Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The district court ordered Case Western School of Medicine to award plaintiff a diploma, despite the university’s determination that he lacked the professionalism required to discharge his duties responsibly. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Lack-of-professionalism finding amounts to an academic judgment to which courts owe considerable deference. The Case Western curriculum identifies nine “core competencies.” First on the list is professionalism. The task of figuring out whether a student has mastered these professionalism requirements falls to the university’s Committee on Students. Although plaintiff did well academically, as exhibited by recommendation letters praising his “academic excellence” in 2011 and 2013, published several articles, and won a special award for “Honors with Distinction in Research,” he received a stinging evaluation about his performance in an internal medicine internship. There were several complaints about his dishonesty, aggressive behavior, lack of preparation, tardiness, poor hygiene, and a DUI conviction. He refused an offer to repeat his internship in order to graduate. View "Al-Dabagh v. Case Western Reserve Univ." on Justia Law

Resident taxpayers of Lemont-Bromberek Combined School District 113A filed three taxpayer derivative actions on behalf of the District, asserting that certain officers and employees of the District and current and former members of its board of education had improperly transferred money from the District’s Working Cash Fund, in violation of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/20-1). Plaintiffs also sought recovery against the surety that issued the bond for the District’s treasurer and against the accounting firm that performed audits of the District’s finances. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. To seek recovery under section 20-6 for the unlawful diversion of funds or for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege that money improperly transferred from the Working Cash Fund was used for an improper purpose, resulting in an actual loss to the school district. View "Lutkauskas v. Ricker" on Justia Law

Daniels is an African-American educator born in 1950. She has a masters degree in elementary education and is certified as a reading specialist. She sued her former employer, the School District of Philadelphia, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, substantively and by retaliating against her because she opposed what she believed was SDP’s discriminatory conduct in violation of the acts. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. She appealed only the retaliation claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Daniels failed to establish a causal link between her protected activities and the adverse actions; she did not show an “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity. View "Daniels v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Maurice J. Moyer Academic Institute (“New Moyer”) is a charter school in the City of Wilmington that serves some of the most economically disadvantaged students in the state. In 2014, the Department of Education, Secretary of Education, and Delaware Board of Education (collectively, Defendants) decided to revoke New Moyer’s charter in June 2016, one year before the charter expired. Defendants based their decision on the fact that New Moyer was the lowest performing charter school in the State based on the State’s testing standards. Plaintiffs - the operator of New Moyer, parents representing several of the school’s students, and the City - sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from revoking New Moyer’s charter. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate (1) a reasonable probability that they were denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the decision to revoke the school’s charter; and (2) that Defendants did not exercise due diligence and good faith when they determined that New Moyer failed to satisfy criteria set forth in the Charter School Act. View "In re The New Maurice J. Moyer Academy Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of New York State's requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend public school. The statute provides two exemptions from the immunization mandate: a medical exemption and a religious exemption. Rejecting plaintiffs' substantive due process, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and Ninth Amendment challenges, the court concluded that the statute and regulation are a constitutionally permissible exercise of the State's police power and do not infringe on the free exercise of religion. The court further concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are either meritless or waived. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Phillips v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Mrs. Bridgewater, a Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. (FACES) member parent, filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, alleging that FACES refused a reasonable accommodation for her allergic daughter by not serving her beef instead of chicken at a social event, therefore discriminating against her due to her disability. FACES subsequently expelled the Bridgewater family. Mrs. Bridgewater then filed a second complaint with the Commission, alleging that FACES unlawfully retaliated against her family for filing the disability discrimination claim. FACES filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Commission did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because FACES was a religious organization, not an educational one. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Bridgewater on the retaliatory discrimination claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s final order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims because the incident giving rise to the claims was not related to education and was thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. Remanded to grant FACES’s motion to dismiss as to both claims. View "Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc’y, Inc. v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

After series of problems arising between Dr. Fatemi and other program residents and coworkers at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), including reported failure to comply with regulatory standards that require a complete history and physical evaluation in the medical record prior to surgery or within 24 hours of admission, the UAMS program terminated Fatemi, a female second-year neurosurgery resident. Fatemi sued UAMS and several of its employees, asserting, among other things, gender discrimination. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fatemi's arguments concerning pretext. While there was an atmosphere of contentiousness and discord between Fatemi and her coworkers during her residency, there was no evidence that the discord was the product of intentional gender discrimination. A reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion on gender discrimination after considering all the undisputed material facts, and considering the few disputed facts in Fatemi's favor. She lost her place at UAMS because of her many professional shortcomings as a resident, not because she is a woman. View "Fatemi v. White" on Justia Law

Michael Doyle submitted to the Town of Falmouth a request pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) seeking to inspect certain cellular telephone bills of the School Department’s former Superintendent. The former Superintendent provided the requested records but redacted the information she considered nonpublic and confidential, exempt from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA, or beyond the scope of Doyle’s request. Doyle appealed, alleging that he was entitled to received unredacted copies of the cellular telephone records. After an in camera review of the unredacted records, the superior court entered judgment in favor of the Town and School Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the personal telephone numbers of public employees, any information concerning calls other than those related to the Town’s business, and any records containing information about parents’ and students’ telephone numbers were properly redacted from the Town’s response to the FOAA request. View "Doyle v. Town of Falmouth" on Justia Law

This case involved three small school districts, Northeast Community School District, East Central Community School District, and Preston Community School District. In 2010, the school boards of Northeast and East Central entered into a whole grade sharing agreement. Thereafter, citizens from Preston and East Central voted to reorganize their districts and merge the districts together into a new school district called Easton Valley Community School District (Easton). The Easton school board subsequently sent a notification of cancellation of the agreement to the superintendent of Northeast, claiming that when East Central ceased to exist the agreement was null. Northeast filed a petition for declaratory action and mandamus and then amended its petition alleging repudiation of the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for Easton, concluding (1) the agreement and the reorganization were valid but that the two were in direct conflict, and (2) the East Central school board did not have the ability to bind Easton as its successor corporation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement could bind the reorganized school district. View "Northeast Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Easton Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law