Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

“Jane Doe” was born in Russia and came to the U.S. at age two when she was adopted by American parents. During her sixth and seventh grade years, male classmates bullied her, sometimes hurling gendered or ethnic insults. The bullying turned violent. Three boys were charged with criminal battery and were expelled or withdrew from school. Doe sued Elmbrook School District and administrators under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the bullying was motivated by her sex and ethnicity, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Although Doe’s classmates’ actions were inexcusable,” the defendants are not legally responsible for those actions. Knowing how thoughtless and cruel children can be to one another, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI and Title IX to impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school officials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of another. School officials must have had “actual knowledge” of harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Even assuming Doe’s harassers were motivated by her sex or ethnicity, once the defendants gained actual notice of behavior that could qualify as severe and pervasive, they took action against the wrongdoers. View "Doe v. Galster" on Justia Law

The Florida Virtual School sued K12, Inc. and K12, Florida, LLC (collectively, K12) for trademark infringement. K12 asserted that the Florida Virtual School had no standing because the authority to file an action with regard to the trademarks at issue was vested exclusively in the Florida Department of State. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court for determination under Florida law. The Supreme Court answered that the Florida Virtual School’s statutory authority to acquire, enjoy, use, and dispose of trademarks, and the designation of its board of trustees as a body corporate with the powers of a body corporate and the authority for the proper operation and improvement of the School, necessarily included the authority to file an action to protect those trademarks. View "Fla. Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, C.M's parents challenged the district court's decision affirming the OAH judge's conclusion that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1487. The parents argued that the District violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA because it failed to properly incorporate C.M's Response-to-Intervention (RTI) data into C.M.'s initial evaluation and it failed to provide them with C.M.'s RTI data. The court concluded that the District did not fail to incorporate the RTI data into the evaluation, but that it violated the IDEA's procedural requirements by failing to provide the parents with the RTI data; the District's procedural violations prevented the parents from meaningfully participating in the individualized education program (IEP) process; and the court remanded for reconsideration of whether the parents were entitled to reimbursement for the cost of private instruction because C.M. was denied a free appropriate public education, and for attorneys' fees. The parents also contested three of the district court's rulings related to the first two OAH proceedings. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that the parents' claim for reimbursement of the cost of Dr. Guterman's evaluation was moot; properly concluded that the parents' due process rights were not violated by a change in the wording of the issue presented; and correctly determined that two of the three claims raised in the second OAH proceeding were time-barred. Finally, the court remanded for consideration of the parents' reevaluation retaliation claim and affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) learned that JM, a minor, had several unexcused absences from school, a deputy count attorney filed a petition alleging that JM was a neglected child because Mother had failed to provide adequate education for JM’s well being. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order of neglect. Mother appealed, claiming that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition because the district court was required to give her notice and counseling before the petition was filed, and she did not receive such notice or counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compulsory attendance statutes upon which Mother relied, which require school districts to give parents notice or counseling based on students’ unexcused absences, do not apply when a juvenile petition is filed by a prosecuting attorney under the Child Protection Act on the basis of a complaint from DFS alleging neglect. View "In re JM" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that African American students who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” in the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The claimed that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101, 12132; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The Third Circuit affirmed. Looking at the whole record, which included statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate against plaintiffs or that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students. View "Blunt v. Lower Merion Schs." on Justia Law

A school librarian having professional teacher status was suspended for conduct deemed to be unbecoming a teacher. An arbitrator considered the merits of the suspension. Applying a “just cause” standard, the arbitrator overturned the suspension, concluding that the school district failed to meet its burden of proof. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by reviewing the merits of the librarian’s twenty-day suspension and concluding that the school district had not met its burden of proving the alleged just cause for the suspension. View "Superintendent-Dir. of Assabet Valley Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Speicher" on Justia Law

C.S., who turned eighteen in March 2012, received special education services from the Butte School District until June 2013. In January 2013, the Montana Office of Public Instruction directed the School District to obtain appointment of a surrogate parent for C.S., who lived with his Foster Father, for educational purposes. The district court subsequently appointed Mary Jo Mahoney as C.S.’s surrogate parent. In March 2013, C.S. filed a motion to vacate the appointment of Mahoney and to substitute Foster Father as his surrogate parent. The court denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court’s refusal to vacate its appointment of Mahoney was not mooted even though C.S. no longer qualified for special education services from the School District; and (2) the district court erred when it refused to remove Mahoney and appoint Foster Father as C.S.’s surrogate parent for educational purposes.View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

Relator filed suit against certain student loan corporations, alleging that they defrauded the Department of Education and thus violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq. After applying the arm-of-the-state analysis on remand, the district court again concluded that all of the student loan corporations constituted state agencies not subject to suit under the Act and granted their motions to dismiss. Applying the arm-of-the-state analysis to the corporations, the court vacated the judgment of the district court as to PHEAA and remanded to permit limited discovery on the question of whether PHEAA was truly subject to sufficient state control to render it a part of the state; vacated the judgment with respect to VSAC and remanded to permit limited discovery; and affirmed the judgment with respect to ASLA because it is an arm of Arkansas and therefore not subject to suit under the FCA.View "U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Kentucky Higher Education" on Justia Law

F.H., born in 1994, has cerebral palsy syndrome, asthma, sleep apnea, auditory and visual limitations, and significant learning disorders; he needs a wheelchair or walker and has limited use of his hands. It is difficult for him to use the bathroom without assistance. From 2002 until 2010, F.H. attended four different Memphis City Schools (MCS) and had 11 different aides. F.H. and his mother claim that he was: frequently left unattended in the bathroom, distraught and unable to clean himself; subjected to verbal and physical abuse, on multiple occasions by aides and school personnel; returned to class with dirty underwear; and sexually abused by an aide. His mother’s claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) resulted in a Settlement Agreement. In 2012, F.H. and his mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with claims of retaliation, and of breach of the Settlement Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that claims accruing prior to the Settlement Agreement were barred by the Agreement, and that all other claims required exhaustion under the IDEA. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 did not arise under the IDEA, were not released by the Agreement, and that administrative exhaustion of these claims would be futile. The language of the Agreement and 2004 Amendments to the IDEA, make the Agreement enforceable in court, so that the breach of contract claim does not require administrative exhaustion. View "F. H. v. Memphis City Schs." on Justia Law

Kathleen was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University (CMU). In 2011, her husband Christopher, a CMU student, sponsored a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Shortly after, in accordance with the faculty’s collective bargaining agreement, Kathleen took a semester of sabbatical leave, agreeing to return to CMU for at least a full year following sabbatical or return any compensation received during her leave. While Kathleen was on sabbatical, she became eligible for and requested a pay supplement. Her department recommended denial. The reviewing dean agreed. Kathleen appealed, but resigned before a final decision. CMU requested that Kathleen return her sabbatical compensation. When she refused, CMU sued in state court for breach of contract. Because Christopher’s tuition had been remitted for Spring 2012 as part of Kathleen’s benefits and Kathleen was contractually obligated to repay her benefits for that semester, CMU determined that Christopher had an outstanding tuition balance and placed a hold on his transcript. The couple sued in federal court alleging retaliation because of Christopher’s role in the no-confidence resolution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether CMU filed suit against Kathleen and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript in retaliation for Christopher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. CMU, as represented by its president in his official capacity, cannot shield itself from liability by invoking qualified immunity.View "Benison v. Ross" on Justia Law