Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

E.M., who has an auditory processing disorder or a central auditory processing disorder, through his parents, filed suit against the district alleging that E.M. had been denied a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that the district acted unreasonably in determining in 2005 that E.M. did not qualify for special education services under the "specific learning disability" category; the Department of Education's position that a central auditory processing disorder is eligible for consideration for benefits under the "other health impairment" category merits deference; but plaintiffs failed to show that the district acted unreasonably in not considering E.M. for benefits under the "other health impairment" category in 2005. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of relief to plaintiffs. View "E.M. v. Pajaro Valley U.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that he was terminated from his position as a special education teacher because of an email he sent to the chancellor, which contained one sentence that constituted speech protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff was using the email as an internal channel through which he could, in his capacity as a teacher, report interference with his job responsibilities. Therefore, under Winder v. Erste, plaintiff's email constituted employee speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Further, it was not unreasonable for defendants to believe that it was not unlawful to fire plaintiff based on preexisting law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. View "Mpoy v. Rhee, et al." on Justia Law

The Lexington school district superintendent dismissed Mark Zagaeski, a Lexington high school teacher, from his position for conduct unbecoming a teacher. Zagaeski timely filed an appeal from the school district’s dismissal decision, which resulted in arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator (1) concluded that the school district carried its burden to show facts amounting to conduct unbecoming a teacher but that Zagaeski’s conduct only “nominally” constituted a basis for dismissal; and (2) reinstated Zagaeski as a teacher on the basis of “the best interests of the pupils.” The superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the superior court judge and vacated the arbitration award, holding that, under the facts of this case, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by awarding Zagaeski's reinstatement. View "Sch. Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a mother with limited financial means raising a severely disabled child, withdrew her daughter from public school and enrolled her in a private learning center, alleging that the Department failed to provide her child with the free appropriate public education (FAPE) required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court concluded that, in light of the contractual obligation to pay tuition, plaintiff had standing under Article III to pursue her challenge to the Individualized Education Program (IEP) and to seek direct retroactive tuition payment. The court also concluded that, in light of intervening authority, the district court erred in affirming the SRO's determination that the December 2008 IEP provided a FAPE. Because the court could not resolve the merits of plaintiff's challenge to the IEP, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "E.M. v. NYC Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

This appeal primarily concerns a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to various sections of the Alabama Constitution that are central to the State's system of ad valorem property taxation. Plaintiffs filed suit asserting that these provisions are rooted in the State's historic racially discriminatory policies and cripple the ability of certain rural, nearly all-black public school systems in Alabama to raise revenues. Because the requested remedy would not address the alleged injury, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutional millage cap provisions despite the district court's finding that they were enacted with discriminatory intent; plaintiffs' challenges to these provision were therefore dismissed without prejudice; plaintiffs' challenge to the State's property classification system (as set forth in Amendments 325 and 373 to Section 217) were not similarly barred, yet these claims failed because the court could not say that the district court clearly erred in finding that this system was not the product of invidious discriminatory intent; sufficient evidence also rendered permissible the district court's finding that these Amendments were financially, and not discriminatorily, motivated; under clear-error review, the court was not free to second-guess the district court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss in part.View "Lynch, et al. v. State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

Walczak, hired as a teacher in the Chicago Public School system in 1970, obtained tenure and taught continuously until her school’s new principal placed her in a performance remediation program during the 2007–2008 academic year. At the end of that year, she was facing discharge proceedings. Walczak filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. While the EEOC charge was pending, a hearing officer assigned to her discharge proceeding recommended that Walczak be reinstated as a tenured teacher. The Chicago Board of Education rejected the recommendation and terminated her employment. Illinois trial and appellate courts affirmed, applying state law. After the trial court decision, Walczak received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and filed suit in federal court The district court dismissed the ADEA suit on the basis of preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Walczak could have brought her ADEA claim in her state-court suit for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Board did not acquiesce to claim-splitting.View "Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Boulder Monitor, which regularly attended meetings of the full Jefferson County High School Board, sued Jefferson High School District No. 1, claiming that a meeting of the Board’s budget subcommittee violated statutory open meeting and public participation requirements because there was a quorum of the Board present at the subcommittee meeting, the meeting discussed personnel matters in addition to the 2012-2013 budget, that all Board members present participated in the discussion, and that the public notice of the subcommittee meeting was inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment to the Monitor, concluding that the Board violated Montana law in the manner in which the budget subcommittee meeting was conducted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment in this case was improper because contested issues of fact existed that may not be resolved on summary judgment. Remanded.View "Boulder Monitor v. Jefferson High Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.”View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

The Board challenged the district court's decision to award O.L.'s parents reimbursement for one-on-one instruction outside the school setting as well as some of their attorney's fees. The parents cross-appealed the district court's decision not to award O.L. compensatory education. The court concluded that the parents were eligible for reimbursement; the district court was right to find that the alternative program was proper under the standard set forth in Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Centr. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley; even if the alternative program has its shortcomings, it was reasonably calculated to permit the child to obtain some educational benefit; the district court's reimbursement award was appropriate; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it took the quality of the chosen alternative into consideration; it was clear on the record that the district court properly weighed the evidence and did not abuse its considerable discretion when it denied the request for compensatory education; and there was no need to reverse the attorney's fee award since the court affirmed the district court's decision in all respects. View "R.L., et al. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law