Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Education Savings Account (ESA) program allows public funds to be transferred from the State Distributive School Account (DSA) into private education savings accounts maintained for the benefit of school-aged children to pay for non-public educational services and expenses. Two complaints were brought challenging the ESA program as violating several provisions of the Education Article in the Nevada Constitution. The district court dismissed one complaint after rejecting the constitutional claims. In the other case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that one of the constitutional challenges had merit. The Supreme Court resolved the appeals together in this opinion and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court orders in both cases, holding (1) the ESA program is not contrary to the legislature’s constitutional duty to provide for a uniform system of common schools and does not violate Article 11, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution; but (2) the use of money appropriated for K-12 public education to instead fund education savings accounts undermines the constitutional mandates to fund public education. Remanded for the entry of a final declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction enjoining the use of any money appropriated for K-12 public education in the DSA to instead fund the education savings accounts. View "Schwartz v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Governor ordered a 4.5 percent budget reduction in the fourth quarter of the 2015-2016 fiscal year that extended to the state’s nine institutions of high education (collectively, the Universities). That same year, the Governor revised the allotments to each institution so that eight institutions’ budget reductions were amended to two percent. The Attorney General filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor, the State Budget Director, the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and the State Treasurer, challenging this action. Three members of the House of Representatives joined as intervening plaintiffs. The Governor moved to dismiss the case claiming that the Attorney General and legislators lacked standing and that his actions were legal. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Governor, concluding (1) the Attorney General had standing, and (2) the Governor had statutory authority to revise downward the Universities’ allotments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Attorney General had standing the challenge the Governor’s actions, but the individual legislators did not; and (2) the Governor’s reduction of the allotments of the Universities exceeded his statutory authority to revise allotments and to withhold allotments. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Commonweath Office of the Gov. ex rel. Bevin" on Justia Law

Jon Krakauer, a journalist and resident of Colorado, published a book chronicling instances of alleged sexual misconduct on or near the Missoula campus of the University of Montana. This case involved Krakauer’s request for release of certain student records related to one instance of allegations of sexual assault. The Commissioner of Higher Education denied Krakauer’s request, and Krakauer filed a petition in the district court citing the right to know under the Montana Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to Krakauer and ordered the Commissioner to make available for inspection the requested records. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) and state statute provide an exception for release of information pursuant to a lawfully issued court order; and (2) the records at issue in this case appear to fall under the “personally identifiable information” protection granted by FERPA. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Krakauer v. Comm’n of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their respective daughters J.C. and T.H., filed suit against District Defendants and NYSED Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs did not make a prima facie showing of discrimination against District Defendants pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. 794 et seq. In this case, plaintiffs' disparate impact claim relies exclusively on data concerning students with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court concluded that, aside from their receipt of special education services, the record is devoid of any evidence as to whether the students included in the data qualify as disabled under the ADA or Section 504. Because, as a matter of law, an IDEA disability does not necessarily constitute a disability under the ADA or Section 504, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ data does not establish “a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices.” Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to make their prima facie showing that District Defendants’ academic intervention services (AIS) policy adversely impacted individuals protected by the ADA and Section 504. The court concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of District Defendants as to the ADA and Section 504 claims. Likewise, the district court properly entered summary judgment on their derivative Section 1983 claim against the District Defendants. The court affirmed the judgment. View "B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, students who are currently enrolled in the District's public school system, filed suit alleging that a majority of the School Board are of the Orthodox/Hasidic Jewish faith or are sympathetic to the interests of the Orthodox/Hasidic Jewish community. Plaintiffs claim that the Board Defendants have promoted the Hasidic Jewish faith in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' unconstitutional actions contributed to the defunding of the public school system, which in turn injured plaintiffs by depriving them of educational opportunities and by damaging their psychological and mental well‐being.The court held that plaintiffs lack standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim against defendants because they are only indirectly affected by the conduct alleged to violate the Establishment Clause. Therefore, it is unnecessary to decide whether defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. View "Montesa v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

