Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Southern Illinois University (SIU) hired Dr. Hatcher as an assistant professor of political science. In 2010 Hatcher assisted a graduate student in making a sexual harassment complaint about a faculty member. Hatcher was up for tenure and promotion to associate professor in 2011. Hatcher had received positive annual evaluations. Her external reviewers all recommended tenure.The political science department voted in favor of promotion and tenure. The College of Liberal Arts committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and 5‐4 against promotion, noting Hatcher’s success in teaching and service, but expressing concern about her lack of academic publications in prestigious journals. The dean recommended that she receive neither tenure nor promotion. The provost agreed. Hatcher was denied tenure and, later, fired. Two male professors in Hatcher’s department were promoted and awarded tenure. The Review Board found that the provost did not sufficiently explain his decision; the Chancellor agreed, but declined to reverse the denial. Hatcher filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her subsequent suit was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Hatcher did not produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU was lying about its reason for denying her tenure; she was not engaging in speech protected under Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the student with the sexual harassment report. The court reversed dismissal of her claim of retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC. View "Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1994, Shott, a tenured associate professor of biostatistics at Rush University, sued, claiming discrimination by refusing to make reasonable accommodations for her religion (Orthodox Judaism) and disability (rheumatoid arthritis). A jury rejected Shott’s claim of religious discrimination but awarded her $60,000 for disability discrimination. She sued Rush again in 2011, alleging that Rush refused to increase her salary or promote her in retaliation for her earlier lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Rush. While that lawsuit was pending, Shott sued Katz (42 U.S.C. 1981), whom she had occasionally helped with statistical analysis, alleging that, in retaliation for her litigation Katz impeded her career advancement by rebuffing her invitations to collaborate. Katz was also Shott’s treating rheumatologist; she claimed he failed to timely respond to requests for prescription refills, requiring her to have an examination every six months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that Shott had not alleged that Katz’s medical care affected Shott's employment. Nor did the examination requirement amount to a material adverse action. “If she was not willing to comply with that obviously reasonable condition, she should have tried to find a new doctor, not filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.” Shott failed to allege a sufficient “nexus” between Katz’s refusal to collaborate and her career advancement; Katz’s decisions about what research to pursue, and with whom, are protected by the First Amendment. View "Shott v. Katz" on Justia Law

After he was temporarily suspended from Watseka Community High School for allegedly consuming or possessing drugs, Dietchweiler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights, with state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and violations of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-22.6, which provides procedures for suspending and expelling students. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the due process claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrators explained to Dietchwieler and his parents the general nature of the charges against him and provided him with a written suspension notice. Most of Dietchweiler’s complaints about the hearing relate to the defendants’ alleged failure to follow their own published policies and procedures, but failure to follow state statutes or state-mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due process claim of constitutional magnitude. While the Board disbelieved the evidence he presented, due process does not guarantee that his version of events will be believed. View "Dietchweiler v. Lucas" on Justia Law

The Board of Education has a written policy that forbids teachers from using racial epithets in front of students, no matter the purpose. Brown, a Chicago sixth grade teacher, caught students passing a note in class. The note contained music lyrics with the offensive word “nigger.” Brown used the episode as an opportunity to conduct an apparently well‐intentioned discussion of why such words must not be used. The school principal happened to observe the lesson. Brown was suspended and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Two of his theories were rejected on summary judgment: that his suspension violated his First Amendment rights, and that the school’s policy was so vague that his suspension violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating “not everything that is undesirable, annoying, or even harmful amounts to a violation of the law, much less a constitutional problem.” Public‐employee speech is subject to a special set of First Amendment rules. Brown himself emphasized that he was speaking as a teacher, an employee, not as a citizen, so his suspension did not implicate his First Amendment rights. Brown’s surprise at being disciplined, along with a few episodes of non‐enforcement, do not support a substantive due process claim. View "Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In November 2010, Board of Education Chief Area Officer Coates sent Bordelon , the long-tenured principal of the Kozminski Academy, notice of a pre‐discipline hearing based on insubordination in failing to respond to a parent issue; failing to arrange a requested meeting regarding the arrest of Kozminski students; and failing to respond to Coates’s email. Bordelon received a five‐day suspension without pay, which he never served. In December 2010, Coates evaluated Bordelon as needing improvement, noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for a second year with test scores trending downward. Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending an investigation into improperly replacing asbestos‐containing tile at Kozminski; purchasing irregularities; and tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded Board access to Kozminski’s records. In early 2011, Kozminski's Local School Council voted to not renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon, age 63, believed that Coates, exercised undue influence over the decision, based his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, stating that that Bordelon did not prove discrimination and that there was substantial evidence of independent reasons for not renewing Bordelon’s contract, making it unlikely that Coates influenced the Board. View "Bordelon v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

ACT, Inc. and The College Board (collectively, Defendants) are national testing agencies that administer the ACT and SAT college entrance exams. When a student applies to take a test, Defendants obtain some of the student’s personally identifiable information (PII). As part of the examination process, some students authorize Defendants to share certain PII with participating educational organizations through an information exchange program. In 2014, a group of former information exchange program participants (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a putative class action complaint against Defendants, alleging that they were harmed because the testing agencies did not disclose that the students’ PII was actually sold to the educational organizations for profit. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s factual allegations failed to establish a plausible claim of Article III standing. View "Silha v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law