Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether three teachers employed by the Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District (Board) appropriately were denied tenure as a matter of law or equity under circumstances , implicating the interplay of N.J.S.A.18A:28-5, which establishes the general rule by which teachers obtain tenure, and N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1, which creates an exception to that general rule. The Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association filed a petition of appeal on behalf of the teachers with the Commissioner. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case, and the Board moved for summary judgment. The Association maintained that the teachers were entitled to tenure as a matter of law and under the equitable principles of apparent authority and equitable estoppel. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the Board s motion, finding that none of the teachers met the statutory requirement for tenure because they each had served as temporary replacements for other tenured teachers. The ALJ rejected the Association's equitable arguments and concluded that the Board was not required to notify teachers of their status as replacement teachers under N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1. The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ s decision. The Association appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1 required a board of education to give an employee notice of his or her designation as a replacement. With respect to the claim of Tamara Manzur, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether she was provided such notice as to her status during the 2007-08 school year. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that equitable principles were inapplicable. View "Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association v. Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District" on Justia Law

Former employees filed a qui tam False Claims suit against Heritage College, a for-profit school, alleging it fraudulently induced the Department of Education (DOE) to provide funds by falsely promising to keep accurate student records as required by 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(3). They claimed that Heritage altered grade and attendance records from 2006 to 2012 to ensure students made satisfactory progress and to avoid refunds, thereby maximizing Title IV funds. Around 97% of Heritage students receive Title IV aid, accounting for about 90% of gross tuition. From 2009 to 2012, the DOE disbursed $32,817,727 to Heritage. Each relator also alleged retaliation under the FCA and wrongful discharge under state law. For purposes of summary judgment, Heritage did not dispute that it altered records. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage, finding that any false statements were not material to government funding decisions. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA claim, but affirmed the employment claims. Heritage could not have executed the participation agreement without stating it would maintain adequate records and without the agreement Heritage could not have received any Title IV funds. Heritage's actions with respect to the plaintiffs were not retaliatory. View "Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc." on Justia Law

The Texas Student Housing Authority (TSHA) had title to the Cambridge at College Station, a student-residential facility near two college campuses. In the summers of 2005 to 2008, TSHA provided lodging at the Cambridge to non-college students attending university-sponsored instructional programs. The Brazos County Appraisal District (BCAD) voided TSHA’s property-tax-exempt status for the years 2005 to 2008 and assessed millions of dollars of back taxes. The trial court affirmed, concluding that TSHA forfeited the exemption once the Cambridge hosted people who were not students, faculty or staff members of an institution of higher learning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TSHA did not forfeit its exemption under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 53.46 by housing summer program participants at the Cambridge because the statute imposes no conditions but rather declares the property-tax exemption in absolute terms. View "Tex. Student Housing Auth. v. Brazos County Appraisal Dist." on Justia Law

After voters in School District rejected a bond proposal to construct an addition to existing high school building, School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Bank, which agreed to finance the project. Appellants, residents and taxpayers in the school district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief contending that the agreement violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-10,105. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) under section 79-10,105, lease-purchase agreements may be used to make school improvements without the voters’ approval if the project is not funded by bonded debt; and (2) School District in this case did not fund the project through bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ claims were moot because, as of the time of this appeal, the addition had been completed, but the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (2) section 79-10,105 does not prohibit a school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement to finance a capital construction project if it has not created a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district, and because there was no evidence that this occurred in this case, School District did not violate section 79-10,105 by entering into the lease-purchase agreement with Bank. View "Nebuda v. Dodge County Sch. Dist. 0062" on Justia Law

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law

Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. View "Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill." on Justia Law

The Wenks have a 17-year-old daughter, M, who has an IQ of 70 or below, and requires special education services. M attended high school in Grandview Heights, under an Individualized Education Program (IEP), as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. In 2011, teachers expressed “concerns” about M’s father’s treatment of M. An administrator’s report to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS) included statements and behaviors by M that were thought to indicate sexual abuse and many comments about father’s physical appearance and demeanor. FCCS concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated; the police department dropped its criminal investigation. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Wenks claimed that the report was filed in retaliation for their advocacy to change M’s educational plan, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied the school administrator qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied the Wenks‘s motion for fees and costs for defending the appeal. The right to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the report and a reasonable official would have understood that filing a child abuse report in bad faith violated those rights. View "Wenk v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Two School Districts filed suit against the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) asking for a mandatory injunction requiring the ADE to release all federal and state funds that they were due. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for the School Districts. The School Districts subsequently moved to have the ADE found in contempt due to the ADE’s refusal to release all amounts they alleged they were due. The circuit court declined to hold the ADE in contempt. The School Districts appealed, and the Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the School Districts filed a motion requesting that the circuit court order the ADE to release to them ninety-eight percent guaranteed Uniform Rate of Tax (URT) adjustment funds that had been released by the ADE in all prior school years and which the ADE had illegally “set off” against “excess URT funds” for certain school years. The circuit court denied relief. The School Districts appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the first appeal did not address the issue of the ninety-eight percent guaranteed URT adjustment funding, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in finding that it lacked the authority to order that those funds be disbursed by the ADE. View "Furnas v. Kimbrell" on Justia Law

Matthew, now 20 years old, is autistic. While he was a high school student in the St. Charles Community Unit School District, he received special-education services. Although he is now in college, he and his parents sued the District and various administrators and teachers for failing to provide necessary educational services to Matthew before his graduation. The district court dismissed the parents’ claims for lack of standing to sue. The court dismissed Matthew’s case for failure to sue an appropriate party. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Matthew’s claim of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 to 796, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12201 to 12213, all plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against the individual defendants except for the District Superintendent, and the individual-capacity claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA. The court vacated with respect to claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 to 1418, View "Stanek v. Saint Charles Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law