Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a mother with limited financial means raising a severely disabled child, withdrew her daughter from public school and enrolled her in a private learning center, alleging that the Department failed to provide her child with the free appropriate public education (FAPE) required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court concluded that, in light of the contractual obligation to pay tuition, plaintiff had standing under Article III to pursue her challenge to the Individualized Education Program (IEP) and to seek direct retroactive tuition payment. The court also concluded that, in light of intervening authority, the district court erred in affirming the SRO's determination that the December 2008 IEP provided a FAPE. Because the court could not resolve the merits of plaintiff's challenge to the IEP, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "E.M. v. NYC Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

This appeal primarily concerns a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to various sections of the Alabama Constitution that are central to the State's system of ad valorem property taxation. Plaintiffs filed suit asserting that these provisions are rooted in the State's historic racially discriminatory policies and cripple the ability of certain rural, nearly all-black public school systems in Alabama to raise revenues. Because the requested remedy would not address the alleged injury, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutional millage cap provisions despite the district court's finding that they were enacted with discriminatory intent; plaintiffs' challenges to these provision were therefore dismissed without prejudice; plaintiffs' challenge to the State's property classification system (as set forth in Amendments 325 and 373 to Section 217) were not similarly barred, yet these claims failed because the court could not say that the district court clearly erred in finding that this system was not the product of invidious discriminatory intent; sufficient evidence also rendered permissible the district court's finding that these Amendments were financially, and not discriminatorily, motivated; under clear-error review, the court was not free to second-guess the district court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss in part.View "Lynch, et al. v. State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

Walczak, hired as a teacher in the Chicago Public School system in 1970, obtained tenure and taught continuously until her school’s new principal placed her in a performance remediation program during the 2007–2008 academic year. At the end of that year, she was facing discharge proceedings. Walczak filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. While the EEOC charge was pending, a hearing officer assigned to her discharge proceeding recommended that Walczak be reinstated as a tenured teacher. The Chicago Board of Education rejected the recommendation and terminated her employment. Illinois trial and appellate courts affirmed, applying state law. After the trial court decision, Walczak received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and filed suit in federal court The district court dismissed the ADEA suit on the basis of preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Walczak could have brought her ADEA claim in her state-court suit for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Board did not acquiesce to claim-splitting.View "Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Boulder Monitor, which regularly attended meetings of the full Jefferson County High School Board, sued Jefferson High School District No. 1, claiming that a meeting of the Board’s budget subcommittee violated statutory open meeting and public participation requirements because there was a quorum of the Board present at the subcommittee meeting, the meeting discussed personnel matters in addition to the 2012-2013 budget, that all Board members present participated in the discussion, and that the public notice of the subcommittee meeting was inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment to the Monitor, concluding that the Board violated Montana law in the manner in which the budget subcommittee meeting was conducted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment in this case was improper because contested issues of fact existed that may not be resolved on summary judgment. Remanded.View "Boulder Monitor v. Jefferson High Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.”View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

The Board challenged the district court's decision to award O.L.'s parents reimbursement for one-on-one instruction outside the school setting as well as some of their attorney's fees. The parents cross-appealed the district court's decision not to award O.L. compensatory education. The court concluded that the parents were eligible for reimbursement; the district court was right to find that the alternative program was proper under the standard set forth in Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Centr. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley; even if the alternative program has its shortcomings, it was reasonably calculated to permit the child to obtain some educational benefit; the district court's reimbursement award was appropriate; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it took the quality of the chosen alternative into consideration; it was clear on the record that the district court properly weighed the evidence and did not abuse its considerable discretion when it denied the request for compensatory education; and there was no need to reverse the attorney's fee award since the court affirmed the district court's decision in all respects. View "R.L., et al. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Chad Jones petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment in an action filed against him by Latonya Hall, individually and as mother and next friend of Demetrius Hall, a minor, and Maurice Caffie, individually (collectively referred to as "Hall"), and to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. Jones was employed as a physical-education teacher at Gresham Middle School and Demetrius Hall and Michael Boyd were students. A fight between the young men broke out during a school basketball game. According to Demetrius, he was guarding Boyd tightly when Boyd became angry and threw the basketball at him, striking him in the face with the ball. Demetrius responded by pushing Boyd and throwing a punch. After the two exchanged insults, another student unexpectedly shoved Demetrius into Boyd, and Boyd responded by "slamming" Demetrius into some nearby metal stairs and striking him in the head. Demetrius was seriously injured as the result of the altercation. Jones contends that he was at the opposite end of the gym when the altercation occurred. Hall sued Jones, Sokol, and Sammy Queen, (another school physical-education teacher) asserting claims of negligence and wantonness and alleging that the defendants had breached their duty to reasonably supervise Demetrius and Boyd by leaving them unattended for an extended length of time. Concluding that Jones failed to demonstrate that he had a clear legal right to the relief sought, the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View " Hall v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of their daughter, filed suit challenging the district's implementation of a new individualized education program (IEP) for their daughter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Determining that the daughter's case was not moot, the court concluded that the court need not decide whether the various notice requirements were satisfied because whatever notice deficiencies there could have been in this case, they did not warrant relief; there was no error in requiring the parents to present a complaint and demand a due process hearing because they disagreed with the IEP team's decision; the district court correctly stated the Loren F. ex. rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Independent School System standard, fully reviewed the administrative record, and independently analyzed each of the parents' claims; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the parents' proposed order and then decided the case on summary judgment; and the court held that 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions for denial of rights conferred by the IDEA were barred because the IDEA's comprehensive enforcement scheme provided the sole remedy for statutory violations and, therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the parents' section 1983 claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "K.A. v. Fulton County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Central States, an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, provides health insurance for Teamsters and their families. Guarantee Trust provides sports injury insurance for student athletes. Each of 13 high school and college athletes, all children of Teamsters, holds general health insurance from Central and sports injury insurance from Guarantee. Each suffered an injury while playing sports (most often football) between 2006 and 2009, and sought coverage from both companies. Each time Guarantee refused to pay the athlete’s medical expenses, and each time Central paid the bill under protest. The district court entered a declaratory judgment under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B), that, when coverage of student athletes overlap, Guarantee must pay, and ordered Guarantee to reimburse Central for the payouts to the 13 students. The Sixth Circuit, affirmed in part characterizing the case as a “you first” paradox, or ‘gastonette.” An ERISA plan may coordinate benefits with another policy, but may not redefine the coverage of another policy. Absent the Central plan, the Guarantee policy would cover the sports injuries at issue without question. An ERISA plan must keep doing what it would do in another plan’s absence. That amounts to coordinating benefits, not redefining coverage. View "Cent St, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. First Agency, Inc." on Justia Law