Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In Gannon I, the Supreme Court confirmed that Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution, which imposes a duty on the legislature to “make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state,” contains both equity and adequacy requirements. On remand, a three-judge district court panel made various rulings. At issue on appeal was the panel’s holding that the State failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s Gannon I directive on equity due to the 2015 legislature amending capital outlay state aid and supplemental general state aid formulas for fiscal year 2015 and repealing the amended aid formulas for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the panel unnecessarily ordered State officials to be joined as parties; (2) the panel had the authority to review the law changing the entitlements for fiscal years 2016 and 2017; (3) the panel properly concluded that the State failed to cure the inquiries affirmed to exist in Gannon I; (4) Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees; and (5) the panel’s remedy was premature. View "Gannon v. State" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Board of Education Chief Area Officer Coates sent Bordelon , the long-tenured principal of the Kozminski Academy, notice of a pre‐discipline hearing based on insubordination in failing to respond to a parent issue; failing to arrange a requested meeting regarding the arrest of Kozminski students; and failing to respond to Coates’s email. Bordelon received a five‐day suspension without pay, which he never served. In December 2010, Coates evaluated Bordelon as needing improvement, noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for a second year with test scores trending downward. Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending an investigation into improperly replacing asbestos‐containing tile at Kozminski; purchasing irregularities; and tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded Board access to Kozminski’s records. In early 2011, Kozminski's Local School Council voted to not renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon, age 63, believed that Coates, exercised undue influence over the decision, based his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, stating that that Bordelon did not prove discrimination and that there was substantial evidence of independent reasons for not renewing Bordelon’s contract, making it unlikely that Coates influenced the Board. View "Bordelon v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of college students, including Miguel Olvera, who were not United States citizens and who were grant beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) filed a declaratory judgment action against the University System of Georgia’s Board of Regents and its members in their official capacities seeking a declaration that they were entitled to in-state tuition at schools in the University System of Georgia. The trial court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity barred the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olvera v. University System of Georgia's Board of Regents" on Justia Law

Middle school and high school cheerleaders, through their parents, sued Kountze Independent School District after the District prohibited them from displaying banners at school-sponsored events containing religious messages or signs. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting mootness in light of its subsequent adoption of a resolution providing that the District was not required to prohibit religious messages on school banners. The trial court denied the District’s plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the District voluntarily discontinued its prohibition on the display of banners containing religious messages or signs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the resolution only states that the District is not required to prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying religious messages on school banners and reserves to the District discretion in regulating those banners, this case was not moot, as the challenged conduct might reasonably be expected to recur. Remanded. View "Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s car was struck by a school activity bus transporting students and school staff to an extracurricular event. Plaintiff brought this action before the North Carolina Industrial Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act to recover for alleged negligence by Randall Long, the bus driver and an employee of Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The Commission granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim because the claim did not fall within the parameters of N.C. Gen. Stat. 143-300.1, which confers jurisdiction upon the Commission to hear claims for the negligent operation of “school buses” and “school transportation service vehicles” when certain criteria are met. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that school activity buses are plainly excluded from section 143-300.1, and therefore, the Commission did not have jurisdiction in this case. View "Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Department appealed a judgment awarding plaintiffs reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., for one year of private school education for their daughter, L.K. The court concluded that the Department’s refusal to discuss the bullying of L.K. with her parents during the process of developing L.K.’s individualized education program (IEP), violated the IDEA. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their choice of a private placement for L.K. was appropriate and that the equities favored reimbursing them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Parents of Seth B., a child diagnosed with autism, obtained an independent educational evaluation (IEE) and sought reimbursement. The district court subsequently ruled that the reimbursement was not warranted. The court concluded that the school board did not waive its right to refuse reimbursement and the proceedings before the district court were procedurally sound; the application of Bulletin 1508 did not violate the right to an IEE in this case; the court remanded for analysis under a substantial compliance standard where Seth’s IEE will “meet agency criteria” and merit reimbursement if it substantially complies with Bulletin 1508; but Parents will not be entitled to the full cost of the evaluation they obtained because they knew of the school board's cost cap of $3,000 and yet spent over $8,000. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Initiative Petition No. 403 sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C. The proposed article would create the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund, designed to provide for the improvement of public education in Oklahoma through an additional one-cent sales and use tax. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Additionally, a percentage of the funds would be used to provide a $5,000.00 pay raise to all public school teachers. Opponents challenged the initiative, arguing it violated the one general subject rule of Art. 24, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Initiative Petition No. 403 did not violate the one general subject rule and was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 403 STATE QUESTION NO. 779" on Justia Law

Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution required the state legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools” open to all children in the state. To fulfill this mandate, the legislature defined three types of school districts according to where the district is located: city school districts, borough school districts, and regional education attendance areas. “[E]ach organized borough is a borough school district”; a borough must “establish[], maintain[], and operate[] a system of public schools on an areawide basis.” Local school boards managed and controlled these school districts under authority delegated by AS 14.12.020. The statute required local borough and city governments to raise money “from local sources to maintain and operate” their local schools. The superior court held that this required local contribution was an unconstitutional dedication of a “state tax or license.” But the minutes of the constitutional convention and the historical context of those proceedings suggested that the delegates intended that local communities and the State would share responsibility for their local schools. Those proceedings also indicated that the delegates did not intend for state-local cooperative programs like the school funding formula to be included in the term “state tax or license.” These factors distinguished this case from previous cases where the Alaska Supreme Court found that state funding mechanisms violated the dedicated funds clause. The Court therefore held that the existing funding formula did not violate the constitution, and reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment holding that the funding formula was unconstitutional. View "Alaska v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

The Frys’ daughter, E.F., suffers from cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist her with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aid as part of her Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415) refused to permit her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued. The district court dismissed on the grounds that because the Frys’ claims necessarily implicated E.F.’s IEP, the IDEA’s exhaustion provision required the Frys to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures prior to bringing suit under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the IDEA exhaustion provision does not apply because the Frys did not seek relief provided by IDEA procedures. Because the specific injuries the Frys allege are essentially educational, they are exactly the sort of injuries the IDEA aims to prevent, so the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies to the Frys’ claims. View "Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs" on Justia Law