Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Hattiesburg High School (“HHS”) filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Mississippi High School Activities Association (“MHSAA”), alleging that its decision to declare one of HHS’s students ineligible to participate in athletics was arbitrary and capricious. The Forrest County Chancery Court agreed, and it vacated the penalties that MHSAA had imposed against HHS. MHSAA appealed. Because the Supreme Court found that HHS failed to state a legally cognizable claim or cause of action, we vacate the decisions of the Forrest County Chancery Court. View "Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc., v. Hattiesburg High School" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

Katherine Rosen filed a negligence action against defendants, alleging that they breached their duty of care by failing to adopt reasonable measures that would have protected her from another student’s foreseeable violent conduct. The student, Damon Thompson, was treated by the school months before the attack for symptoms indicative of schizophrenia disorder, including auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that UCLA did not owe a legal duty to protect Rosen from third party criminal conduct based on her status as a student; UCLA did not owe a duty to protect Rosen based on her status as an invitee onto the property; Rosen failed to establish a triable issue of material fact whether UCLA owed a duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine; Rosen failed to produce evidence establishing the existence of a triable issue of material fact whether a UCLA psychologist who treated Thompson had a duty to warn under Civil Code section 43.92; and Rosen failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding either of her newly-raised theories of liability. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' petition for writ of mandate. View "Regents v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Before 2010, Azin Agah was employed at the University of South Alabama ("USA") as a professor engaged in scientific research. Agah's position was a tenure-track professorship. In early 2010, USA's vice president for Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged research misconduct. Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio Turrens. Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who was a professor and associate dean at USA. Agah sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference with a contractual property right arising out of the termination of her employment by USA. Agah also sued "R.T., W.B.D., R.F.," whose names were "known and unknown" and who, according to Agah, played a role in the theft of her research, "the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right of employment." After the lawsuit had been filed, and after a period of discovery, Agah gave names to the initials previously listed in her original complaint: Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks. She would also add Dusty Layton and others who were involved in the review of Agah's research. The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed a motion to dismiss. Each argued, among other things, that, with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred. They also argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three motions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint against them. Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue claim, were barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, Agah's conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their individual capacities sought relief that the petitioners could not provide. Therefore, the trial court was directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them. View "Ex parte Richard Talbott et al." on Justia Law

Brenda Franks was a former nontenured employee of the Choctaw County Public School System. Before the 2008-2009 school year, Franks had been employed as a full-time counselor in the school system for three years when her contract was not renewed. For the 2008-2009 school year, Franks was offered and accepted a part-time, temporary position as a vocational counselor starting in February 2009. She signed an employment contract acknowledging that the position was temporary. She also signed a "Letter of Understanding Concerning Temporary Employment." Franks worked pursuant to the contract for five months. The superintendent notified Franks, in writing, of her intention to recommend that the School Board members cancel the contract because of a "justifiable decrease in jobs in the system." The Board members approved the recommendation to cancel the contract. Franks did not contest the cancellation. In July 2010, the Board members posted a vacancy for a business-education teacher. Franks applied for the position, but was not hired. Franks sued the Board and Superintendent, asserting that the Board members had terminated her employment based on a reduction in force ("RIF"), but that she was entitled to be hired for the teaching position pursuant to the RIF policy. Franks sought to be instated to that position, with backpay, interest, and restoration of progress toward tenure. However, Franks died prior to the conclusion of this suit. Petitioners Ronald Hampton, Darry Phillips, Wayne Taylor, Isaac Johnson, and Sharon Sheppard, the individual members of the Choctaw County Board of Education, and Sue Moore, the superintendent of the Choctaw County Public School System sought an order compelling the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because of plaintiff's death and the petitioners' immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent and the Board members demonstrated immunity and established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment on all the claims asserted against the superintendent and the Board members. View "Ex parte Ronald Hampton, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, J.M. did not comply with certain conditions of the Government Claims Act (Government Code, section 810 et seq.): he did not present a claim with the board of the Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) within six months of the date on which his causes of action accrued, as required by sections 945.4 and 911.2. He retained counsel, who presented an application under section 911.4 to present a late claim on the ground J.M. was a minor. The District did not act on the application, and, as a consequence, under the express language of section 911.6, subdivision (c), his application was deemed denied by operation of law. Still represented by counsel, J.M. filed a petition under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement. The superior court denied his petition as untimely because it was not filed within six months of the date on which his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M. appealed the superior court’s order denying his petition for relief under section 946.6. "The plain, unambiguous language of sections 911.6 and 946.6 compel[led]" the Court of Appeal to affirm: J.M.’s application to present a late claim was made under section 911.6, subdivision (b)(2) on the ground that he was a minor at the time he was required to present a claim. Because the District did not act, under the plain language of section 911.6(c), J.M.’s application was deemed denied by operation of law on the 45th day after it was presented. "When an application is denied by operation of law under section 911.6(c), a claimant can challenge that denial only by petition to the superior court under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement." J.M. filed his petition to the superior court more than six months after his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M.’s petition therefore was untimely, and the superior court did not err by denying it. View "J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Education Code (47605.8) authorizes the State Board of Education (Board) to grant (or deny) an application for a “state charter school” and directs the Board to adopt regulations. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs both quasi-judicial proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings by an agency. The Education Code refers to the APA section concerning adjudicatory proceedings. The Board claimed that the reference was an error and that, in directing the Board to “implement” the statute, the Legislature intended to refer to APA rule-making provisions. The California School Boards Association argued—and the trial court agreed—that the statutory language is plain and cannot be disregarded. The court of appeal reversed. The statute governs approval or denial of a charter school application, which is a quasi-legislative function—requiring consideration of policy questions and the opportunity for public input—and is fundamentally at odds with adjudicatory procedures. Legislative directives to adopt regulations for the implementation of a statute invariably call for a rule-making process pursuant to the APA’s adjudicatory provisions, so the reference is a complete anomaly. The use of an adjudicatory proceeding to approve or deny state charters would be inconsistent with all other like provisions in the Charter School Act, none of which entail quasi-judicial proceedings. View "Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. View "Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

After attending a parochial school, G.L. entered high school in the Ligonier Valley District in 2008. At an open house shortly after he started, G.L.’s teacher told his father that G.L. seemed distracted and lacked organizational skills. G.L.’s father orally requested that the District evaluate G.L. for special education needs. No evaluation was conducted and, following a car accident in which G.L. lost his sister, the District purportedly investigated whether G.L. lived within its boundaries. That investigation confirmed the District’s obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to provide G.L. a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Little was done to deal with G,L.’s struggles or alleged bullying, while the District repeatedly investigated residency. His parents withdrew G.L. from the school in March 2010. Within two years (the limitations period set forth in 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(C)), G.L.’s parents filed a due process complaint, alleging that the District denied him a FAPE and requesting compensatory education for September 2008 through March 2010. A hearing officer adopted a two-year remedy cap, compensating only injuries that occurred within two years of the filing date, regardless of whether filing occurred within two years of reasonably discovering older injuries. The Third Circuit disagreed and remanded, concluding that section 1415(b)(6)(B) is simply an inartful attempt to mirror the two-year statute of limitations. View "G L v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist" on Justia Law