Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Brown, a black female law professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law (DCSL), had worked for DCSL in various capacities for more than 20 years when she applied for tenure and promotion. The Faculty Evaluation Committee recommended tenure and transmitted her application to Dean Broderick, who initially recommended that the Committee withdraw its approval due to the sparseness and quality of Brown’s legal scholarship. Once Broderick learned that a law journal agreed to publish another of Brown’s articles, she endorsed the recommendation and forwarded her approval to then–Interim Provost Baxter, who rejected the application. President Sessoms agreed that Brown should not be awarded tenure and did not submit Brown’s application to the Board. Around the same time, the administration considered the tenure application of McLain, a white male. Brown alleges that McLain had “no legal publications” but that Broderick did not insist that he satisfy the three-publication requirement, as Broderick had with Brown’s application. The Board awarded him tenure and a promotion to full professor. Brown sued. The district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal of Brown’s D.C. Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 claims and affirmed dismissal of her other claims. View "Brown v. Sessoms" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached. View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a high school student and his mother, filed suit against defendants for violation of the student's freedom of speech under the First Amendment and the mother's substantive due process right to parental authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' complaint stemmed from the student's suspension and transfer to an alternative school for his posting of a rap song on his Facebook page and on YouTube that criticized and named two male athletic coaches at his school for sexually harassing female students. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo the School Board could invoke Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in this case, it would not afford the School Board a defense for its violation of the student's First Amendment rights because the evidence does not support a finding, as would be required by Tinker, that the student's song either substantially disrupted the school's work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a disruption. In the alternative, the court concluded that the student's song did not gravely and uniquely threaten violence to the school population such to justify discipline pursuant to the court's narrow holding in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District that student speech that threatened a Columbine-style attack on a school was not protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the student's speech did not constitute a true threat as evidenced by, inter alia, its public broadcast as a rap song, its conditional nature, and the reactions of its listeners. The district court reversed in part and rendered in favor of the student against the School Board on the First Amendment claim; remanded and directed the district court to award the student nominal damages, court costs, appropriate attorneys' fees, and an injunction ordering the School Board to expunge all references to the incident at issue from the student's school records. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

The parties in this case - a board of education and an education association - proceeded to arbitration on a dispute. The parties proceeded on a three member arbitration panel. When a journalist with a newspaper sought to cover the arbitration proceedings, the panel adjourned to what it designated an executive session, closed to the public. The journalist and newspaper (together, Defendants) filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission, claiming that the panel violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Commission ordered the members of the arbitration panel and the Department to create a transcript of the hearing and provide that transcript to Defendants, concluding that the arbitration panel was a committee of the Department of Education and that the evidentiary portion of the arbitration proceeding under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA) was subject to the open meetings provision of the FOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because a TNA arbitration panel is not a “committee of” the Department, it does not constitute a “public agency.” View "Gould v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

South Kingstown School Committee (Committee) runs one of Rhode Island’s public school districts. Rhode Island has accepted federal funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Appellant, the mother of P.J., a disabled child the Committee was responsible for educating, filed a due process complaint seeking additional educational services for P.J. from the Committee. The Committee settled with Appellant pursuant to a Settlement Agreement under which the Committee agreed to perform four evaluations of P.J. After Appellant demanded ten additional evaluations, the Committee filed a due process complaint of its own. A Hearing Officer ruled against the Committee, concluding that some of the evaluations of P.J. had not been appropriate. The Committee then filed suit in federal district court. The district court reversed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the Settlement Agreement relieved the Committee of any obligation to perform or fund one of the evaluations; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that there was insufficient factual support for Appellant’s other evaluation request. Remanded. View "S. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' request for tuition assistance for their daughter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the State Review Officer's (SRO) decision to deny reimbursement for private schooling and the district court reversed in part and ordered the school district to reimburse plaintiffs for May 1, 2009 to May 31, 2009, and for the 2009-2010 school year. Because the court deferred to the SRO's determination that plaintiffs did not meet their obligation to demonstrate the appropriateness of their daughter's placement, plaintiffs cannot recover under the IDEA for any portion of the time she was placed at Family Foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of an order affirming the SRO's decision. View "Hardison v. Bd. of Ed. Oneonta City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of nine-year-old E.L., who has autism, initiated an administrative complaint against the school board under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. An ALJ determined that the school board violated the IDEA by failing to provide E.L. with required speech therapy but, in all other respects, she was provided an appropriate special education program. The school board appealed and the state review officer reversed the ALJ's conclusion regarding the speech therapy. Plaintiffs then filed a civil action seeking judicial review of the administrative proceedings. The court concluded that E.L. did not exhaust her administrative remedies and that the school board did not violate the IDEA where the review officer's conclusion that E.L. received the speech therapy mandated by her individualized education program is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "E. L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Board of Education" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

After School District notified Petitioner, a tenured school social worker, that she was to be suspended without pay for misconduct, Petitioner made a written request for a hearing on the specifications pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law 3020-a. In response, Respondent told Petitioner that she could only challenge the disciplinary determination against her by means of the procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the School District and a teachers association. Petitioner grieved the matter under the process specified in the CBA, without success. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. CPLR 78 proceeding to annul the disciplinary determination, asserting that she had been disciplined without being afforded the process to which she was entitled under the Education Law. The Appellate Court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because section 3020-a plainly provides that, in any CBA taking effect on or after September 1, 1994, tenured employees must be permitted to elect the discipline procedures set forth in section 3020-a, and because the governing renegotiated CBA became effective in 2006, Petitioner was not foreclosed from invoking the statutory procedure. View "Matter of Kilduff v. Rochester City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Deer/Mt. Judea School District (“Deer/Mt. Judea”) filed a complaint on its own behalf and on behalf of its students and taxpayers, alleging that the State had illegally and unconstitutionally failed to provide adequate funding to small, remote schools, some of which it closed. Deer/Mt. Judea sought declarations that the State’s school-funding and education systems were inequitable and inadequate and that section 32 of Act 293 of 2010 constituted special legislation and injunctions prohibiting the closure of the small, remote schools, among other things. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of some of Deer/Mt. Judea’s claims. Fort Smith School District, Greenwood School District, Alma School District, and Van Buren School District (collectively, “Fort Smith”) filed a motion to intervene in the litigation. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Fort Smith’s motion was untimely, and even if it was timely, Fort Smith did not have an interest in the case that needed to be protected. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to intervene, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for intervention as untimely. View "Fort Smith Sch. Dist. v. Deer-Mt. Judea Sch. Dist." on Justia Law