Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

J.S. is the mother of M.S., a child covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). M.S. was a residential student at the Utah Schools for the Deaf and Blind (“USDB”). Believing USDB was not complying with IDEA’s procedural requirements and was not providing M.S. with free appropriate public education (FAPE), J.S. sought a due process hearing. Unsatisfied with the relief she obtained in that hearing, J.S. filed a civil action in federal court, and appealed the district court decision granting her additional limited relief. She asserts the district court erred when it: (1) delegated its authority to resolve the propriety of M.S.’s residential placement to members of the team tasked with developing M.S.’s individualized education program (“IEP”); and (2) granted her only a partial award of attorneys’ fees. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court delegated the issue of M.S.’s residential placement to her IEP team and that such delegation "[was] at odds with" 20 U.S.C. 1415. The Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the issue of M.S.’s residential placement and reconsideration of the attorney fee award. View "M.S. v. Utah School for the Deaf" on Justia Law

Several school districts filed complaints seeking reimbursement for retroactive reductions in school foundation funding. The State Board of Education of Ohio (the department) moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that it was insulated from liability. The trial court held that the General Assembly did not have the constitutional authority to adjust local school funding retrospectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly had constitutional authority to retroactively reduce the amount of state funding allocated to local school districts and to immunize the department against the school districts’ legal claims. Remanded. View "Toledo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Education Code section 17406 governs lease-leaseback construction agreements. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the lease-leaseback agreements entered into by defendants were a sham to avoid the competitive bid process and are therefore void. The court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to all causes of action alleging the district was required to obtain competitive bids where competitive bids were not required under section 17406. The court also concluded that the trial court should have overruled the demurrer to the conflict of interest cause of action for violation of Government Code section 1090 where, at this early stage in the proceedings, section 1090 may apply. The court rejected defendants' arguments that plaintiffs lack standing to raise the issue and that section 1090 always excludes all independent contractors. Finally, the court concluded that the sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney must be reversed because the litigation is not frivolous. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "McGee v. Balfour Beatty Constr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law

One of the cases (consolidated on appeal) was filed by nonprofit associations and guardians ad litem for minor public school students, one adult taxpayer and homeowner and two adult taxpayers and homeowners who are parents of students. The other was filed by nonprofit associations, guardians ad litem, and several California school districts. The California Teachers Association intervened. The suits sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations of violations of sections 1 and 5 of California Constitution article IX. The suits claim that all public school children have a constitutional right to an education of “some quality,” and that the Legislature is currently failing to meet its constitutional duty by employing an irrational educational funding scheme. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, finding no implied constitutional rights to an education of “some quality” for public school children or minimum level of expenditures for education. The language of the cited constitutional sections do not include qualitative or funding elements that may be judicially enforced by the courts, but leave the difficult and policy-laden questions associated with educational adequacy and funding to the legislative branch. View "Campaign for Quality Educ. v. California" on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

After G.G., a transgender boy, began to use the boys’ restrooms with the approval of the school administration, the local school board passed a policy banning G.G. from the boys’ restroom. G.G. filed suit alleging that the school board impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The district court dismissed G.G.’s Title IX claim and denied his request for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed the dismissal of G.G.’s Title IX claim, concluding that the district court did not accord appropriate deference to the relevant Department of Education regulations. In this case, the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation, 34 C.F.R. 106.33, as it relates to restroom access by transgender individuals, is entitled to Auer v. Robbins deference and is to be accorded controlling weight. The court also concluded that the district court used the wrong evidentiary standard in assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court evaluated G.G.’s proffered evidence against a stricter evidentiary standard than is warranted by the nature and purpose of preliminary injunction proceedings to prevent irreparable harm before a full trial on the merits. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the preliminary injunction without considering G.G.’s proffered evidence. The court vacated the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for consideration under the correct standard. View "G. G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Kansas Board of Education (the “Board”) adopted curriculum standards establishing performance expectations for science instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade. Appellants, Citizens for Objective Public Education, Kansas parents, and school children (collectively, “COPE”), contended that although the standards purported to further science education, their concealed aim was to teach students to answer questions about the cause and nature of life with only nonreligious explanations. COPE also claimed two plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers who objected to their tax dollars being used to implement the Standards. The district court disagreed, and dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of standing. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded all of COPE's theories of injury failed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "COPE v. KS State Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, nine students who were attending California public schools filed suit against the State and several state officials, seeking a court order declaring various provisions of California’s Education Code unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which govern how K-12 public school teachers obtain tenure, how they are dismissed, and how they are laid off on the basis of seniority, violate the California Constitution’s guarantee that all citizens enjoy the “equal protection of the laws.” The trial court declared five sections of the Education Code unconstitutional and void. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the challenged statutes violate equal protection, primarily because they did not show that the statutes inevitably cause a certain group of students to receive an education inferior to the education received by other students. Although the statutes may lead to the hiring and retention of more ineffective teachers than a hypothetical alternative system would, the statutes do not address the assignment of teachers; instead, administrators - not the statutes - ultimately determine where teachers within a district are assigned to teach. Critically, plaintiffs failed to show that the statutes themselves make any certain group of students more likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other group of students. Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the statutes violate equal protection on their face, the court reversed the judgment. View "Vergara v. State of California" on Justia Law