Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the parents of an autistic child withdrew him from the Douglas County School District because they believed his educational progress was inadequate. They later sought reimbursement of tuition and related expenses pursuant to federal law that required public schools to reimburse parents if the school could not meet the student's educational needs. The District’s denial of reimbursement was upheld after a due process hearing in administrative court, and that determination was also upheld in federal district court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient support in the record to affirm the findings of the administrative law judge that the child received some educational benefit while in the District’s care and that is enough to satisfy the District’s obligation to provide a free appropriate public education. View "Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District" on Justia Law

D. Stahl claimed she was the victim of vicious, physical bullying by fellow East Porter students. D. complained to school officials. Apart from witnessing the counselor talk to one alleged bully and seeing the principal call another to her office, D. does not know if officials took any action. D. alleges that some teachers and coaches participated or were complicit in the bullying. Eighth Grade girls, preparing to play basketball, taunted D. D’s mother, Debbie came to the school and yelled at the alleged bullies. D.’s father, George, arrived and confronted the principal. Leaving the gym, George and his father confronted alleged bullies. The girls yelled that the men had attacked them. The principal called the police, who did not issue a citation. Superintendent Gardin stated that Debbie and George were banned from East Porter property until they met with him. The Stahls never arranged a meeting. D voluntarily did not return. The Stahls contacted a neighboring school district. George testified that he was advised that the school had “open enrollment." George told the principal about the ban. That evening, the principal informed them that D. would not be permitted to enroll.The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the Stahls’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no genuine issue of material fact under the state-created danger standard. D. did not identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently with regard to her attempt to transfer schools. View "D. S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp" on Justia Law

Bible defaulted on a loan under the Federal Family Education Loan Program, but entered into a rehabilitation agreement. She remains current on her reduced payments, but a guaranty agency assessed $4,500 in collection costs. Bible’s loan terms were governed by a Stafford Loan Master Promissory Note (MPN), approved by the Department of Education, incorporating the Higher Education Act, and providing for “reasonable collection fees and costs” in default, as defined by regulations promulgated under the Act. Bible sued, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, arguing that federal regulations prohibit assessment of collection costs and that the guaranty agency committed mail fraud and wire fraud in assessing collection costs despite its representations that her “current collection cost balance” and “current other charges” were zero. The court dismissed, finding both claims “preempted” by the Higher Education Act, which permits collection costs and that Bible had not shown “a scheme to defraud; commission of an act with intent to defraud; or the use of mails or interstate wires in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The contract claim does not conflict with federal law. The Secretary of Education interprets the regulations to provide that a guaranty agency may not impose collection costs on a borrower who is in default for the first time and has complied with an alternative repayment agreement. Bible’s RICO claim is not preempted. View "Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc." on Justia Law

When the Chicago Board of Education deems a school to be deficient, it implements a reconstitution, replacing all administrators, faculty, and staff. A school may be subject to turnaround if it has been on probation for at least one year and has failed to make adequate progress . Under the collective bargaining agreement, tenured teachers are placed in a pool where they continue to receive a full salary and benefits for one school year. If a tenured teacher does not find a new position within that year, she is honorably terminated. Others are eligible for the cadre pool where they can receive substitute assignments, paid per assignment. From 2004-2011, the Board reconstituted 16 schools. In 2011, the Board identified 74 schools by removing schools that met the objective criteria related to standardized test scores and graduation rates. Brizard chose the final 10 schools. All were in areas where African Americans make up 40.9% of tenured teachers. No schools were selected from the north side, where only 6.5% of tenured teachers are African American. Of the teachers displaced, 51% were African American, despite comprising just 27% of the overall CPS teaching population. Teachers and the Union filed suit. The court declined to certify a class of: All African American persons … teacher or para-professional staff … subjected to reconstitution. The court found that the plaintiffs had not met established a common issue and had not adequately shown that common questions of law or fact predominated over individual claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the class can be certified under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school student, filed suit against his school district and his teacher for injuries he received during a science demonstration conducted in the school gymnasium. Defendants moved for summary judgment under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff’s injury did not fall within any exceptions to governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendants’ alleged negligence did not fall within the exceptions to governmental immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of a building or for negligent operation or maintenance of any recreation area. View "Fugle v. Sublette County Sch. Dist. #9" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school student, filed suit against his school district and his teacher for injuries he received during a science demonstration conducted in the school gymnasium. Defendants moved for summary judgment under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff’s injury did not fall within any exceptions to governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendants’ alleged negligence did not fall within the exceptions to governmental immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of a building or for negligent operation or maintenance of any recreation area. View "Fugle v. Sublette County Sch. Dist. #9" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the school district had violated T.B.’s civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' allegations that the school district violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to offer and implement a gastronomy tube (g-tube) feeding regime that would enable T.B. to attend school safely; California law establishes federally enforceable rights governing g-tube feeding in schools; the court held that where the State has defined an accommodation by law, that accommodation is enforceable in court; but, plaintiffs failed to prove that the district court was deliberately indifferent to the need to meet state standards for feeding T.B. at school. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claim regarding the 2007-2008 Individualized Education Plan (IEP), because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the district violated T.B.’s civil rights by failing to accommodate his need for g-tube feedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court that a reasonable jury would not be able to find that the district retaliated against plaintiffs. The court vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs and remanded. View "T.B. V. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law