Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a teacher since 1976, was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. By 1999, she required insulin injections. Until 2008, plaintiff was never disciplined. In 2008, plaintiff was summoned to address allegations that she had been sleeping during class. Plaintiff claimed that she was not sleeping but rather exhibiting symptoms of diabetes. She was formally reprimanded and requested accommodations: training in recognizing symptoms of diabetes; assistance if she appeared asleep; and breaks for insulin injections. The superintendent allowed her to keep snacks in her classroom, to use the nurse’s office if she first obtained classroom coverage, and to disseminate diabetes information to students and staff. Plaintiff was subsequently suspended for missing classes, sleeping in class, and referring to Playgirl Magazine in class discussion. The Board decided to terminate her contract. Plaintiff was 71 years old. A referee upheld the termination. Instead of appealing, plaintiff filed suit, alleging age discrimination under Ohio law; failure to make reasonable accommodations (ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and state law); retaliation for engaging in protected activity (ADA and state law); and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to age discrimination, but reversed on other claims. View "Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Michigan adopted race-conscious admissions policies for public colleges and universities in the 1960s and 1970s, In 2003, the Supreme Court held that universities cannot establish racial quotas but could continue considering race or ethnicity as a ‘plus’ factor along with other relevant factors, On a 2006 statewide ballot, Proposal 2, to amend the Michigan Constitution “to prohibit all sex- and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting” passed by a margin of 58 to 42 percent and eliminated consideration of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions decisions. No other admissions criterion (grades, athletic ability, geographic diversity, or family alumni connections) was eliminated. Opponents filed suit, alleging that provisions affecting public colleges and universities violated the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. The district court issued postponed application of Proposal 2. In 2008, the district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the “existence of such a comparative structural burden” (making the policy constitutional in nature) undermines the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change. View "Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of MI" on Justia Law

McCormick was pursuing a graduate degree in psychology at Miami University in Ohio when she was diagnosed with several illnesses that slowed her progress in her graduate studies. After the faculty voted against promoting McCormick to doctoral status, she filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and disability in violation of state and federal laws. To circumvent the expired two-year statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, which provides an express cause of action against state actors, McCormick asserted federal claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed, concluding that McCormick’s discrimination claim under section 1981 was barred because section 1983 provided the exclusive means to bring a damages suit against state actors in either their official or individual capacities for violations of section 1981. The court also dismissed Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "McCormick v. Miami Univ." on Justia Law

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Rosebrough was born without a left hand. After she expressed interest in a job as a school bus driver, the supervisor informed her that a waiver is required from the Ohio Department of Education before an individual who is missing a limb is allowed to operate a school bus and told her to come to the office to pick up the waiver forms. Rosebrough received approval of the waiver. After having conflicts with her assigned trainer, Rosebrough stopped short of obtained her commercial driver’s license and filed suit asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Ohio Revised Code, 4112.02, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Rosebrough was not qualified to be a bus driver because she did not have a CDL, the district court granted summary judgment to the school. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Rosebrough’s ADA-covered position as a trainee was at issue, and she could not be required to have a CDL to be “otherwise qualified” for the position of training to obtain a CDL. Having a CDL was not necessary for Rosebrough to perform the essential functions of her training position View "Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch." on Justia Law

Branham began teaching in 1983 and was a tenured law professor. She sometimes suffered from seizures. She had a 12-month teaching contract for 2006. For the spring semester she was assigned to teach constitutional law and torts. Branham indicated that she did not want to teach the classes, citing health reasons and her greater experience with criminal law. She nonetheless taught the courses. In summer Branham sold her house, moved to Illinois, and was granted a leave of absence. Assigned to teach constitutional law after returning from leave, she refused to do so. The dean terminated her employment in December. Her contract required that dismissal be voted upon by faculty. That process was not initially followed. Branham sought damages for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed all but the contract claim, granted a motion to limit the remedy on the contract-breach claim to equitable relief, held that the school had breached the contract, and ordered compliance. Faculty and the board of directors concurred in the dismissal. The district court entered judgment against Branham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch." on Justia Law

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities. View "Doe v. Merrill Comty Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity. View "Howell v. Sander" on Justia Law

A Caucasian high school football player (H) accidentally hit an African-American team member (D) with his car, causing D to suffer a sprained ankle. H got out and apologized. D threatened to kill him. The principal had instructed staff to be lenient with African-Americans because too many were serving suspensions. Although the Code of Conduct prohibits threats, the school did not discipline D. D's parents threatened suit. The principal admitted suspending H for 10 days to "cover" himself and the school. H's witness statements were not provided to panelists in advance. H's attorney was limited to passing notes and not allowed to present witnesses. Employees were informed that they would lose their jobs if they attended the hearing. The board sustained the charge of reckless endangerment and suspension, so that it went on H's record. An appeal was denied. Before his suspension, college recruiters had approached H and a congressman had offered an appointment, the first step to attend a military academy. H alleges he lost those opportunities. The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for substantive due process violations, failure to train, and negligence; claims by H's parents; claims against individuals in their official capacities; claims against the board of education and the public school system. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss procedural due process and equal protection claims based on the conduct of three defendants and that those defendants are not protected by qualified immunity.View "Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Proposal 2, a successful voter-initiated amendment to the Michigan Constitution, became effective in 2006 and prohibited public colleges from granting "preferential treatment to[] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." The district court entered summary judgment upholding Proposal 2. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and applying strict scrutiny because the enactment changed the governmental decision-making process for determinations with a racial focus. Proposal 2 targets a program that "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority" and reorders the political process in Michigan in such a way as to place "special burdens" on racial minorities. Admissions committees are political decision-making bodies and the Proposal is more than a mere repeal of desegregation laws. The court noted the procedural obstacles that would be faced by minorities favoring race-based admissions.