Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

According to her Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, plaintiff Kasha LaPointe was employed as a tenured public school teacher by defendant Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB or the Board”). Jerome Puyau, the Superintendent of Schools for VPSB advised LaPointe that a “due process hearing” would be held in his office to address charges of alleged “willful neglect of duty” and “dishonesty.” According to the Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, this letter, also called the “charge letter” by the parties, advised LaPointe that she would be “afforded an opportunity to respond” to the allegations but that “[n]o witnesses [would] be heard….” However, LaPointe did appear with her counsel in the office of the superintendent and did present, with counsel's assistance, her explanations and responses to the allegations in the “charge letter.” After that hearing, the Board elected to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe challenged the termination, asking for a Tenure Hearing Panel. The Tenure Hearing Panel was convened. The hearing officer and the panel proceeded to take evidence and hear testimony, all of which was preserved. Thereafter, the panel made its recommendation, voting 2-1 to concur with the superintendent‟s action to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 17:443(B)(2), requesting judicial review of her termination. No judicial review of the termination itself had been conducted at this point, owing to a constitutional challenge. As to the constitutional challenge, LaPointe requested a judicial declaration that Act 1 of 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was unconstitutional in its entirety and further declaring Act 1 to be null, void, and of no legal effect whatsoever. She alleged the hearing provisions of Act 1 deprived her of her vested property right to continued employment without due process of law as required by Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2, and of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Because the constitutionality of Act 1 was challenged, the Attorney General later intervened as a defendant in the matter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the lower court erred in declaring unconstitutional on its face Act 1 of the 2012 Legislative Session as codified in La. Rev. Stat. 17:443(B)(1) and (2). Upon de novo review, the Court found the court of appeal erred in declaring La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 unconstitutional on its face because it did not afford a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to termination. Instead, the Court found La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 provided sufficient due process to protect the tenured teacher's vested employment rights. View "LaPointe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

The Douglas County School District implemented its Choice Scholarship Pilot Program (CSP), a program that awarded taxpayer-funded scholarships to qualifying elementary, middle, and high school students. Those students could use their scholarships to help pay their tuition at partnering private schools, including religious schools. Following a lawsuit from Douglas County taxpayers, the trial court found that the CSP violated the Public School Finance Act of 1994, as well as various provisions of the Colorado Constitution. The trial court permanently enjoined implementation of the CSP. The court of appeals reversed, holding that: (1) Petitioners lacked standing to sue under the Act; and (2)the CSP did not violate the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the CSP comported with both the Act and the Colorado Constitution. After review, the Court held that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the CSP under the Act. Further, the CSP violated article IX, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court with instructions to remand back to the trial court so that the trial court could reinstate its order permanently enjoining the CSP. View "Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Board appealed the district court's holding that the Board violated the stay-put provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), and awarding reimbursement to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cross-appealed. The court held that the appropriate equitable relief for a stay-put violation is reimbursement or compensatory education (or both) for the full value of services that the educational agency was required to fund, not the (lesser) value of services the parent was able to afford. The court further held that an educational agency’s obligation to maintain stay-put placement is triggered when an administrative due process proceeding is initiated, not when an impasse is reached. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in most respects, but vacated the award of reimbursement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

WSCS objected to the District's offer of classrooms and related space at Crenshaw High School and filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a peremptory writ ordering the District to comply with its obligations under Proposition 39, Ed. Code, 47614. The trial court denied the writ petition. Under Proposition 39, the District must “make reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the charter school wishes to locate.” The court rejected WSCS’s contentions that the District did not make reasonable efforts to place WSCS near its desired location; the offer of space at Crenshaw represented facilities near WSCS’s desired location; WSCS was not entitled to a specific location of its choosing, only reasonable efforts to place it near its desired location; and the District did not abuse its discretion by placing WSCS at Crenshaw instead of two other schools. View "Westchester Secondary Charter Sch. v. LA Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Flores Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting the State Defendants Rule 60(b)(5) relief from a judgment for alleged violations of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. 1701–21. The district court also vacated its earlier injunction granting the Flores Plaintiffs statewide relief. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from judgment because the circumstances surrounding the implementation and funding of English Language Learners (ELLs) programs at the state and national levels have changed substantially since 2000, and the current programs constitute “appropriate action” under the EEOA; the Flores Plaintiffs have not shown that Arizona is violating the EEOA on a statewide basis, and that the facts alleged by them are insufficient to justify the maintenance of a statewide injunction; and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Flores v. Huppenthal" on Justia Law

