Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Scheick was hired as Principal of Tecumseh High School in 2004, at 51 years of age, and continued in that position until 2010. For the first three years, Scheick was employed directly by TPS. Then, by agreement, the 54-year-old Scheick formally retired from TPS and was hired by the staffing firm PESG to continue working as principal under a three-year contract between TPS and PESG. Under that arrangement, Scheick began receiving pension and health care benefits from the retirement system, and TPS avoided more than $29,000 in payroll and benefit costs per year. The next year, several other TPS employees entered into similar arrangements as cost-saving measures. In early 2010, when Scheick was almost 57 years of age, TPS decided not to renew the contract. Scheick claimed that the contract was not renewed because of his age and filed suit against TPS after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2202(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding a genuine issue of material fact.View "Scheick v. Tecumseh Pub. Schls." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their son in a specialized private school designed to educate children with learning disabilities and filed suit against the District for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) awarded tuition reimbursement but the State Review Officer (SRO) reversed. The court held that the SRO's decision was insufficiently reasoned to merit deference and deferred to the IHO's decision, which was more thorough and carefully considered. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, where the parents had not presented sufficient evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment.View "C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Samantha C. was a juvenile as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. Samantha argued that the juvenile court could not adjudicate her under section 43-247(3)(b) because her school had failed to comply with the remedial measures set forth in the compulsory education statutes. The juvenile court rejected Samantha’s argument and entered an order adjudicating Samantha as being habitually truant from school. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was not required to first prove Samantha’s school’s compliance with the compulsory education statutes because the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the compulsory education statutes are separate statutory enactments with distinct purposes and goals; and (2) the State met its burden of proving that Samantha was habitually truant from school under section 43-247(3)(b). View "In re Samantha C." on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the University of California faculty, was prosecuted under Government Code section 1090 for participating in a decision to hire his wife as a program assistant for a four-week summer study abroad course. The trial court dismissed the information under Penal Code section 995. The district attorney, on behalf of the People, argued that defendant committed a felony under section 1090 because he was "financially interested" in a contract made by him in his official capacity to hire his wife. Finding no grounds for forfeiture, the court concluded on the merits that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of section 1090 reflect an intent to include the University and its employees within the ambit of the statute; there is no case law applying section 1090 to the University; and the Williamson rule does not apply in this case. The court further concluded that this contract does not involve a matter of statewide concern and its application impinges upon exclusively internal University affairs and municipal home rule cases do not apply. Allowing the People to prosecute defendant under section 1090 would impair the Regents' ability to govern and would contravene article IX section 9 of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order dismissing the information. View "People v. Lofchie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school districts and individuals, filed suit against the State, alleging, among other claims, that the State violated the Kansas Constitution by failing to provide a suitable education to all Kansas students. A district court panel concluded (1) the State violated Kan. Const. art. VI when the legislature underfunded K-12 public education between fiscal years 2009 and 2012; (2) the legislature failed to consider the actual costs of providing a constitutionally required education before making its funding decisions; and (3) the legislature withheld or reduced certain funding to which school districts were statutorily entitled. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) certain Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring some claims; (2) the panel did not apply the correct constitutional standard in determining that the State violated the Article 6 requirement of adequacy in public education; and (3) the State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities by (i) withholding all capital outlay state aid payments to which certain school districts were otherwise entitled, and (ii) prorating the supplemental general state aid payments to which certain districts were entitled. Remanded.View "Gannon v. State" on Justia Law

D.E., now 23 years old, was a minor diagnosed with a learning disability and enrolled in school in the Central Dauphin School District. His parents claimed that while D.E. was enrolled in Central Dauphin he was deprived of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and that he was discriminated against based upon his disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court dismissed the IDEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and later granted summary judgment in Central Dauphin's favor as to the ADA and RA claims. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the ADA and RA claims, but reversed dismissal of the IDEA claim. Individuals seeking to enforce a favorable decision obtained at the administrative level are "aggrieved" for purposes of the IDEA and may properly pursue such claims in court. The court stated: "we encourage the District Court to consider any form of compensatory education proposed" in a manner consistent with the IDEA and Third Circuit precedent. View "D.E v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Rashdan, an Egyptian dentist, enrolled in a program to credential her for practice in the U.S. Three months before graduation, Rashdan followed her clinical supervisor’s instructions to seat a crown, but the procedure was unsuccessful. The head of the restorative dentistry program, Geissberger, heard about the failed procedure, and told Rashdan, within earshot of others, that her “clinical work ... was ‘Third World Dentistry.’” Later, another supervisor greeted Rashdan saying, “What’s up, TW?” then stated: “Don’t you get it? ... Third World?” Days before graduation, Rashdan was informed that despite adequate academic work, she was not recommended for graduation and that she would have to remediate in restorative dentistry and removable prosthodontics. Rashdan entered an additional quarter of clinical work at no extra cost; her performance did not improve. Evaluators stated that she was actively harming patients. Faculty members exchanged emails about her poor performance, and recommended that Rashdan pursue an additional quarter of remedial work on models, after which she could return to work on patients. Rather than appeal the plan or begin remediation, Rashdan took a leave of absence and filed suit, claiming national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d. The district court rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment claims under Title VII applied to the Title VI claim. Rashdan did not establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.View "Rashdan v. Geissberger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a senior in the nursing program at Delaware State University (DSU) when she was dismissed for consuming a half of a margarita while on break during a clinical program. Plaintiff filed suit seeking reinstatement in the nursing program. The Court of Chancery granted relief, holding (1) DSU dismissed Plaintiff for academic reasons; (2) because Plaintiff was not fully informed of the charges against her or the severity of the consequences, she was not validly removed from the nursing program; and (3) Plaintiff was duly excluded from the clinical course but not from the nursing program. View "Jenkins v. Del. State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs unilaterally placed their child, a child with autism, in a private placement. Plaintiffs then sought reimbursement of school placement expenses for the 2008-2009 school year under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court affirmed the SRO's decision denying the request. The court applied the three-pronged Burlington/Carter Test to determine eligibility for reimbursement and concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "C.F. v. New York City Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Montana Lance locked himself inside the school nurse's bathroom when he was in the fourth grade and took his own life. Montana's parents filed suit against the school district alleging, among other claims, that the school district violated Montana's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and discriminated against him because of his disabilities under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact regarding their discrimination claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact under three theories of section 1983 liability: a "special relationship" theory; a "state-created danger" theory; and a "caused-to-be subjected" theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district.View "Estate of Montana Lance, et al. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law