Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In the underlying “school finance” case, Shawnee Mission School District No. 512 (U.S.D. 512) filed a motion to intervene. Plaintiffs opposed U.S.D. 512’s entry into that litigation, and the State did not object. The district court panel denied the motion to intervene, concluding that the State adequately represented U.S.D. 512’s interests and that the motion to intervene was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the panel did not abuse its discretion in denying U.S.D. 512’s motion to intervene as a matter of right, as (1) U.S.D. 512’s interests were not adequately represented by the parties in this case; but (2) U.S.D. 512’s motion to intervene was untimely. View "Gannon v. State" on Justia Law

In 2013, Froid Elementary School District No. 65 petitioned the Roosevelt County Superintendent of Schools to transfer territory from the Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to the Froid School District. Poplar opposed the transfer. The deputy superintendent appointed for the purpose of hearing and deciding the petition approved the territory transfer. Poplar appealed. The district court awarded summary judgment to Poplar and vacated the order transferring territory to Froid on the basis that the territory transfer statute required statements to be made under oath and that the deputy superintendent’s failure to administrator oaths was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Poplar failed to preserve its statutory issue concerning the necessity of sworn testimony and it was error for the district court to reach the merits of the question. Remanded. View "In re Petition to Transfer Territory from Poplar Elementary Sch. to Froid Elementary Sch." on Justia Law

The United States Department of Education (DOE) Secretary decided through an administrative proceeding that International Junior College of Business and Technology, Inc. (International) could not participate in certain federal student financial assistance programs. Specifically, the DOE found that International failed to comply with a requirement that for-private colleges derive at least ten percent of their revenue from some source other than federal student aid (“the 90/10 rule”). International challenged the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act in a Puerto Rico district court. The district court granted the DOE’s motion for summary judgment, thus dismissing the action. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the DOE’s 90/10 assessment was proper; (2) the Secretary did not err in rejecting International’s attempts to cure its 90/10 violation; and (3) the magistrate judge did not err by denying International the chance to conduct discovery. View "Int’l Junior Coll. of Bus. & Tech., Inc. v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

E.M. is a student at the Learning Center for Exceptional Children (LCEC), a private school for children with intellectual disabilities. E.M.’s federally-mandated individualized education plan created by her parents, teachers, and local public-school system—says that she should attend LCEC and integrated classes with students from Today’s Learning Center (TLC), a private school for regular-education students that shares classroom space with LCEC. The New Jersey Department of Education asserts that it has not approved LCEC or TLC to teach integrated classes of regular-education students and students with disabilities. The Department directed LCEC to confirm that it would not place its public-school students with disabilities in classrooms with private-school regular-education students. LCEC agreed under protest. E.M.’s parents and LCEC obtained preliminary injunctive relief under the so-called “stay-put” rule of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412, which allowed her to attend classes with TLC’s regular-education students during the pendency of the case. The Third Circuit remanded with the injunction intact for additional fact finding, including whether other educational alternatives are available to E.M. View "D. M. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