Tenth-grader Jesus Rodriguez was injured while traveling to a soccer match in the bed of a pickup truck driven by a fellow student and teammate. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company had issued a policy to the Kansas State High School Activities Association, which administered various extracurricular activities in the state. Rodriguez’s mother (Plaintiff) filed a claim with Mutual of Omaha. Mutual of Omaha denied the claim, reasoning that the travel during which Rodriguez was injured did not qualify as covered under the policy. Plaintiff sued the school district, Mutual of Omaha, and other defendants. The district judge held that Mutual of Omaha should be dismissed as a defendant in the case because Rodriguez’s travel was neither authorized by the school district nor subject to reimbursement, the two requirements for “covered travel” under the definition in the Mutual of Omaha policy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the travel involved in this case did not qualify as subject to reimbursement, and thus there was no coverage under the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the travel during which Rodriguez was injured was “authorized” and “subject to reimbursement,” and therefore, there was coverage under the policy language. View "Rodriguez v. United Sch. Dist. No. 500" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Jefferson County, Tennessee, school board, facing a budget shortfall, abolished its alternative school and contracted for its students to be educated in a program at a private, Christian school (Kingswood). The County students were exclusively within Kingswood’s day program, which did not feature deliberate religious instruction and has been recognized by the Tennessee Senate as a model alternative-school program. They were taught by state-licensed teachers and regularly met with licensed counselors. The school building did not include any religious symbols or messages. Day students were not required to pray, observe a “moment of silence,” or engage in any religious or spiritual activity. Students were required to submit a weekly form—signed by parents—that contained a quote from the Gospel of Luke: “Jesus . . . said, Suffer little children to come unto me….” Report cards contained the same Biblical text. The Kingswood website and newsletter contained some religious references. No County student or parent complained about any of Kingswood’s religious references. Teachers who lost their jobs in the abolition of the original alternative school sued, asserting an Establishment Clause violation. The district court awarded damages and an injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the action involved a secular legislative purpose, did not give rise to a governmental endorsement of religion, and did not entail an excessive entanglement between the government and religion. View "Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Nelson spent six months as the Director of Education at Sanford‐Brown College, a for‐profit educational institution in Milwaukee. After he resigned, Nelson initiated suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729. Based on its receipt of federal subsidies from the U.S. Department of Education, Nelson alleges that the college’s recruiting and retention practices resulted in the transmission of thousands of false claims to the government, potentially subjecting the college and its corporate parent to hundreds of millions of dollars in liability. After the United States declined to intervene, the district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of Sanford‐Brown. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by holding that its subject matter jurisdiction was limited to the period of time when Nelson was employed by SBC (2008-2009). FCA liability is not triggered by an institution’s failure to comply with Title IV Restrictions after its entry into a Program Participation Agreement, unless the relator proves that the institution’s application to establish initial Title IV eligibility was fraudulent. Sanford-Brown entered into its PPA in 2005. View "United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a disabled student, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of attending a private program. The hearing officer denied the request for reimbursement, concluding that it was untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-443(a). The district court held, however, that the student's placement by the parents was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the parents were entitled to reimbursement. The court agreed and concluded that the student's family is entitled to reimbursement for the 2010–11 school year because the DOE tacitly consented to his enrollment at the private school program by failing to provide an alternative. The court also affirmed the district court's fee award. View "Sam K. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law