Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

On February 11, 2016, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the three-judge district court panel that found changes made to the State's K-12 funding system through enactment of the Classroom Learning Assuring Student Success Act of 2015 (CLASS) violated the equity component of Article 6, section 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution. Specifically, the Court determined the operation of capital outlay state aid and local option budget (LOB) supplemental general state aid, as formulated under CLASS, still allowed inequitable distribution of funding among school districts that it had held unconstitutional in "Gannon v. State," (319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (Gannon I)). This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether the State met its burden to show that recent legislation brought the State's K-12 public school funding system into compliance with Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution. After review, the Court held that it had not: (1) H.B. 2655 cured the capital outlay inequities affirmed to exist in "Gannon II;" (2) H.B. 2655, which included a hold harmless and extraordinary need provisions, failed to cure the LOB inequities affirmed to exist in Gannon II; and (3) the unconstitutional LOB funding mechanism was not severable from CLASS, thus making CLASS unconstitutional. View "Gannon v. Kansas" on Justia Law

R.M. was a 12-year-old middle school student in Lexington, when several students pulled him to the ground and beat him, repeatedly kicking and punching him in the head and stomach. The beating was captured on a video. Principal Flynn discussed the incident with R.M.’s mother, Morgan. He indicated that R.M. had agreed to the beating as part of an initiation into a group and had "delay[ed] the investigation," so that R.M. would not be allowed to participate in an upcoming track meet. Later, R.M. was "pushed, tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways." R.M. had his pants pulled down in front of other students and was pushed into a locker. Morgan emailed Principal Flynn that R.M. did not feel safe at school and was scared to report bullying for fear of retaliation. R.M. missed a significant amount of school due to anxiety attacks. Morgan filed suit, alleging violation of R.M.'s federal substantive due process rights, relying upon a theory once suggested by the Supreme Court that when the state creates a danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal, further agreeing that the conduct did not fall within the scope of Title IX, which is concerned with actions taken "on the basis of sex," and not undifferentiated bullying. View "Morgan v. Town of Lexington" on Justia Law

Paso Robles was responsible for providing Luke, a child with autism, with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1487. At the time of Luke’s initial evaluation, Paso Robles was aware that Luke displayed signs of autistic behavior, and therefore, autism was a suspected disability for which it was required to assess him. Paso Robles chose not to formally assess Luke for autism because a member of its staff opined, after an informal, unscientific observation of the child, that Luke merely had an expressive language delay, not a disorder on the autism spectrum. The court held that, in so doing, Paso Robles violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA and, as a result, was unable to design an educational plan that addressed Luke’s unique needs. Accordingly, the court held that Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public education, and remanded for the determination of an appropriate remedy. View "Timothy O. v. Paso Robles USD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, K.T., filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., against the DOE. At issue is the adequacy of three individualized education programs (IEP), which were characterized by a pattern of procedural violations of the IDEA committed by the DOE, and whether these errors deprived K.T. of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for a period of three consecutive years. The court concluded that the procedural violations in formulating each IEP, when taken together, deprived K.T. of a FAPE for each school year. The DOE displayed a pattern of indifference to the procedural requirements of the IDEA and carelessness in formulating K.T.’s IEPs over the period of many years, repeatedly violating its obligations under the statute, which consequently resulted in the deprivation of important educational benefits to which K.T. was entitled by law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court is directed to consider, in the first instance, what, if any, relief plaintiff is entitled to as an award for K.T.'s FAPE deprivations. View "L.O. ex rel. K.T. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellants are a sub-class of moderately to severely disabled children who have moved to intervene in a class action brought on behalf of all disabled students in the LAUSD against the LAUSD (the Chanda Smith Litigation). Appellants seek to intervene to challenge the legality of a new policy, adopted by LAUSD in 2012 as part of a renegotiation of the Chanda Smith parties’ settlement. The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and further erred when it found intervention unnecessary to protect appellants’ interest in ensuring the receipt of public education consistent with their disabilities and federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. LAUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Uriel Jimenez was injured at a middle school within defendant Roseville City School District. The 14-year old Jimenez was in a classroom where fellow middle school students were purportedly practicing break dancing, but in which some were also performing “flips.” Students had been ordered not to perform flips; and the teacher who allowed the students to use his classroom for dancing violated school policy by leaving them unsupervised. Jimenez was seriously injured when other students waited for the teacher to leave them unsupervised, and then induced Jimenez to attempt a flip. The trial court granted the District summary judgment, concluding Jimenez assumed the risk of injury by participating in break dancing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jimenez, the Court of Appeal found two viable theories of liability, and as such, reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to deny the District’s summary judgment motion. View "Jimenez v. Roseville City School Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 (Act 21), which, among other things, amended portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which governs the procedures for administrative rule making and allows the Governor and the Secretary of Administration (Secretary) permanently to halt the rulemaking process. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI). The circuit court permanently enjoined the Governor and Secretary from proceeding under Act with respect to the SPI, concluding that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the SPI because it gives superior authority over public instruction to officers who are not subordinate to the SPI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Act 21 unconstitutionally vests the Governor and Secretary with the supervision of public instruction in violation of Wis. Const. art. X, 1 because it does not allow the SPI and DPI to proceed with their duties of supervision without the Governor’s, and in some circumstances, the Secretary’s approval. View "Coyne v. Walker" on Justia Law

