Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus alleging that his rights had been violated by the denial of his parole. The circuit court found, among other things, that Appellant failed to establish that he had a right to be paroled, that the Due Process Clause does not create a protected liberty interest for an inmate to have a specific release and parole-eligibility date, and that the denial of Appellant's parole was not a new punishment in violation of double jeopardy. In affirming, the Supreme Court held that Appellant failed to establish a right or a performance of a duty for which the writ should issue. View "Warren v. Felts" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging a Title IX student-on-student harassment claim against Culver-Stockton College after she was allegedly sexually assaulted by a Culver-Stockton student on campus. The court held that, assuming arguendo that plaintiff's status as a non-student did not preclude her from asserting a Title IX harassment claim, the complaint failed to state a plausible claim to survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In this case, plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the college acted with deliberate indifference, the college had actual knowledge of discrimination, and that either the alleged misconduct or the college's response to plaintiff's allegations had the required systemic effect such that she was denied equal access to educational opportunities provided by the college. View "K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College" on Justia Law

J.S., a student at a middle school, was suspended for fifteen days for a post made on a social media website that caused a substantial disruption at her school. J.S. requested an administrative hearing to contest her removal. The superintendent and board of education each upheld J.S.’s suspension. J.S. filed a petition with the district court to appeal the board’s decision. The district court affirmed, concluding that the suspension did not exceed the authority provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-264 and 79-267. J.S. appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that J.S. failed to seek district court review in the mode and manner provided by statute, and therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Student Discipline Act. As a result, the district court’s decision was void. View "J.S. v. Grand Island Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the school district did not offer her daughter a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On appeal, the school district challenged an award in favor of plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit held, without adopting the characterization that the district court created a new category of IDEA private school student, that the district court's order could not be supported based on a requirement of temporary services for transfer students; plaintiff took a financial gamble of not being reimbursed when she placed her daughter in a private school without first allowing the school district to seek to comply with its obligations under IDEA; and, although the district court failed to recognize the proper private school placement, that failure did not create a penalty beyond what otherwise would be owed. Because the district court erred by holding that the school district was obligated to provide temporary services and by ordering reimbursement of the costs associated with such services, the court reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the school district failed to make a timely offer of FAPE, thereby making reimbursement an appropriate form of relief. The court remanded for the district court to determine the amount of reimbursement owed from April 24, 2014, to the end of the school year. View "Dallas Independent School District v. Woody" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her son, alleging that VICC's race-based, school-transfer policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiff lacked standing because the mention of magnet schools and the generalized grievance about VICC's transfer policy for them was insufficient to allege an injury in fact. In this case, VICC had no administrative or supervisory authority over charter schools, which are independent public schools, governed by the state. Even if VICC's policy applied to charter schools, VICC still would not cause the son's injury because VICC does not make or adopt rules or regulations for charter schools. Because the son's injury was not fairly traceable to VICC, he lacked standing. View "E.L. v. Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals affirming the district court’s dismissal of the State’s amended complaint against Minnesota School of Business and Globe University (the Schools). The State alleged that the Schools charged usurious interest rates and made loans without the required license for making private student loans at interest rates of up to eighteen percent. The State’s amended complaint sought permanent statutory injunctive relief to stop the Schools from engaging in unlicensed and usurious lending. The district court granted summary judgment for the Schools. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Schools charged usurious interest rates in violation of Minn. Stat. 334.01(1); and (2) the Schools were required to obtain a lending license under Minn. Stat. 56.01(a), and their failure to do so meant that they engaged in unlicensed lending. View "State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability. Appellee, Judge Robert McClelland, granted Appellant’s motion for judicial release and placed him on community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had failed to make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.20(J) before granting judicial release. Thereafter, the trial court revoked Appellant’s judicial release and ordered him to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. The trial court subsequently filed an entry stating that the court of appeals’ order had been rendered moot. Appellant sought writs of mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals to compel Judge McClellan to comply with the prior appellate judgment reversing the grant of judicial release. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to prove that Judge McClellan exercised unauthorized judicial power and that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy at law exists. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. McClelland" on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from the desegregation of the school district, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the School Board's latest proposed candidate, approving instead the candidate supported by plaintiffs and the Court Compliance Officer. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the academic-qualifications requirement and the selection-and-approval process. The court also held that the district court did not err by denying the motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) where a candidate's role with the Ministerial Alliance did not justify holding that the district court abused its discretion in appointing the candidate as Chief Desegregation Implementation Officer (CDIO). View "Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s convictions for six counts of perjury but affirmed her convictions for six counts of offering false or forged instruments for filing. The convictions stemmed from Defendant’s act of signing a sworn verification that she personally circulated nominating petitions containing voters’ signatures in order to get her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States Senate. Defendant, however, did not personally circulate these petitions, which she submitted to the Secretary of State. The Supreme Court held (1) signing a nominating petition under a written oath before submitting it to a state authority is not a statement made in a “proceeding or action” under S.D. Codified Laws 22-29-1, and therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the perjury charges; (2) submitting a nominating petition with a circulator’s verification signed by someone other than the person who circulated the petition is offering a false or forged instrument under S.D. Codified Laws 22-11-28.1; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for offering false or forged instruments for filing. View "State v. Bosworth" on Justia Law

Crosby, a tenured professor at the University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department Chair amounted to a deprivation of his protected property and liberty interests without due process of law. He claimed that the defendants were not protected by qualified immunity and were liable under contract law for monetary damages. Before his removal, Crosby had been investigated for being “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,” “very condescending,” and “out of control.” The report included an allegation that Crosby stated that the Associate Dean for Research had been appointed “because she is a woman, genitalia” and contained claims that the Department’s performance was suffering as a result of Crosby’s temper and hostility toward other departments. The University declined Crosby’s request to handle his appeal under a proposed Governing Regulation and stated that existing regulations would apply. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of his claims.Crosby identified no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair; “the unlawfulness” of the defendants’ actions was not apparent “in the light of pre-existing law,” so they were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crosby v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law