Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a disabled child, Abigail P., who filed a due process complaint against the Old Forge School District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Pennsylvania state law. Abigail, who suffers from severe disabilities, claimed that the school district denied her a free appropriate public education (FAPE) when it moved to remote instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic.The case was first heard by a hearing officer appointed by the Pennsylvania Department of Education, who disagreed with Abigail's claim. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania also disagreed and affirmed the hearing officer's decision.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court was tasked with deciding whether Abigail received a FAPE during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that the school district did not deny Abigail a FAPE. The court concluded that the school district provided an educational program reasonably calculated to confer meaningful educational benefits in light of Abigail's individual circumstances, even during the period of remote instruction. The court also clarified that its opinion does not give school districts carte blanche to reduce a disabled student’s school day for any reason or no reason at all. View "Abigail P. v. Old Forge School District" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-verbal student, Alexandre Le Pape, and his family who repeatedly requested that the Lower Merion School District change his educational program to include a new communication protocol known as "Spelling to Communicate" (S2C). The school district denied these requests, leading to Alexandre's withdrawal from public education. The family filed an administrative special education due process complaint against the school district, alleging that the district failed to protect Alexandre's rights and denied him a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under various laws. An administrative hearing officer ruled against the family on all claims, leading them to file a suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.The District Court granted the school district's motions for summary judgment on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim and judgment on the administrative record for the denial-of-FAPE claims. The Le Papes appealed the court's decision, arguing that the court granted judgment without applying the summary judgment standard to which they were entitled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the school district on the Le Papes' ADA discrimination claim and judgment on the administrative record for their discrimination claims under both the ADA and Section 504. The court clarified that a denial-of-FAPE claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) can be resolved through an administrative appeal, but ADA and Section 504 discrimination claims seeking compensatory damages, even if on the same facts, should be resolved through summary judgment and, possibly, trial. View "Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District" on Justia Law

A student, Brooklyn, and her parent, Gabrielle M., filed a complaint against the Upper Darby School District, alleging that the district failed to provide Brooklyn with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The family claimed that the district had not fulfilled its "Child Find" obligation to identify Brooklyn as eligible for services under Section 504 until fourth grade, despite requests for a comprehensive evaluation as early as kindergarten. The family also argued that the district's 504 plan for Brooklyn was inadequate.The case was first heard by a special education hearing officer, who ruled that the district had denied Brooklyn a FAPE by providing an inadequate 504 plan, but had not violated its Child Find obligation. The family then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision and granted judgment on the administrative record to the School District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's decision, stating that the court had erred in not separately analyzing the Child Find claim under Section 504, despite the broader definition of disability under Section 504 compared to the IDEA. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further analysis of the Child Find claim under Section 504. View "B. M. v. Upper Darby School District" on Justia Law

Paul Montemuro was elected as the President of the Jim Thorpe Area School Board. However, a week later, the Board elected someone else without giving Montemuro any prior notice. Montemuro sued the Board members who voted against him and the Jim Thorpe Area School District, alleging that they had deprived him of his property without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants claimed qualified immunity.The District Court held that Montemuro had a clearly established property right in his employment and had been deprived of that right without due process. The defendants appealed this decision, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court found that Pennsylvania law clearly established that Montemuro had a property interest in his job as the Board President. The Court also accepted Montemuro's allegation that he was removed from office without notice. Therefore, the Court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had violated Montemuro's clearly established right to due process. View "Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School District" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students. View "Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

The universities, Pitt and Temple, offer traditional, on-campus educational programs. Temple also offers fully online distance-learning programs, which are separately advertised and priced. Students who enrolled in the Universities’ traditional on-campus programs for the Spring 2020 semester were required to pay tuition and mandatory fees and to sign a Financial Responsibility Agreement (FRA). On March 11, 2020, then-Governor Wolf ordered a temporary closure of all non-life-sustaining businesses, citing the rising number of COVID-19 cases. The Universities closed campus buildings, canceled all on-campus student events, announced that classes would be conducted online for the remainder of the semester, and urged students not to return to campus housing. Neither university offered any reduction in tuition or mandatory fees. Temple issued pro-rata housing and dining refunds. Pitt did so only for students who moved out by April 3, 2020.Students sued for breach of contract, or, alternatively, unjust enrichment, citing the Universities’ “website[s], academic catalogs, student handbooks, marketing materials, and other circulars, bulletins, and publications,” which described the benefits of campus life, and the reduced pricing for online courses.The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissals of both suits. There is no express contract precluding the implied contract or unjust enrichment claims. The FRAs function as promissory notes, not integrated contracts. The students adequately pleaded their implied contract claims as to tuition in exchange for in-person education, Pitt’s mandatory fees, and Temple’s university services fee—but not as to Pitt’s housing and dining fees. The students also adequately pleaded unjust enrichment. View "Hickey v. University of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Porat, the Dean of the Fox School of Business at Temple University, was “almost obsessed with rankings.” To manipulate Fox’s U.S. New and World Report rankings, he submitted false information about students taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), offers of admission, student debt, and average undergraduate GPA. Partly because of these deceptions, With Porat’s knowledge and involvement, Fox aggressively marketed its false high rankings. At trial, former students testified that they chose Fox because of its rankings or that they believed employers hire students from schools with the best “brand” and that Fox’s high rankings would help them “compete in the marketplace.” The government estimated that Fox gained nearly $40 million in tuition from the additional students who enrolled during 2014–2018. In 2018, Porat’s scheme was exposed. Fox administrators disclosed the false GMAT data to U.S. News, which announced Fox’s “misreported data.” As Fox’s rankings fell, its enrollment fell.The Third Circuit affirmed Porat’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and wire fraud, section 1343. The government proved by sufficient evidence that he sought to deprive his victims of money, that he sought to personally obtain money, or that the party he deceived was the same party he defrauded of money (“convergence” View "United States v. Porat" on Justia Law

Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law