Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs unilaterally placed their child, a child with autism, in a private placement. Plaintiffs then sought reimbursement of school placement expenses for the 2008-2009 school year under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court affirmed the SRO's decision denying the request. The court applied the three-pronged Burlington/Carter Test to determine eligibility for reimbursement and concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "C.F. v. New York City Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Montana Lance locked himself inside the school nurse's bathroom when he was in the fourth grade and took his own life. Montana's parents filed suit against the school district alleging, among other claims, that the school district violated Montana's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and discriminated against him because of his disabilities under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact regarding their discrimination claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact under three theories of section 1983 liability: a "special relationship" theory; a "state-created danger" theory; and a "caused-to-be subjected" theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district.View "Estate of Montana Lance, et al. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a student cheerleader paralyzed while practicing a tumbling maneuver in gymnastics class, sought coverage under the insurance policy that Mutual issued to Prairie View as a member of the NCAA. Mutual argued that the policy covered student cheerleaders who were injured during cheerleading practice sessions. The court concluded that the gymnastics class could be considered a "practice session" under the policy; the coach authorized, supervised, and organized the cheerleading activities during the gymnastics class; the activities performed during the class were performed in preparation for a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team competition where plaintiff's primary purpose in taking the class was to improve his skills as a cheerleader; and the activities during the class were directly associated with the activities of a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.View "Patterson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA) filed a grievance against the University Laboratory School (ULS), alleging that the ULS refused to implement the proper salary placement for teachers as agreed to in a supplemental agreement negotiated by the HSTA and the Hawaii Board of Education. The ULS argued that the step placement chart the HSTA sought to enforce had never been agreed upon or incorporated into the agreement. The HSTA subsequently filed a grievance and a motion to compel arbitration of its grievance. The circuit court denied the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying HSTA’s motion, determining that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the HSTA’s grievance and that the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration was premature. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that because the parties agreed to leave questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the HSTA’s motion to compel arbitration after concluding that an arbitration agreement existed. Remanded.View "Haw. State Teachers Ass’n v. Univ. Lab. Sch." on Justia Law

Students brought a civil rights suit against the school district and two school officials after the school asked a group of students to remove clothing bearing images of the American flag when school officials learned of threats of race-related violence during a school-sanctioned celebration of Cinco de Mayo. The court concluded that school officials did not violate the students' rights to freedom of expression, due process, or equal protection where the school officials anticipated violence or substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities and their response was tailored to the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the policy was not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the students' rights to due process.View "Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

N., an autistic child, born in 2004, was diagnosed with the speech disorder, apraxia. In 2007, N.’s parents enrolled him in district schools, which placed him at St. Rita’s School for the Deaf under an individual education program (IEP). In 2010, N.’s parents became dissatisfied, removed N. from the school, unilaterally placed him at ABS (another Cincinnati private school), and requested reimbursement for the tuition and transportation. The district generated a new IEP. The district and N.’s parents could not agree on placement. Mediation resulted in the district agreeing to reimburse tuition and transportation expenses incurred from August 19, 2010 to November 30, 2010 and to pay a portion of the costs through the summer of 2011. The parties created a tentative transition plan, but N.’s parents balked at its implementation and filed a due-process complaint. A hearing officer rejected their claims, but ordered the district to reimburse the costs of attending ABS during the 2011–2012 school year. The Exceptional Children Appeal Board reversed that “stay-put” decision, holding that ABS was not N.’s “placement.” In a suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482, the district court found that N. had not established that the offer of placement at a district school with an autism-specific classroom was inappropriate, but that N.’s operative placement was ABS, requiring reimbursement. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. IDEA bars a court from ordering reimbursement absent a finding that the district failed to provide a free and appropriate public education.View "N.W. v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

In 1989, Seamans received a Federal Perkins Loan of $1,180.00 from Temple University. The first payment was due in 1992. The loan was declared delinquent the following month. Nonths later, Temple notified Seamans that the account had been placed for collection. In 2010, Seamans enrolled at Drexel University. He sought a Pell Grant, but Drexel refused to provide with financial assistance until Seamans repaid the Temple Loan. In 2011, Seamans repaid that loan in full. Seamans then noticed a “trade line” on his credit report. The trade line may or may not have appeared on his credit report when the account was in default. Seamans formally disputed some of the information by contacting the credit reporting agency. Temple, had its loan servicer investigate, but resubmitted information virtually unchanged. Seamans again contacted Temple and credit agencies, to dispute the trade line. After a second investigation, Temple modified certain elements, but still did not report various details. There was evidence that Temple treated other disputes in a similar manner. Seamans sued, alleging that Temple negligently or willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681–1681x. The district court granted Temple summary judgment, finding that the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001–1155, exempted Temple from FCRA compliance because the credit instrument was a Perkins Loan. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that Seamans’s dispute appears to have merit and that failure to report the dispute may constitute a material inaccuracy on his credit report.View "Seamans v. Temple University" on Justia Law

E attended kindergarten and first grade in the Ridley School District, 2006-2008, receiving special services for learning disabilities and health problems. After first grade, her parents concluded that the school was not meeting E’s needs, and enrolled her at a private school, Benchmark, that specializes in educating students with learning disabilities, then filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education claiming violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(b)(2), by failing to provide a suitable Individualized Education Program. A hearing officer found no violations during kindergarten year, but awarded compensatory education for first grade and ordered Ridley to reimburse tuition and transportation costs for 2008-2009. Two years later, a federal district court reversed, finding the proposed IEP adequate. The Third Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, the parents sought payment for Benchmark costs from the date of the hearing officer’s decision forward pursuant to the IDEA, which states that a disabled child shall remain in the child’s current educational setting pending resolution of a dispute over the child‘s placement. The district court ruled in favor of the parents, rejecting the district’s timeliness contentions and awarded costs for three years, $57,658.38. The Third Circuit affirmed. It is impossible to protect a child‘s educational status quo without sometimes taxing school districts for private education costs that ultimately will be deemed unnecessary. View "M. R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.View "CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist." on Justia Law