Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Board appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, mother and son, requiring the Board to reimburse the mother for the cost of the placement of her son, who was diagnosed with autism, in a private school. A hearing officer later found that the Board failed to offer a free appropriate public education to the son before his third birthday, as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A), and that the Board instead consented to the son's placement at Mitchell's Place, a preschool that provided services and education to autistic children. The district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the equities and concluded that the County must reimburse plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Blount Cty. Bd. of Educ., et al. v. Bowens, et al." on Justia Law

In 1993, Dr. Dargie was a student at the UT College of Medicine. In 1994, Middle Tennessee Medical Center agreed to pay Dargie’s tuition, fees, and other reasonable expenses for attending UT. After graduation and completion of his residency, Dargie was required to repay MTMC’s grant by either working as a doctor in the medically underserved community of Murfreesboro for four years or repaying two times the uncredited amount of all conditional award payments he received. MTMC paid UT $73,000 on Dargie’s behalf. After completing his medical training in 2001, Dargie chose to practice in Germantown, near Memphis. In 2002, Dargie repaid $121,440.02. In 2005, the Dargies filed an amended tax return for 2002, claiming they had “inadvertently omitted an ordinary and necessary business expense” on their Schedule C for the $121,440 repayment. The IRS disallowed the deduction under I.R.C. 162. The Dargies sued. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the repayment was a personal expense and, regardless, no deduction would be allowed under I.R.C. 265(a)(1) because the amount was allocable to income the Dargies had received tax-free. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the repayment a personal expense.View "Dargie v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tenured teacher, was dismissed based on charges that he had physically and abusively disciplined his students. Plaintiff contended that the Board's failure to consider or formulate written charges before initiating his dismissal nullified all further proceedings. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate, finding that the board's failure to consider or formulate charges before initiating plaintiff's dismissal was a nonsubstantive procedural error that was not prejudicial. The court concluded that plaintiff's informal notification of charges, eventual receipt of written charges, representation by counsel, involvement in the discovery process and participation in a four-day evidentiary hearing confirmed he was provided notice and a full opportunity to oppose the charges. Plaintiff has not shown the board's reliance on oral presentation of charges in initiating his dismissal undermined his preparation or otherwise prejudiced his defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying his mandate petition and the court affirmed the judgment. View "DeYoung v. Com. on Professional Competence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that her teenage daughter - who suffers from severe emotional, mental, and physical disabilities - was sexually assaulted by another student while in defendant's care. The district court concluded that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief and dismissed with prejudice. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motions for partial reconsideration and for leave to amend. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" warranting the reopening of the final judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for partial reconsideration. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "M. G. v. St. Lucie Cty. Sch. Bd., et al." on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

John and Jane Doe, the parents Susan Doe, a transgender girl, filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging that Regional School Unit 26 (RSU 26) had violated the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) by excluding Susan from the communal girls’ bathroom at elementary and middle school. The Commission found reasonable grounds to believe discrimination had occurred. Thereafter, the Does and the Commission filed a complaint in the superior court asserting claims for unlawful discrimination in education (Count I) and unlawful discrimination in a place of public accommodation (Count II) on the basis of sexual orientation. The superior court granted RSU 26’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that where it has been clearly established that a student’s psychological well-being and educational success depend on being permitted to use the communal bathroom consistent with her gender identity, denying the student access to the appropriate bathroom constitutes sexual orientation discrimination in violation of the MHRA. Remanded for entry of summary judgment for the Does and the Commission. View "Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair for mobility, filed suit against the District, contending that he could not fully enjoy football games because of the unavailability of wheelchair accessible seating. The court concluded that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12165, does not a require a public entity to structurally alter public seating at a high school football field, where the seating was constructed prior to the ADA's enactment, and the school district provides program access to individuals who use wheelchairs. In this case, the District provided plaintiff with program access to the football games and plaintiff failed to establish that the District excluded him from a public program. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim failed under Title II of the ADA and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District. View "Daubert v. Lindsay USD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff enrolled her son at a private school after she decided that the individualized education program (IEP) proposed by the DOE for the 2010-2011 school year failed to provide her son with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff filed suit seeking tuition reimbursement, the IHO granted her relief, but the SRO reversed the decision, and the district court affirmed. The court deferred to the IHO's well-reasoned determination that the son required the services of a 1:1 paraprofessional for longer than the transitional three-month period afforded him by his IEP. Because the DOE failed to offer him a FAPE, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to consider the appropriateness of plaintiff's private placement and the balance of the equities. View "Reyes v. NYC Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Two years after Cindy Hill, the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State, the Wyoming Legislature passed Senate Enrolled Act 0001 (Act), which removed the Superintendent as the administrator and chief executive officer of the Department of Education (Department), created the new position of Director of the Department, and assigned to the Director nearly all the duties that were formerly the responsibility of the Superintendent. On the day the Act was signed into law, Hill and two Wyoming citizens (collectively, Appellants) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. The district court for the First Judicial District of Wyoming certified questions of law to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that the Act unconstitutionally deprives the Superintendent of the power of “general supervision of the public schools” entrusted to the Superintendent in Wyo. Const. art. XII, 14 by impermissibly transferring the power to the Director. View "Powers v. State" on Justia Law

The District and UTLA petitioned the court, challenging the trial court's ruling that the District was required to produce unredacted Academic Growth Over Time (AGT) scores, as well as the location codes which identify the school to which each teacher is assigned. The court held that the unredacted AGT scores are exempt from disclosure under the catch-all exemption in section 6255 of the California Public Records Act, Gov. Code, 6250 et seq., because the public interest served by not disclosing the teachers' names clearly outweighs the public interest served by their disclosure. Therefore, the court granted the separate petitions for writ of mandate by the District and UTLA to the extent they challenged the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the court remanded for further proceedings regarding disclosure of the location codes. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law