Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A district elementary school principal interpreted an educational policy to mean that elementary school teachers were expected to be present in their classrooms ten minutes before the start of the instructional day. The Coastal Education Association, an affiliate of a union representing teachers, filed a grievance with Regional School District Unit No. 5 (RSU No. 5) challenging the principal’s interpretation as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Association and the Board of Directors of RSU No. 5. An arbitrator concluded that the principal’s directive violated the CBA and directed RSU No. 5 to rescind the educational policy. RSU No. 5 filed an application to vacate the arbitration award. The superior court granted the application, concluding that the dispute was not substantively arbitrable pursuant to the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law, which prevents school boards from bargaining on matters of educational policy or submitting educational policy disputes to interest arbitration. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the educational policy at issue in this case was, as a matter of law, not substantively arbitrable. View "Reg’l Sch. Unit No. 5 v. Coastal Educ. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-five taxpayers, filed a complaint challenging the Opportunity Scholarship Program, which allows a small number of students in lower-income families to receive scholarships from the State to attend private school. The trial court declared the Opportunity Scholarship Program legislation unconstitutional on its face and permanently enjoined further implementation and enforcement of the legislation, including the disbursement of public funds. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and final judgment and dissolved the injunction, holding that no prohibition in the Constitution or in precedent foreclosed the General Assembly’s enactment of the challenged legislation in this case. View "Hart v. State" on Justia Law

Tetzlaff, age 56, lives with his mother, is unemployed, and owes approximately $260,000 in student loan debt, which is guaranteed by Educational Credit Management Corporation. When Tetzlaff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2012, he sought to have this debt discharged, claiming that repayment constituted an “undue hardship” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court held that Tetzlaff’s student debt could not be discharged. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the bankruptcy court found that Tetzlaff’s financial situation has the ability to improve given that “he has an MBA, is a good writer, is intelligent, and family issues are largely over” and that “Tetzlaff is not mentally ill and is able to earn a living.” The courts rejected an argument that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to consider Tetzlaff’s payments to Florida Coastal Law School (which were not included in the discharge action) in concluding that he had not made a good faith effort to repay the debt held by Educational Credit. View "Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a reimbursement action for a unilateral private placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., challenging the adequacy of the public school proposed by the school district for the placement of their child. The court found that the due process complaint’s challenges to the school were in fact substantive attacks on the child's individualized education plan (IEP) rather than prospective challenges to the school's capacity to provide the services mandated by the child's IEP. Therefore, the court agreed with the SRO and district court’s ultimate conclusions that the school district was not required to present evidence regarding the adequacy of the school at the impartial hearing, and the school district provided the child with a free appropriate education plan (FAPE). The court further clarified its decision in R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., which imposes no such requirement. Consequently, plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement for their unilateral placement of the child in private school for the 2012 school year. The court affirmed the judgment. View "M.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, including fees for work performed by a special education expert employed by their attorney, after prevailing in actions brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the special education expert is a highly experienced special education consultant and expert. Because the expert is not a paralegal, her fees were nonrecoverable as part of reasonable attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McAllister v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The parent of K.E., a student who was diagnosed with several learning issues, seeks reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., after she chose a private boarding school for K.E. The hearing officer and the district court denied reimbursement because, in their view, the child had no need to be in a residential program. The court concluded, however, that all statutory, regulatory, and judicial requirements for reimbursement of the costs of private school have been satisfied: the school district failed to offer the child a “free appropriate public education” in either a public school or a non-residential private school; the private boarding school the parent selected was, at the time, the only one on the record “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” designed to meet the child’s needs; the residential component of the private school was in fact “necessary to provide a free appropriate public education to” the child; and the school district has not shown that the parent acted unreasonably. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leggett v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Florida public school teachers, filed suit challenging Florida’s Student Success Act, Fla. Stat. 1012.34, as well as the Florida State Board of Education’s and three school districts’ implementation of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the Act resulted in teacher evaluation policies that violated the teachers’ rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Determining that plaintiffs have standing and the case is not moot, the court concluded that, under rational basis review, the school district's evaluation policies are rationally related to the purpose of improving student academic performance. Therefore, plaintiffs substantive due process and equal protection claims failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cook v. Chartrand" on Justia Law

The school board of Tucson developed the Mexican American Studies (MAS) program in Tucson public schools to provide a culturally relevant curriculum for students by incorporating historical and contemporary Mexican American contributions into coursework and classroom studies. Arizona state superintendents of education successfully sponsored and implemented legislation that did away with the program (A.R.S. 15-111 and 15-112). The statute prohibits a school district or charter school from including in its program of instruction any courses or classes that: (1) “Promote the overthrow of the United States government,” (2) “Promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” (3) “Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” or (4) “Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.” Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statutes. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings that A.R.S 15-112(A)(3) is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment but severable from the rest of the statute; that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment; and that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not vague in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim where there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the enactment and/or enforcement of A.R.S. 15-112 was motivated at least in part by a discriminatory intent. The court remanded that claim for trial. Finally, the court remanded plaintiffs’ First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arce v. Douglas" on Justia Law

MSD appealed the district court's determination that Mathew, who has Asperger's Syndrome, was entitled to the preparation of an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE) at public expense under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400; an award of attorneys' fees to Mathew's parents; and an injunction against Mathew's graduation from high school. The court found no error in the district court’s affirmance of the hearing officer’s determination that Matthew was entitled to an IEE at public expense; the parents’ request for attorneys’ fees is more analogous to an independent claim than an ancillary proceeding and thus was timely filed; by procuring an IEE at public expense, the parents were “prevailing parties;" because the plain language of the IDEA limits awards of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) to instances in which the child has been determined to need special education services, and Matthew had not been found to need such services, the parents are not eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA; and the "stay-put" injunction preventing Matthew’s graduation from high school must be lifted. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. v. D.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a child with autism and speech and language disabilities, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482, seeking payment for an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of the child to determine his educational needs. The district court dismissed the parents' complaint, holding that the parents' request in the state administrative proceeding was time-barred. Because a reevaluation of the child is due, the relief the parents seek - an order directing the District to pay for an IEE - will no longer redress the procedural injury they allege. Because the parents lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the appeal, their appeal is moot. Accordingly, the court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded. View "T.P. v. Bryan Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law