More than half of the State’s school districts and various entities and individuals brought this school funding challenge arguing, among other things, that the current school finance system violates the adequacy and suitability requirements of Tex. Const. art. VII, 1. The trial court declared the school system constitutionally inadequate, unsuitable and financially inefficient in violation of Article VII, section 1, that the system is unconstitutional as a statewide ad valorem tax in violation of Tex. Const. art. VIII, 1(e), and that the system does not meet constitutional adequacy and suitability requirements for two subgroups of students. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the current school funding regime meets minimum constitutional requirements, despite its imperfections. View "Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coalition" on Justia Law

The Dunbarton School District (appealed a Board of Education decision which determined that Dunbarton was liable to the Goffstown School District for its proportional share of Goffstown’s obligation on a 20-year construction bond approved in 2001 for renovations to the Goffstown High School. The hearing officer reasoned that, “[b]y initiating the withdrawal study, Dunbarton would have put Goffstown on notice prior to the bond as to the potential additional financial risk on the bond without Dunbarton remaining part of the [Authorized Regional Enrollment Area] AREA.” Although the 2004 AREA plan expired June 30, 2014, “Dunbarton was clearly on notice back in 2001 that there was a twenty (20) year bond, and had the opportunity to initiate a withdrawal study at that point in time so that Goffstown would be on notice of the possible financial ramifications of Dunbarton withdrawing from the AREA.” Accordingly, the hearing officer recommended that the Board find that Dunbarton remained financially obligated with respect to the high school construction bond. The Board voted to accept the hearing officer’s report and adopted his recommendation. On appeal, Dunbarton argued that RSA chapter 195-A “envisions two possible endings to an area relationship: (1) withdrawal by one party; and (2) expiration of the area agreement. [. . .] only where an area relationship terminates . . . before the end of its term through ‘withdrawal’ that the statute imposes liability for payments on outstanding bond issues” pursuant to statute. Consequently, “[t]he Board unlawfully and unreasonably categorized Dunbarton as a ‘withdrawing’ sending district because Dunbarton never withdrew; instead, the 2004 Contract expired by its terms and with it, any further obligation for Dunbarton to pay Goffstown.” The Supreme Court agreed with Dunbarton's interpretation of RSA 195-A:14, reversed the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Dunbarton School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that federal student loans were fraudulently procured on their behalf when the Wilford beauty schools falsely certified that plaintiffs had an ability‐to‐benefit (ATB) from the education they received from Wilfred. Plaintiffs allege that the DOE’s refusal to temporarily suspend collection of the student loan debt of putative class members, and refusal to send them notice of their potential eligibility for a discharge, was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to review this case because plaintiffs had standing when they filed their class action complaint and this case fits into the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine for class action claims that are “inherently transitory.” On the merits, the court held that plaintiffs are entitled to judicial review because there is sufficient law to apply to the challenged agency decisions. The text of the relevant statute directs that the DOE “shall” discharge a borrower’s loan liability when a school has falsely certified a student’s ATB.  DOE’s regulations and informal agency guidance direct that the DOE “shall” temporarily suspend collection on loans and notify borrowers of their possible eligibility for a discharge when the DOE has reliable information that a borrower “may be eligible” for discharge.  Because plaintiffs' claims are judicially reviewable under the APA, the court vacated and remanded. View "Salazar v. King" on Justia Law