J.G.’s mother, Gohl, enrolled J.G. (age 3) in the Webster School Moderate Cognitive Impairment Program. During the year, his teacher,Turbiak, a 12-year special education teacher, faced criticism that she was overly harsh. It was reported that she pushed on children’s shoulders, once force-fed a gagging and crying student, and lifted children by one arm. During a meeting with Principal Moore, Turbiak admitted that she was “stressed out.” Although Moore told Turbiak not to do so, Turbiak called a meeting to find out who had complained. Turbiak’s co-workers returned to Moore, fearing retaliation. Turbiak was sent home for a few days and warned to be more professional, or face disciplinary action. The letter did not accuse Turbiak of abusing students. For four months, no one reported any problems. Then a social worker saw Turbiak “grab [J.G.] by the top of his head and jerk it back quite aggressively.” Turbiak claimed she was using a “redirecting” technique to focus J.G.’s attention after he threw a toy. A special education teacher familiar with this technique thought this sounded reasonable and returned Turbiak to her classroom. After a subsequent investigation, the district placed Turbiak on administrative leave. Gohl sued on J.G.’s behalf. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants; Gohl did not sufficiently allege violation of the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. View "Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

On a January 2013 school day, Christina Regusters entered Bryant Elementary School in Philadelphia, where Jane was enrolled in kindergarten. Regusters went directly to Jane’s classroom, where she encountered Littlejohn, Jane’s teacher. Per School District policy, Littlejohn asked Regusters to produce identification and verification that Jane had permission to leave school. Regusters failed to do so. Littlejohn nonetheless allowed Jane to leave with Regusters. Regusters sexually assaulted Jane off school premises, causing her significant physical and emotional injuries. In the early hours of the next morning, a sanitation worker found the child in a playground after hearing her cries. The district court denied a motion to dismiss a "state-created danger" lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, rejecting an assertion of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the allegations sufficiently stated a constitutional violation of the young child’s clearly established right to be free from exposure by her teacher to an obvious danger. It is “shocking to the conscience that a kindergarten teacher would allow a child in his care to leave his classroom with a complete stranger.” View "L.R. v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

L.J.’s mother filed suit in federal district court to require the school district to provide L.J. with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) to provide specialized services to assist with what she contends are serious disabilities. The district court reviewed the record and found that L.J. was disabled under three categories defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that an IEP for specialized services was not necessary because of L.J.’s satisfactory performance in general education classes. The court concluded that L.J. clearly exhibited behavioral and academic difficulty during the snapshot period where he threatened and attempted to kill himself on three occasions in 2012; in the fall, he frequently acted out at school, and continued to have needs associated with his medication regimen; and the district court should not have discounted these facts. The court concluded that they demonstrate that L.J. required special education services. Because L.J. is eligible for special education, the school district must formulate an IEP. The court also concluded that the school district clearly violated important procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA. In this case, the school district failed to disclose assessments, treatment plans, and progress notes, which deprived L.J.’s mother of her right to informed consent. The school district also failed to conduct a health assessment, which rendered the school district and IEP team unable to evaluate and address L.J.’s medication and treatment related needs. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "L. J. V. Pittsburg U.S.D." on Justia Law

C.R. challenged his suspension, for sexually harassing two younger students, in district court under the First Amendment. C.R. argued that because the harassment occurred off-campus, in a public park, the school lacked the authority to discipline him. C.R. also challenged his suspension on due process grounds. The district court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The court upholds a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge. In this case, the school administration’s investigation uncovered at least some evidence that C.R. participated in sexually suggestive joking directed at the younger students. The court concluded that the school district's characterization of this behavior as sexual harassment in its Student Handbook is reasonable. Thus, the court deferred to the school district’s determination that C.R. participated in sexual harassment. The court concluded that the school district had the authority to discipline C.R. for his off-campus, sexually harassing speech where the speech occurred exclusively between students, in close temporal and physical proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously demarcated from the campus itself. The court concluded that a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community. The court also concluded that the school district's decision to suspend C.R. for two days for sexual harassment was permissible under Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. because sexually harassing speech, by definition, interferes with the victims' ability to feel safe and secure at school. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the school district on C.R.'s First Amendment claims. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the school district afforded C.R. all the process that he was due and that C.R. failed to raise any viable substantive due process claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J" on Justia Law