8002(1), the search was reasonable and the district court erred in requiring proof of exigency. The Supreme Court concurred and reversed the district court. View "Idaho v. Pool" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her 12 year old son, alleging that an assistant principal violated her son's Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets after a teacher caught him selling contraband candy. Plaintiff initially alleged that the principal had grabbed her son's genitalia. The district court denied the principal qualified immunity. After the undisputed record evidence later demonstrated that, at most, the principal had only searched the boy's pocket and did not grab his genitalia, the district court granted the principal qualified immunity.On appeal, plaintiff complained that the district court misunderstood her earlier argument and that she never claimed that the principal grabbed her son's genitalia, but that he unreasonably searched the son's pockets. Accepting plaintiff's contention as true, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court should have granted qualified immunity to the principal earlier. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "S. O. v. Hinds County School District" on Justia Law

Poplarville School District and Pearl River County sought to undo the July 1, 2018 consolidation of the Lumberton Public School District and the Lamar County School District. In 2016, the Mississippi Legislature adopted Senate Bill 2500, which, after being signed into law, was codified as Mississippi Code Section 37-7-104.5, the purpose of which was to administratively dissolve, consolidate, and split the Lumberton Public School District at the Lamar and Pearl River County line. The statute created the Commission on the Administrative Consolidation of the Lumberton Public Schools to work in conjunction with the Mississippi State Board of Education to accomplish the consolidation goal. However, Poplarville School District contended that instead of following the directive of Section 37-7-104.5, the Commission dissolved the Lumberton School District and consolidated all of it, to include the students who reside in Pearl River County, into the Lamar County School District. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the Pearl River County Board of Supervisors was a “person aggrieved” for purposes of Section 37-7-115, publication was not necessary pursuant to Section 37-7-115, and Section 37-7-115 was an exclusive remedy. Furthermore, the Court held the chancery court did not err by finding that the appeal was untimely filed pursuant to Section 37-7-115, and affirmed the chancery court's decision. View "Pearl River County Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying certain defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity.Plaintiffs, the parents of four school-age children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, brought this action seeking judgment from the City of Norwalk's Board of Education and three of its members. Plaintiffs alleged that the negligent hiring and supervision of Stacy Lore, who was hired to provide autism related services to children in the school district, proximately caused them to suffer permanent and ongoing injuries and losses. The Board filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, claiming that the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandated dismissal of the claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) the trial court improperly dismissed this action on the ground that Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies; and (2) the Board and its members were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were acting under the control of, and as an agent of, the municipality rather than the state. View "Graham v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs filed suit against UC, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, alleging that UC violated Title IX by failing to adequately respond to their individual assaults and that UC violated Title IX by maintaining a general policy of deliberate indifference to reports of sexual misconduct, which heightened the risk that plaintiffs would be assaulted.The Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff alleging a Title IX claim against a school that arises from student-on-student or faculty-on-student sexual harassment or assault must establish five elements: (1) the school exercised substantial control over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; (2) the harassment was so severe that it deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities; (3) a school official with authority to address the alleged discrimination had actual knowledge of it; (4) the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment, such that the school's response was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances; and (5) the school's deliberate indifference subjected the student to harassment. The panel affirmed the dismissal of two of the plaintiffs' individual claims and affirmed the district court's holding that the third plaintiff failed to establish triable issues.The panel vacated the district court's dismissal of the pre-assault claim, holding that allegations that UC had actual knowledge or acted with deliberate indifference to a particular incident of harassment are unnecessary to sustain this theory of liability. Rather, all plaintiffs needed to allege are facts demonstrating (1) a school maintained a policy of deliberate indifference to reports of sexual misconduct, (2) which created a heightened risk of sexual harassment, (3) in a context subject to the school’s control, and (4) the plaintiff was harassed as a result. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Karasek v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

