Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Shawn Jones, a teacher employed under a limited contract by the Kent City School District Board of Education, faced nonrenewal of his contract. The board was required by Ohio law (R.C. 3319.111(E)) to conduct three formal observations of Jones teaching before deciding on nonrenewal. The first observation occurred in January 2020, and the second in May 2020, both involving Jones actively teaching. However, the third observation, conducted in May 2020, only involved the evaluator attending a remote session with Jones’s students, which Jones could not attend due to a medical condition.The Portage County Court of Common Pleas initially affirmed the board’s decision not to renew Jones’s contract. Jones appealed, arguing that the board did not comply with the statutory requirement of observing him teaching three times. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the board failed to meet the statutory requirements because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the board did not comply with R.C. 3319.111(E) because the third observation did not involve observing Jones teaching. The court ordered the board to reinstate Jones and remanded the case to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas for the calculation of Jones’s back pay. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement of observing the teacher teaching is mandatory and cannot be substituted by observing students without the teacher’s presence. View "Jones v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn." on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. View "Smith v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the summary judgment entered by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Warrensville Heights in this real property dispute, holding that the agreement between the parties in this case was valid and enforceable.The Beachwood City School District Board of Education sought approval from the state board of education for a transfer of territory it annexed in 1990 to the Beachwood City School District. The Warrensville Heights City School District Board of Education, whose district the annexed territory was a part of, objected. In 1997, Beachwood and Warrensville Heights agreed that the territory would not transfer to the Beachwood City School District but that the districts would share the tax revenue generated from real property located within the territory. The court of common pleas granted summary judgment for Warrensville Heights, concluding that the parties' agreement was not valid. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1997 agreement required neither approval nor a fiscal certificate and therefore was valid and enforceable. View "Beachwood City School District Bd. of Education v. Warrensville Heights City School District Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal of a decision of the Ohio State Board of Education, holding that the state board's final determination that a charter school must repay approximately $60 million in excess funding could not be appealed under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119.In 2016, the Ohio Department of Education determined that the state had overpaid the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), formerly Ohio's largest charter school, approximately $60 million based on a review of the school's enrollment data. ECOT appealed under Ohio Rev. Code 3314.08(K)(2)(b), which allows a charter school to appeal such a decision to the board of education for an informal hearing. The state board confirmed the department of education's determination. At issue was whether ECOT could appeal the board of education's "final" decision where section 3314.08(K)(2)(d) provides that any decision made by the board on such an appeal is final. The Supreme Court concluded that ECOT had no right to appeal the decision under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 119. View "Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a resolution passed by the Madison Local School District Board of Education to authorize certain school district employees to carry a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on school property "for the welfare and safety of [its] students" did not comply with Ohio law.At issue was whether the training or experience that Ohio Rev. Code 109.78(D) required of a school employee, other than a security guard or special police officer, in which the employee goes armed while on duty, applied to teachers, administrators, and other school staff whom a board of education had authorized to carry a deadly weapon in a school safety zone. The trial court concluded that the training-or-experience requirement did not apply to teachers, administrators, and most other school employees. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the resolution violated section 109.78(D) to the extent it permitted school employees without the statutorily-required training or experience to carry a deadly weapon while on duty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the resolution violated section 109.78(D). View "Gabbard v. Madison Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Education (ODE) to approve Relators' applications for Quality Community School Support (QCSS) grants and to pay them the amounts due under 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166 (H.B. 166), holding that Relators were entitled to the writ.Under the QCSS program, a community school that has met certain criteria would receive grant funding for the 2020-2021 and 2021-2011 fiscal years. Relators, twelve Horizon Science Academy community schools, had applied for QCSS grants, but ODE denied the applications, concluding that ODE was not "in good standing" as required by section 265.335 of H.B. 166. The ODE's determination was made on the grounds that the schools' operator was a foreign corporation not licensed with the Ohio secretary of state. The Supreme Court granted Relators' requested writ of mandamus, holding that ODE's interpretation of "in good standing" was incorrect. View "State ex rel. Horizon Science Academy of Lorain, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Andrew Frank to compel the production of public records from the Clermont County prosecuting attorney, holding that Frank did not show that he was entitled to the writ.Frank filed this original action seeking four specific items, including a "packet of information" sent to the Ohio State University Office of Student Life/Student Conduct (OSU), damages, costs and attorney fees. The prosecutor provided the records that had been sent to OSU, thereby mooting the primary claim in Frank's mandamus complaint. In a subsequent merit brief, Frank asserted that a writ of mandamus was necessary to compel the prosecutor to produce any additional responsive records that may exist. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Frank failed to show that the prosecutor was currently withholding responsible documents; and (2) the prosecutor did not breach any obligation under the Public Records Act, and therefore, Frank was not entitled to attorney fees, statutory damages, or court costs. View "State ex rel. Frank v. Clermont County Prosecutor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals finding that Ohio Rev. Code 3319.321(B), a provision of the Ohio Student Privacy Act (OSPA), prohibits disclosure of records pertaining to a deceased former public-school student in response to a public-records request, holding that the OSPA unambiguously forbids disclosure of the requested records.Appellants each submitted a public-records request to the school district of Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools (the school district) requesting school records related to Connor Betts, who killed nine people in a mass shooting in Dayton. Betts was a graduate of a high school that was part of the school district. When the school district denied the requests Appellants filed this action for a writ of mandamus, arguing that they had a clear legal right to inspect Betts's records under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B). The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 3319.321(B) prohibits the disclosure of the records sought by Appellants. View "State ex rel. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Local Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Andrew Frank to compel Ohio State University (OSU) to provide documents that Frank's attorney had requested in a public-records request, holding that OSU responded promptly and fully to the attorney's request and that Frank was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.The records in question were student records containing "personally identifiable information." The parties disputed whether the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, applied to the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus without reaching the issue, holding that OSU responded promptly and fully to the attorney's request and, therefore, Frank was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Frank v. Ohio State University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that 2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 70 (H.B. 70) does not usurp the power of city school boards in violation of Ohio Const. art. VI, 3, and the bill received sufficient consideration for purposes of Ohio Const. art. II, 15(C).The purpose of H.B. 70 was to enact new sections within Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 3302 to authorize community schools and school districts to create community learning centers at schools where academic performance was low. After the bill was signed into law, Appellants moved for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction, arguing that H.B. 70 was unconstitutional, as was the General Assembly's legislative process in enacting it. The trial court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the enactment of H.B. 70 violated neither the three-consideration rule articulated in Article II, Section 15(C) nor the right of voters to decide the number of members and the organization of the district board of education, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 3. View "Youngstown City School District Board of Education v. State" on Justia Law