Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appeal by a student, Matthew Boermeester, who was expelled from the University of Southern California (USC) for intimate partner violence. Following his expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied. He then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which initially ruled in his favor, concluding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.After the case was remanded back to the Court of Appeal, Boermeester argued that USC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC's use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that substantial evidence supported USC's decision and there was no denial of fair process in USC's use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process.The court also noted that Boermeester's claims of investigator bias were unsupported and that he was provided a substantial amount of process, including multiple layers of review. Boermeester's argument that the investigator's conduct of phone interviews contravened USC's policy was also rejected. The court concluded that there was nothing inherently unfair about USC's combined investigator-adjudicator model or the specific procedures followed in this case. Therefore, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Parents Protecting Our Children, an association of parents, sought an injunction against the Eau Claire Area School District in Wisconsin to stop the enforcement of the District’s Administrative Guidance for Gender Identity Support. The parents argued that the policy violated the Due Process and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution by interfering with their right to make decisions on behalf of their children. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the parents failed to identify any instance where the policy was applied in a way that infringed on parental rights.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the parents' concerns about potential applications of the policy did not establish standing to sue unless the policy resulted in an injury or created an imminent risk of injury. The court stated that the parents had brought a pre-enforcement facial challenge against the policy without any evidence of the School District applying the policy in a manner detrimental to parental rights.The court also noted that the Administrative Guidance did not mandate exclusion of parents from discussions or decisions regarding a student’s gender expression at school. The court found that the alleged harm was dependent on a speculative "chain of possibilities," which was insufficient to establish Article III standing. Therefore, the court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was required to make a decision on a case involving a high school student, M.G., who was expelled on an emergency basis by Yakima School District No. 7 (the District). The District later extended the expulsion to a long-term suspension without providing M.G. with the statutorily required procedural protections. The Court of Appeals found that M.G. was indefinitely suspended in violation of his statutory procedural rights and reversed the dismissal of M.G.’s suit by the superior court.M.G., a high school student, had previously signed a behavior agreement, or “gang contract." He was expelled from school for violating this contract and for his involvement in an altercation with another student. The District converted M.G.’s 10-day emergency expulsion into a long-term suspension. M.G. was later enrolled in an online learning program, which did not meet his academic needs.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the District’s decision was disciplinary and that M.G. had a right to due process, which was violated. The court determined that under RCW 28A.600.015(1) and WAC 392-400-430(8), M.G. was entitled to return to his regular educational setting following the conclusion of his suspension. The court also found compensatory education to be a potential equitable remedy for violations of student disciplinary statutes and regulations. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the appropriate remedy. View "M.G. v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7" on Justia Law

In the case between Alex W., a student with disabilities, and Poudre School District R-1, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the school district provided Alex with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Alex's parents alleged that the district had denied Alex a FAPE, whereas the district counterclaimed seeking reversal of a reimbursement order for an independent evaluation.After a detailed review of the evidence provided, the court held that the school district had fulfilled its obligations under the IDEA. It ruled that the district had appropriately identified and addressed Alex's behavioral needs, that Alex's Individualized Education Programs were reasonably calculated to allow him to make progress, and that the district had appropriately evaluated Alex in all areas of disability.The court also held that the district was within its rights to reduce Alex's direct therapy hours and that Alex was not denied a FAPE because he was not provided extended school year services. Furthermore, the court ruled that while parents have a right to request an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public expense if they disagree with a school district's evaluation, they are only entitled to one publicly-funded IEE for each district evaluation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order requiring the school district to reimburse Alex's parents for a second IEE. View "W. v. Poudre School District R-1" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. View "Smith v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status following an investigation into allegations of sexual abuse. The allegations involved a fellow academic, identified as Jane Doe, who was sexually harassed by Balakrishnan at an off-campus academic event, and a UCSC student that Balakrishnan harassed after an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the University's decision, arguing that the University lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not University students, that the University misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, that he did not receive notice of all charges, and that the sanctions were excessive.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Balakrishnan's petition. The appellate court rejected the professor's jurisdiction argument, stating that the University's sexual harassment policy applied to both incidents. The court also found that the professor had notice of the charges against him. Lastly, the court held that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of the professor's conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine the constitutionality of a process for selecting a student member of a county school board in Howard County, Maryland. Two parents sued the board, arguing that allowing public-school students to elect the student member diminishes adults’ voting power, violating the Equal Protection Clause, and that the selection process violates the Free Exercise Clause as it excludes students who opt not to attend public schools, including those who do so for religious reasons.The court affirmed the dismissal of both claims. It held that the selection process was "basically appointive rather than elective," therefore, the one-person, one-vote principle derived from the Equal Protection Clause was not applicable. The court also found that the selection process was neutral and generally applicable, thus it did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The process excluded students who chose not to attend public school for any reason, not just those who did so for religious reasons. View "Kim v. Board of Education of Howard County" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, The Arc of Iowa and several parents of children with disabilities, sought to challenge a provision of the Iowa Code that prevents schools from imposing mask mandates unless required by other laws. They had received a preliminary injunction from a lower court that had been vacated by this court due to changing circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that the phrase 'other provisions of law' in the contested Iowa Code section includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the contested Iowa Code section cannot be cited as the sole basis for denying a student's request for reasonable modification or accommodation under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that requires others to wear masks.The defendants, the Governor of Iowa and the Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed to the Eighth Circuit, raising issues of exhaustion of remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), standing of the plaintiffs, and the propriety and necessity of the relief granted by the district court.The appellate court, after de novo review, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for standing, which include having suffered an injury in fact, traceability of the injury to the defendant's conduct, and the likelihood of redress by a favorable judicial decision. The court found that the general risks associated with COVID-19 were not enough to constitute "imminent and substantial" harm for standing. It also concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the conduct of the Governor or the Director of the Department of Education. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss due to lack of standing. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law