Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Three special-education students claimed that Kowalski abused her students during the 2003–2004 school year by, among other things, gagging one student with a bandana to stop him from spitting, strapping another to a toilet to keep her from falling from the toilet, and forcing another to sit with her pants down on a training toilet in full view of her classmates to assist her with toilet-training. They alleged that Kowalski’s supervisors were deliberately indifferent to this alleged abuse, and that North Point created an environment primed for abuse by its adoption of allegedly unconstitutional policies and practices. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants in the suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, because Kowalski’s instructional techniques, while inappropriate and even “abusive,” did not rise to the conscience-shocking level required of a substantive due process claim; because Kowalski’s supervisors had insufficient notice of her actions to be found deliberately indifferent; and because North Point’s policies and practices were not constitutionally inadequate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, as a matter of law, Kowalski’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Domingo v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The district and its faculty entered into a collective bargaining agreement that grants part-time, temporary faculty who have taught at least five consecutive semesters a preferential reemployment status that can be revoked, as pertinent here, only upon “written notice” and, as reasonably interpreted by the arbitrators in this case, upon a showing that the faculty member was “guilty of misconduct” as defined in the Education Code. At issue on appeal is whether a community college district’s authority to revoke a part-time, temporary faculty member’s annual reappointment rights is governed by section 87665 of the Education Code or instead by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to section 87482.9. The court concluded that section 87482.9 controls where, as here, a district elects to revoke a faculty member’s reappointment right rather than terminate that faculty member. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order to the contrary, and reinstated the arbitrator's awards for all three faculty members. View "Santa Monica College Faculty v. Santa Monica Community College" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

The Chicago Board of Education and the Teachers Union 2007-2012 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) established a grievance procedure that culminated in binding arbitration. In 2010, the Board notified the Union of a new policy: designating as ineligible for rehire probationary appointed teachers (PATs) who have been non-renewed twice, or have had an unsatisfactory performance rating. The Board began implementing this policy and notified PATs that they were being non-renewed, but did not inform them that it had placed a “do not hire” (DNH) designation in their personnel files. The Union presented grievances and demanded arbitration. The Board refused to arbitrate, claiming that Board hiring decisions were exclusive management rights. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act found that, under the Act and the CBA, the Board had a duty to arbitrate the DNH grievances and, by refusing, had violated 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. PATs are employed for a single school-year; the Board alone is vested with selection of such employees as a matter of inherent managerial policy. The policy of placing a DNH designation in PAT files following two nonrenewals or an unsatisfactory performance rating was within the Board’s authority because it directly relates to its exclusive right to determine hiring guidelines. View "Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an elementary school principal, was terminated after the school board learned that he had been involved in a sexual relationship with a teacher. Plaintiff filed a complaint against school defendants, alleging breach of contract and that the notice and procedure utilized by the school board in terminating his administrator’s contract denied him due process. The superior court granted summary judgment for the School. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing process described in the teacher’s termination statute does not apply to termination of an administrator when his underlying teaching contract is not being terminated; (2) the language in Plaintiff’s form teacher’s contract referring to a hearing with the benefit of counsel and a just cause determination applies only to Plaintiff’s underlying teacher’s contract and not his administrator’s contract; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff received constitutional due process. View "Hewitt v. Westfield Washington Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

An organization called Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) brought this lawsuit challenging Harvard College’s consideration of race in its undergraduate admissions decision. An opposing group of current and prospective Harvard students (“Students”) sought to intervene, over both parties’ objection, to advocate for the defeat of SFFA’s claims. The district court denied Students’ motion to intervene. Students appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Students failed to show that no existing party would adequately represent Students’ interest and thus that Students’ participation as a party was not needed. View "Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

Linn State's Board of Regents adopted a mandatory drug screening policy. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the drug screening policy. In Barrett v. Claycomb, a panel of this court reviewed an interlocutory appeal, discussing, and ultimately reversing, the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs on their facial challenge to the drug testing policy. On remand, plaintiffs clarified their claims to assert an as-applied challenge to the very same policy. The district court, in part, permanently enjoined Linn State from conducting any further collection, testing, or reporting. On appeal, Linn State challenged the district court's grant of a permanent injunction and subsequent grant of attorneys' fees in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that, on balance, testing the entire student population entering Linn State is reasonable and hence constitutional and an effective means of addressing Linn State's interest in providing "a safe, healthy, and productive environment for everyone who learns and works at LSTC by detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among students." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb" on Justia Law

In 2009, a first grade student complained to a teacher that her genitals hurt and the teacher sent her to the school nurse who visually inspected the girl. Plaintiff, the girl's mother, filed a money-damages action against the nurse and the school district for conducting a search in violation of her child’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court subsequently issued an injunction that required the school system to train its nurses more effectively to prevent incidents of this sort from happening again. The court reversed the injunction because: (1) the mother did not seek such an injunction; (2) the undisturbed (and now unappealed) jury verdict that no constitutional violation occurred eliminated the factual predicate for such an injunction; and (3) the mother (and daughter) lacked standing to obtain such an injunction anyway. The court directed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the school district. View "Hearring v. Sliwowski" on Justia Law

ACT, Inc. and The College Board (collectively, Defendants) are national testing agencies that administer the ACT and SAT college entrance exams. When a student applies to take a test, Defendants obtain some of the student’s personally identifiable information (PII). As part of the examination process, some students authorize Defendants to share certain PII with participating educational organizations through an information exchange program. In 2014, a group of former information exchange program participants (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a putative class action complaint against Defendants, alleging that they were harmed because the testing agencies did not disclose that the students’ PII was actually sold to the educational organizations for profit. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s factual allegations failed to establish a plausible claim of Article III standing. View "Silha v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law