Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

When Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved in 1994, the trial court awarded Mother primary care and custody of the parties’ daughter (Daughter) and ordered Father to pay child support. In 2011, after Daughter enrolled at Ball State University (BSU), Mother petitioned to modify child support, requesting that Father pay Daughter’s postsecondary educational expenses. Daughter withdrew from BSU in 2012 and attempted to enroll at Indian University Northwest. BSU, however, would not release Daughter’s official transcript because of her outstanding tuition bill. Mother requested to join BSU as a supplemental defendant. The trial court granted the request and ordered BSU to release the transcript. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s order was appealable as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mother’s motion for joinder, as Mother failed to carry her burden in demonstrating that BSU was a necessary party under Trial Rule 19. View "Ball State University v. Irons" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals were two local educational agencies in California, a school district and a county office of education. In separate actions, Plaintiff sued the California Department of Education in federal court alleging that, in resolving disputes between parents and the school districts, the Department routinely violated certain procedural requirements imposed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its implementing regulations. The district court dismissed the actions, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked a statutory right of action to seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding alleged violations of procedural requirements imposed by the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that school districts lack a right of action to challenge a State’s non-compliance with the IDEA’s procedural protections in the context of complaint resolution proceedings. View "Fairfield-Suisun Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

In a consolidated qui tam action, three relators brought claims under the False Claims Act against an educational institution for falsely certifying to the government that it was in compliance with various federal statutes and regulations to receive Title IV financial-aid funds. The district court ruled against the relators. After final judgment was entered, two of the relators appealed. Relator Carlos Urquilla-Diaz appealed from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his claims under the False Claims Act against Defendants Kaplan University, Kaplan Higher Education Corp., and Kaplan, Inc. (Kaplan). Relator Jude Gillespie appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Kaplan on his claims under the False Claims Act as well as several other orders. Diaz worked for Kaplan University from August 2004 through April 2005 as a professor of paralegal studies. In April 2007, he filed his qui tam action against Kaplan, alleging that Kaplan had violated several provisions of the Higher Education Act and its implementing regulations. These violations in turn rendered Kaplan ineligible to receive Title IV funds. And because these violations were committed with the requisite scienter, Kaplan was liable under the False Claims Act. Gillespie, began working for Kaplan University in 2004 as an associate professor of paralegal studies. He was promoted to department chair. Two months later, he informed Kaplan that he had a medical disorder and requested several accommodations. His requests were granted. Even so, in April 2005, Gillespie complained an associate general counsel for Kaplan, Inc., that Kaplan’s grievance policies violated section 504 the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations. At that time, he indicated that he planned to file an administrative complaint with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (the OCR). The following day, Kaplan fired him for job abandonment because he had refused to perform his job duties. After investigating Gillespie’s allegations against Kaplan, the OCR rejected his individual claims. The agency found that Kaplan did not discriminate or retaliate against him, but did take issue with some of Kaplan's policies and procedures regarding disabled employees in the Kaplan Higher Education Corporation Employee Handbook, Kaplan Field Employee Handbook, and Kaplan University Faculty Handbook. Kaplan voluntarily entered into a resolution agreement with the OCR to change its policies. In doing so, Kaplan did not admit to any violation of or noncompliance with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or its implementing regulations. In April 2007, Gillespie filed his qui tam action against Kaplan, alleging that Kaplan violated the False Claims Act by making false statements in its 2004 and 2007 program participation agreements when it certified that it would “comply with . . . Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the implementing regulations 34 C.F.R. Part 104 (barring discrimination on the basis of physical handicap).” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Diaz’s claims against Kaplan that were based on its alleged violations of the Department of Education’s satisfactory-progress regulation and the accreditation requirement. But the Court modified the judgment of dismissal to be without prejudice with respect to the government. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Diaz’s claims against Kaplan to the extent that they were based on its alleged violation of the incentive-compensation ban, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Kaplan on all of Gillespie’s claims. View "Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University" on Justia Law

The issues presented in three appeals (consolidated for review) were ones of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding the state Accountability Act (AAA). Plaintiffs Daniel Boyd (superintendent of the Lowndes County Public School System), Anita Gibson (a teacher and president of the Alabama Education Association) and Senator Quinton Ross, Jr. (representative of the 26th District) sued Julie Magee in her official capacity as the Commissioner of Revenue, and Thomas White, Jr. in his official capacity as the state Comptroller. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the AAA under certain provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 that allowed the substitution of House Bill (HB 84), the creation of certain tax credits, the appropriation of funds for those credits, the repeal of certain tax credits, and the creation of new debt - all in relation to education funding in the State of Alabama. The circuit court entered an order in favor of plaintiffs as to their first eight counts in their complaint. With regard to Counts IX and X, the court concluded the issues were moot. The circuit court then enjoined enforcement of the AAA. The State defendants moved to stay the circuit court order, then appealed. The Supreme Court, after careful consideration of the legislation at issue and the circuit court's order, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court found: (1) no subsequent act of the Legislature mooted any issue presented here; and (2) the AAA was constitutional with regard to all of plaintiffs' allegations that it was not. The case was remanded for further proceedings on those issues deemed moot by the circuit court; the court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Magee v. Boyd" on Justia Law

C.W. was eligible for special education services and was in a special day class within the Capistrano Unified School District. K.S. consented to an occupational therapy assessment for C.W. K.S. then requested an independent assessment at public expense based on her disagreement with the occupational therapy report. The District denied the request and then initiated a due process hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ concluded that the District’s assessment was appropriate. K.S. appealed, claiming violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Rehabilitation Act. The federal district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision and awarded the District attorney’s fees and costs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the ADA and section 1983 claims were frivolous, and therefore, the district court correctly awarded attorney’s fees and costs for representation relating to those claims; but (2) the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims were not frivolous and/or brought for an improper purpose, and therefore, the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees and costs related to the litigation of those claims. View "C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A student-athlete was ejected from a high school football game for allegedly committing a flagrant personal foul. Because the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (SSAC) does not allow participation in the game following an ejection, the student-athlete was suspended from playing in the next game. The SSAC refused to review the student-athlete’s administrative appeal, instead invoking its non-review of ejections rule. The student-athlete sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction from the circuit court, arguing that the SSAC’s non-review of ejections rule violated the Legislature's requirement that the SSAC provide a “proper review procedure.” The circuit court enjoined the SSAC from enforcing its penalty against the student-athlete, finding that that the SSAC violated the Legislature’s requirement that the SSAC provide a proper review procedure. The SSAC sought a writ of prohibition to halt enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the SSAC’s non-review of ejections rule violates the Legislature’s requirement that the SSAC provide a proper review procedure. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor, filed suit against WCC, alleging violations of her state and federal constitutional rights when WCC terminated her employment for purportedly making offensive comments in class. On appeal, WCC challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that WCC is not an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that a finding of sovereign immunity for WCC would not serve the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment because immunity would not further the state's interest in preserving its treasury, nor would it protect the integrity of the state. View "Leitner v. Westchester Community College" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Novak filed suit against Southern Illinois University and three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. After review of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff could not show that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was pretextual. On that ground, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of So. Ill. University" on Justia Law