Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants are a sub-class of moderately to severely disabled children who have moved to intervene in a class action brought on behalf of all disabled students in the LAUSD against the LAUSD (the Chanda Smith Litigation). Appellants seek to intervene to challenge the legality of a new policy, adopted by LAUSD in 2012 as part of a renegotiation of the Chanda Smith parties’ settlement. The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and further erred when it found intervention unnecessary to protect appellants’ interest in ensuring the receipt of public education consistent with their disabilities and federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. LAUSD" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her son prevailed at both hearings concerning their due process complaint against the District. At issue on appeal is the district court's award of attorney fees, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415, to petitioner's attorney, Tania Whiteleather. The district court awarded $7,780 in fees, substantially less than the $66,420 requested. The court concluded that the outcome of the administrative hearing was not more favorable to petitioner than the District's settlement offer and petitioner was not substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply the $400 rate without seeking additional rebuttal evidence from the District. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's claim for paralegal fees was barred by collateral estoppel because the district court had already concluded that Dr. Susan Burnett was an education consultant in the expedited hearing appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

A.G. and her parents filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–12134, as well as tort claims under Arizona state law. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims for defendants. Defendants cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s order vacating taxation of costs. The parties settled on other claims, including claims under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1491. First, the court clarified federal legislation addressing special education for disabled children. The court concluded that the district court improperly dismissed A.G.’s meaningful access and reasonable accommodation arguments. The court concluded that a triable factual dispute exists as to whether the services plaintiffs fault the school district for failing to provide were actually reasonable, necessary, and available accommodations for A.G. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the school district on plaintiffs’ section 504 and Title II claims and remanded for further consideration. In regard to the state law claims, the court concluded that plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim was correctly dismissed because there is no material issue of fact concerning the school district's conduct. Plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim was also correctly dismissed where the district court found the facts alleged by plaintiffs did not rise to the predicate level typically required for such a claim in Arizona. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on claims for assault and battery where plaintiffs introduced evidence that creates an issue of fact as to whether the school district defendants physically escorted and restrained A.G. when she was not a danger to herself or others and despite knowing of her tactile sensitivity. Finally, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim where plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether A.G. was a danger to herself or others when school district staff restrained her. The order denying costs to defendants is vacated. View "A.G. V. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

The government filed suit to collect unpaid federally reinsured student loans from defendant. The Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 (HETA) eliminated all statutes of limitations on actions to recover on defaulted federally guaranteed student loans. The court concluded that HETA did not violate defendant's due process rights because HETA’s elimination of the limitations period for actions to collect on federally guaranteed student loans does not result in a denial of due process. In this case, the government established a prima facie case through certificates of indebtedness, which were signed under the penalty of perjury, showing that defendant executed promissory notes to secure loans, defaulted on the loans, and owed the United States certain amounts after offsets from various sources. Defendant failed to present sufficient evidentiary facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact or a question as to liability for the alleged indebtedness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the government. View "United States v. Falcon" on Justia Law