By calling a teacher’s instructional work in a specialized and separate school district educational program, provided outside of regular school instructional hours, an “extracurricular assignment,” the school district claimed the teacher had no tenure protection to that position and had no recourse when she was replaced by a non-tenured teacher and suffered a loss in compensation. The district wrapped the label “extracurricular” around the assignment even though the after-hours instructional program was provided by the school district in order to fulfill core curriculum requirements for certain students unable to fulfill those requirements through the school district’s day program. The teaching position in which petitioner served in the alternative education program was tenure eligible. Indeed, the Board of Education and the Commissioner both conceded that a person serving in that “BookBinders” position exclusively for the requisite period of time would have been entitled to tenure. But petitioner was denied tenure because she already held tenure in a teaching position in the district’s regular-education day-instruction program. After review, of the Commissioner of Education’s decision regarding the teacher’s tenure, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded petitioner met the statutory criteria for tenure, and that she was entitled to a remedy for the violation of her right not to be removed or reduced in salary while protected by tenure for her work in the BookBinders program. View "Melnyk v. Board of Education of the Delsea Regional High School District" on Justia Law

While at Rhodes College, Bose was accepted into the George Washington University medical school early selection program. Bose completed Professor Bea’s course, Organic Chemistry I. The following summer, Bea approached Bose on campus, asking personal questions and inviting her to have dinner. Bose declined. Bose took Bea’s Organic Chemistry II class the following semester. Bose also took a corresponding lab course with a different professor. Bea regularly visited the lab, starting conversations with Bose and offering to help her; he did not give the same attention to other students. Bea gave his students the option to take tests early. Bose often used this option and took tests in Bea’s office while he taught another class. After Bose asked Bea, in the presence of a classmate, to stop asking about her boyfriend and “keep the relationship professional,” Bea’s behavior changed. Bose claims Bea misrecorded her test score and would not respond to Bose’s requests for help. Bea told a colleague that he suspected a student of cheating, then created a fake answer key and stayed logged in on his computer. Bea later testified that Bose took Quiz 5 in Bea’s office and that her answers matched the fake answer key precisely. The Honor Council voted to expel Bose. An investigator determined that her allegations of sexual harassment could not be sustained.Bose sued, alleging retaliation under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681–88, and defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bose’s Title IX claim. There is no individual liability under Title IX; the court declined to apply the cat’s paw theory, which imputes the discriminatory animus of another to the funding recipient, as inconsistent with Title IX principles. The district court erred by holding that Bea’s statements were subject to absolute privilege under Tennessee defamation law. View "Bose v. Bea" on Justia Law

Duquesne petitioned for review of the Board's decision and order requiring the school to bargain with a union representing the school's adjunct facility. Duquesne argued that its religious mission places it beyond the Board's jurisdiction.The DC Circuit granted the petition for review, agreeing with the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals which have held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—read in light of the Religion Clauses—does not allow the Board to exercise jurisdiction over religious schools and their teachers in a series of cases over the past several decades. The court held that Pacific Lutheran University, 361 N.L.R.B. 1404 (2014), runs afoul of the court's decisions in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Carroll Coll. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which continue to govern the reach of the Board's jurisdiction under the NLRA in cases involving religious schools and their faculty members or teachers. Therefore, the court held that the Board has no jurisdiction in this case and the court need not address the remaining arguments. View "Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school district in an action brought by a parent, alleging that the school district violated his First Amendment rights by imposing a "Communication Plan," limiting his communications with school district employees regarding his daughters' education.The panel held that the Communication Plan did not violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights even if it restricted his speech; plaintiff failed to explain how the Communication Plan imposed unreasonable restrictions on his ability to share his concerns about his daughters' educational needs or any other topic; the Communication Plan addressed the manner in which plaintiff communicated with the school district – not the content of his speech or any viewpoints he wished to convey; and thus the panel agreed with the district court that the Communication Plan was a reasonable effort to manage a parent's relentless and unproductive communications with school district staff. View "L. F. v. Lake Washington School District #414" on Justia Law

Two former players for the St. Marys (Ohio) Memorial High School Football Team brought claims for federal Title IX violations and state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress against their coach, Frye. The players claim that Frye harassed them by using numerous derogatory terms—most notably, the term “pussy”—with the intent to insult (and presumably to motivate) the two in front of their teammates. The plaintiffs also sued the school board, superintendent, and athletic director for failing to address Frye’s conduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. As a matter of decency, Frye’s conduct was distasteful and offensive to many but as a matter of law, his conduct did not constitute sex-based discrimination, in violation of Title IX, nor was it conduct intolerable in a civilized society, in violation of Ohio tort law. Frye did not make sexual advances or act out of sexual desire. Frye was not motivated by general hostility to the presence of men. Frye did not treat men and women differently in a mixed-sex environment. View "Lininger v. St. Marys City School District Board of Education" on Justia Law