Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The government filed suit to collect unpaid federally reinsured student loans from defendant. The Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 (HETA) eliminated all statutes of limitations on actions to recover on defaulted federally guaranteed student loans. The court concluded that HETA did not violate defendant's due process rights because HETA’s elimination of the limitations period for actions to collect on federally guaranteed student loans does not result in a denial of due process. In this case, the government established a prima facie case through certificates of indebtedness, which were signed under the penalty of perjury, showing that defendant executed promissory notes to secure loans, defaulted on the loans, and owed the United States certain amounts after offsets from various sources. Defendant failed to present sufficient evidentiary facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact or a question as to liability for the alleged indebtedness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the government. View "United States v. Falcon" on Justia Law

In 2013, Vaughn School District received a petition requesting the transfer of a specific portion of territory from Vaughn School District to the Power School District. A panel of three county school superintendents dismissed the school territory transfer petition on the ground that the transfer territory was located within three miles of an operating school - the Hillcrest Hutterite Colony Attendance Center. Power School District petitioned for judicial review of the superintendent panel’s decision. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that the superintendent panel (1) did not act unreasonably in concluding that the attendance center operates as any public school in the state of Montana; and (2) did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in interpreting the governing statutes. View "In re Vaughn Elementary School Petition" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Arkansas State Board of Education (State Board) classified six schools within the Little Rock School District as being in academic distress. In 2015, the State Board voted to immediately remove all members of the District’s board of directors and to direct the commissioner of education to assume the authority of the Board of Directors for the governance of the District. Appellees, three former members of the District board of directors and a parent whose children attend school in the District - filed an amended complaint for declaratory relief, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief, alleging that the State Board’s actions were unconstitutional, ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, and wantonly injurious. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Appellees’ complaint, holding (1) the allegations in the complaint did not establish a sovereign-immunity exception; but (2) Appellees failed to establish in their complaint that the State Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith in assuming control of the District. View "Key v. Curry" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether settlement agreements between a public school and the parents of a public school student who requires special education are public records subject to disclosure. Plaintiff requested from Defendant school district copies of such agreements where Defendant “limited its contribution to education funding or attached conditions for it for out of district placements” for certain school years. The school district denied the request. The superior court declared that the agreements were public records and were not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) the settlement agreements regarding placement of students in out-of-district private educational institutions are not “public records” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, 7; but (2) the settlement agreements may be redacted to remove personally identifiable information, after which they become subject to disclosure under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66, 10, the Massachusetts public records law. View "Champa v. Weston Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the school district and its employees, alleging claims related to the sexual molestation of A.W. by her teacher. The district court dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred. At issue is the Texas statute of limitations that applies to Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims involving sexual abuse. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs’ Title IX and section 1983 claims are time-barred because plaintiffs' claims accrued more than two years prior to their filing suit and the equitable tolling principles they have identified do not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal. View "King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a hearing officer's conclusion that the School Board had provided O.S. with a free and appropriate education (FAPE). The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. At issue was whether the standard for a FAPE under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., has changed since Board of Education v. Rowley. The court held that it has not and that, in evaluating whether a school provides a FAPE, the court still looks to whether the individualized education program (IEP) provides some education benefit to the student. Applying that standard to this case, the court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the School Board met that requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "O.S. v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Hattiesburg High School (“HHS”) filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Mississippi High School Activities Association (“MHSAA”), alleging that its decision to declare one of HHS’s students ineligible to participate in athletics was arbitrary and capricious. The Forrest County Chancery Court agreed, and it vacated the penalties that MHSAA had imposed against HHS. MHSAA appealed. Because the Supreme Court found that HHS failed to state a legally cognizable claim or cause of action, we vacate the decisions of the Forrest County Chancery Court. View "Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc., v. Hattiesburg High School" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

Katherine Rosen filed a negligence action against defendants, alleging that they breached their duty of care by failing to adopt reasonable measures that would have protected her from another student’s foreseeable violent conduct. The student, Damon Thompson, was treated by the school months before the attack for symptoms indicative of schizophrenia disorder, including auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that UCLA did not owe a legal duty to protect Rosen from third party criminal conduct based on her status as a student; UCLA did not owe a duty to protect Rosen based on her status as an invitee onto the property; Rosen failed to establish a triable issue of material fact whether UCLA owed a duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine; Rosen failed to produce evidence establishing the existence of a triable issue of material fact whether a UCLA psychologist who treated Thompson had a duty to warn under Civil Code section 43.92; and Rosen failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding either of her newly-raised theories of liability. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' petition for writ of mandate. View "Regents v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Before 2010, Azin Agah was employed at the University of South Alabama ("USA") as a professor engaged in scientific research. Agah's position was a tenure-track professorship. In early 2010, USA's vice president for Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged research misconduct. Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio Turrens. Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who was a professor and associate dean at USA. Agah sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference with a contractual property right arising out of the termination of her employment by USA. Agah also sued "R.T., W.B.D., R.F.," whose names were "known and unknown" and who, according to Agah, played a role in the theft of her research, "the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right of employment." After the lawsuit had been filed, and after a period of discovery, Agah gave names to the initials previously listed in her original complaint: Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks. She would also add Dusty Layton and others who were involved in the review of Agah's research. The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed a motion to dismiss. Each argued, among other things, that, with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred. They also argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three motions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint against them. Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue claim, were barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, Agah's conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their individual capacities sought relief that the petitioners could not provide. Therefore, the trial court was directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them. View "Ex parte Richard Talbott et al." on Justia Law