Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Parents of Seth B., a child diagnosed with autism, obtained an independent educational evaluation (IEE) and sought reimbursement. The district court subsequently ruled that the reimbursement was not warranted. The court concluded that the school board did not waive its right to refuse reimbursement and the proceedings before the district court were procedurally sound; the application of Bulletin 1508 did not violate the right to an IEE in this case; the court remanded for analysis under a substantial compliance standard where Seth’s IEE will “meet agency criteria” and merit reimbursement if it substantially complies with Bulletin 1508; but Parents will not be entitled to the full cost of the evaluation they obtained because they knew of the school board's cost cap of $3,000 and yet spent over $8,000. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Initiative Petition No. 403 sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C. The proposed article would create the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund, designed to provide for the improvement of public education in Oklahoma through an additional one-cent sales and use tax. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Additionally, a percentage of the funds would be used to provide a $5,000.00 pay raise to all public school teachers. Opponents challenged the initiative, arguing it violated the one general subject rule of Art. 24, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Initiative Petition No. 403 did not violate the one general subject rule and was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 403 STATE QUESTION NO. 779" on Justia Law

Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution required the state legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools” open to all children in the state. To fulfill this mandate, the legislature defined three types of school districts according to where the district is located: city school districts, borough school districts, and regional education attendance areas. “[E]ach organized borough is a borough school district”; a borough must “establish[], maintain[], and operate[] a system of public schools on an areawide basis.” Local school boards managed and controlled these school districts under authority delegated by AS 14.12.020. The statute required local borough and city governments to raise money “from local sources to maintain and operate” their local schools. The superior court held that this required local contribution was an unconstitutional dedication of a “state tax or license.” But the minutes of the constitutional convention and the historical context of those proceedings suggested that the delegates intended that local communities and the State would share responsibility for their local schools. Those proceedings also indicated that the delegates did not intend for state-local cooperative programs like the school funding formula to be included in the term “state tax or license.” These factors distinguished this case from previous cases where the Alaska Supreme Court found that state funding mechanisms violated the dedicated funds clause. The Court therefore held that the existing funding formula did not violate the constitution, and reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment holding that the funding formula was unconstitutional. View "Alaska v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

The Frys’ daughter, E.F., suffers from cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist her with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aid as part of her Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415) refused to permit her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued. The district court dismissed on the grounds that because the Frys’ claims necessarily implicated E.F.’s IEP, the IDEA’s exhaustion provision required the Frys to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures prior to bringing suit under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the IDEA exhaustion provision does not apply because the Frys did not seek relief provided by IDEA procedures. Because the specific injuries the Frys allege are essentially educational, they are exactly the sort of injuries the IDEA aims to prevent, so the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies to the Frys’ claims. View "Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs" on Justia Law

Three special-education students claimed that Kowalski abused her students during the 2003–2004 school year by, among other things, gagging one student with a bandana to stop him from spitting, strapping another to a toilet to keep her from falling from the toilet, and forcing another to sit with her pants down on a training toilet in full view of her classmates to assist her with toilet-training. They alleged that Kowalski’s supervisors were deliberately indifferent to this alleged abuse, and that North Point created an environment primed for abuse by its adoption of allegedly unconstitutional policies and practices. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants in the suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, because Kowalski’s instructional techniques, while inappropriate and even “abusive,” did not rise to the conscience-shocking level required of a substantive due process claim; because Kowalski’s supervisors had insufficient notice of her actions to be found deliberately indifferent; and because North Point’s policies and practices were not constitutionally inadequate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, as a matter of law, Kowalski’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Domingo v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The district and its faculty entered into a collective bargaining agreement that grants part-time, temporary faculty who have taught at least five consecutive semesters a preferential reemployment status that can be revoked, as pertinent here, only upon “written notice” and, as reasonably interpreted by the arbitrators in this case, upon a showing that the faculty member was “guilty of misconduct” as defined in the Education Code. At issue on appeal is whether a community college district’s authority to revoke a part-time, temporary faculty member’s annual reappointment rights is governed by section 87665 of the Education Code or instead by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to section 87482.9. The court concluded that section 87482.9 controls where, as here, a district elects to revoke a faculty member’s reappointment right rather than terminate that faculty member. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order to the contrary, and reinstated the arbitrator's awards for all three faculty members. View "Santa Monica College Faculty v. Santa Monica Community College" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

The Chicago Board of Education and the Teachers Union 2007-2012 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) established a grievance procedure that culminated in binding arbitration. In 2010, the Board notified the Union of a new policy: designating as ineligible for rehire probationary appointed teachers (PATs) who have been non-renewed twice, or have had an unsatisfactory performance rating. The Board began implementing this policy and notified PATs that they were being non-renewed, but did not inform them that it had placed a “do not hire” (DNH) designation in their personnel files. The Union presented grievances and demanded arbitration. The Board refused to arbitrate, claiming that Board hiring decisions were exclusive management rights. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act found that, under the Act and the CBA, the Board had a duty to arbitrate the DNH grievances and, by refusing, had violated 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. PATs are employed for a single school-year; the Board alone is vested with selection of such employees as a matter of inherent managerial policy. The policy of placing a DNH designation in PAT files following two nonrenewals or an unsatisfactory performance rating was within the Board’s authority because it directly relates to its exclusive right to determine hiring guidelines. View "Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an elementary school principal, was terminated after the school board learned that he had been involved in a sexual relationship with a teacher. Plaintiff filed a complaint against school defendants, alleging breach of contract and that the notice and procedure utilized by the school board in terminating his administrator’s contract denied him due process. The superior court granted summary judgment for the School. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing process described in the teacher’s termination statute does not apply to termination of an administrator when his underlying teaching contract is not being terminated; (2) the language in Plaintiff’s form teacher’s contract referring to a hearing with the benefit of counsel and a just cause determination applies only to Plaintiff’s underlying teacher’s contract and not his administrator’s contract; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff received constitutional due process. View "Hewitt v. Westfield Washington Sch. Corp." on Justia Law