Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Krieger, age 53, cannot pay her debts. She lives with her mother in a rural community; they have only monthly income from governmental programs. She is too poor to move and her car, more than 10 years old, needs repairs. She lacks Internet access. In her bankruptcy proceeding, Educational Credit moved to exempt her student loans from discharge; 11 U.S.C.523(a)(8) excludes educational loans “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor.” The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, noting that Krieger, although unable to pay even $1 per year, had not enrolled in a program that offered a 25-year payment schedule. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Krieger. “Undue hardship” requires showing that the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay; that additional circumstances exist indicating that this situation is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period; and that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay. The court noted that Krieger incurred the debt to obtain paralegal training at a community college, has made about 200 applications in 10 years, and used a substantial part of her divorce settlement to pay off as much of the educational loan as possible. View "Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 10, a budget repair bill proposed by recently-elected Governor Walker. Act 10 significantly altered state public employee labor laws, creating two classes of public employees: “public safety employees” and all others, “general employees.” The Act prohibited general employees from collectively bargaining on issues other than “base wages,” imposed rigorous recertification requirements on them, and prohibited their employers from deducting union dues from paychecks. The Act did not subject public safety employees or their unions to the same requirements. The enactment was controversial and received nationwide publicity. Unions filed suit, challenging the limitations on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a prohibition on payroll deduction of dues, under the Equal Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction provision under the First Amendment. The district court invalidated Act 10’s recertification and payroll deduction provisions, but upheld the limitation on collective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act is valid in its entirety. Act 10 is viewpoint-neutral and, while “publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ exercise of First Amendment rights, [states are] under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities.” The classifications and recertification requirement survive rational basis review. View "WI Educ. Ass'n v. Walker" on Justia Law

A suit on behalf of a 14-year-old, eighth grade boy alleged that the failure of the public school district to prevent sexual abuse by a female teacher violated the student’s rights under Title IX of the federal Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress under Wisconsin law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district; claims against the teacher remain pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a private suit under Title IX, a school district cannot be held liable on the ground of respondeat superior for an employee’s violation absent proof of actual notice and deliberate indifference. That other teachers suspected improper conduct and administrators investigated and accepted the teacher’s denials does not establish knowledge or deliberate indifference. . View "N. R. Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Hoppe is a tenured professor of Philosophy at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics after the new chair of the Aviation Department, Brogan, deemed her unqualified because she had no formal training in aviation, had never worked in the industry, and had not obtained any degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During the two years before her removal from the course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation. She sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court awarded the university summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions or her inability to perform them, the undisputed evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe three different accommodations, which she rejected, and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe has no evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and Brogan’s decision and failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. View "Hoppe v. Lewis Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity. View "Gschwind v. Heiden" on Justia Law

Park hoped to become a dental surgeon when she enrolled at the Indiana University School of Dentistry (IUSD) in 2006. After one year at the school, Park began to experience a series of serious setbacks, including several failing grades and allegations of professional misconduct. Eventually, the school dismissed her. Park appealed without success to school committees and administrators. The district court dismissed her suit, alleging Equal Protection and Due Process violations, as well as claims for state law breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Park did not allege bad faith in the dismissal and had no contract claim. Park’s interest in becoming a dentist is not one that the due process clause protects. Park did not allege intentional discrimination. View "Park v. IN Univ. Sch. of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim. View "Capeheart v. Terrell" on Justia Law

ITT is a for-profit corporation that runs “ITT Technical Institutes” throughout the country, including Lathrop, California. Halasa was the Lathrop Campus’s College Director for six months in 2009. ITT says that Halasa was fired for poor management skills and delivering inadequate results; Halasa alleges that he was fired in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), after identifying and reporting several irregularities in the way ITT was handling its federally subsidized loans and grants for students. The district court granted ITT summary judgment and costs. Even if Halasa did engage in protected conduct under the Act, he did not establish that he was fired because of this conduct. There was no evidence that decision-makers were made aware of his reporting. View "Halasa v. ITT Educational Servs., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the court reversed in part. The public school graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of a Christian church, violated the Constitution. The court noted that it was not making a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of church-owned facilities, nor was it criticizing cases permitting governmental use, in the proper context, of certain church-owned facilities. When confronted with an Establishment Clause challenge of this nature, the Supreme Court requires examination of the context in which government interacts with a religious organization. Here, the involvement of minors, the significance of the graduation ceremony, and the conditions of extensive proselytization prove too much for the district’s actions to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause. View "Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist." on Justia Law