This case was a direct review of a King County Superior Court decision that found certain portions of Initiative 1240 (I-1240) (Charter School Act), codified at chapter 28A.710 RCW, unconstitutional but left the remainder of the Act standing. In November 2012, Washington voters approved I-1240 providing for the establishment of up to 40 charter schools within five years. The Act was intended to provide parents with "more options" regarding the schooling of their children. But the new schools came with a trade-off: the loss of local control and1local accountability. Charter schools are exempt from many state rules. With the exception of "the specific state statutes and rules" identified in RCW 28A.710.040(2) and any "state statutes and rules made applicable to the charter school in the school's charter contract," charter schools were "not subject to and are exempt from all other state statutes and rules applicable to school districts and school district boards of directors ... in areas such as scheduling, personnel, funding, and educational programs." Alarmed over the lack of local accountability and fiscal impacts of the Act, appellants sued the State seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. Several supporters of charter schools intervened. All three parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the State and intervenors on all issues but one. The trial court held that charter schools were not "common schools" under article IX of Washington's Constitution and, therefore, the common school construction fund could not be appropriated to charter schools. The trial court found, however, that the provisions permitting such appropriations were severable. The trial court concluded that the Act was otherwise constitutional. All parties sought direct review, which the Washington Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of I-1240 that designated and treated charter schools as common schools violated article IX, section 2 of the state constitution and were void. This included the Act's funding provisions, which attempted to tap into and shift a portion of moneys allocated for common schools to the new charter schools authorized by the Act. Because the provisions designating and funding charter schools as common schools were integral to the Act, such void provisions were not severable, and that determination was dispositive of this case. View "League of Women Voters of Wash. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Barstow Unified School District Board of Education approved closing two of its elementary schools: Thomson Elementary School and Hinkley Elementary School. Students from those schools were transferred to other District “receptor” schools. The District determined that the closures and transfers were exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because they fell within the categorical exemption for “minor additions” to schools. A citizens group, plaintiff-appellant, Save Our Schools (SOS), petitioned the trial court for a peremptory writ setting aside the District’s resolutions approving the closures and transfers and finding them exempt from CEQA. The petition was denied and SOS appealed, claiming: (1) insufficient evidence supported the District’s determinations that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA; and (2) if the closures were exempt, then SOS met its burden showing that two exceptions to CEQA’s categorical exemptions applied. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the administrative record contained insufficient evidence of the “original student capacity” (or total enrollment before the transfers) of any of the receptor schools. It was therefore impossible for the District to determine, based on the record before it, that the closures and transfers would not increase the total student enrollment of any of the receptor schools beyond the levels allowed under the minor additions exemption. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to issue a peremptory writ (1) voiding the District’s resolutions approving the school closures and student transfers and (2) directing the District to reconsider its determination that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA review. On remand, the District may accept and consider additional evidence not before it when it made its original exemption determinations. View "Save Our Schools v. Barstow Unified" on Justia Law

B.S., a 16-year-old with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had an individualized education program (IEP). A dispute arose and the parents requested a due process hearing. The parties settled several issues, so the only claim remaining was whether B.S. was entitled to compensatory education services for alleged past denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On the first day of the hearing, B.S.’s counsel spent five hours examining the special education administrator. The district objected, noting the allotted nine hours of time. The ALJ subsequently reminded B.S.'s counsel that the time limit set at the pretrial conference would be enforced, and offered an opportunity to reorder the evidence. B.S. objected to enforcement of the time limits and continued with the lengthy examination of the case manager. B.S's time expired and B.S. was not allowed to question witnesses further or cross-examine district witnesses. B.S. made an informal offer of proof of additional evidence that B.S. had intended to present. After an unfavorable decision, B.S. appealed, also alleging that state defendants established an unpromulgated "best practices" rule restricting the length of testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court dismissed the state defendants, finding that B.S. was challenging only one ALJ's discretionary decision, so the state was not a proper party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that B.S. did not suffer a legally cognizable injury for which the state could be liable and had not been denied a FAPE. View "B.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Juanya, age 15, participated in a mandatory swimming class run by his physical education teacher, Rodgers. Juanya, a non-swimmer, was submerged for a few seconds, possibly inhaling or swallowing water. Juanya exited the pool and told Rodgers that his chest hurt. Rodgers told Juanya to sit on the bleachers. Several minutes later, Rodgers went over to check on Juanya, who requested to remain out of the pool for the rest of class. Rodgers denied the request. Juanya followed instructions and stayed in the shallow end for the remainder of the period. In his next class, nearly an hour and a half after leaving the pool, Juanya fell backward and hit the desk behind him. As he rolled off his chair and onto the floor, he had a seizure. A school nurse attempted to revive Juanya. Paramedics took Juanya by ambulance to a hospital, where he died that day, apparently of a rare form of asphyxiation called “dry” or “secondary drowning.” Juanya’s mother sued Rodgers and the Bethlehem Area School District, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rodgers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which the court denied. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rodgers’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, View "Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law