Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In this matter, petitioner is one of the founders of the proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair (Quest Academy), which sought licensure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4 to operate as a charter school for high school students. The Commissioner of Education denied the application. The Commissioner granted petitioner the opportunity to revise the application, as well as an opportunity to participate in a training program for preparing an application for the upcoming application deadline. Following petitioner’s filing of a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, the Commissioner issued a written amplification of reasons for denial of the application. The Appellate Division upheld the Commissioner’s action on the grounds that the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Supreme Court, after review, concluded that the Commissioner's decision to deny Quest Academy’s charter school application was amply supported by the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "IMO Proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair Founders Group" on Justia Law

Michael Garcia received special education services during his school years. Before Garcia turned sixteen, he was arrested on felony charges and transferred to the Los Angeles County Jail to await trial. At that point, Garcia stopped receiving special education services. The issue of whether Garcia was entitled to special education services in the county jail was raised in several proceedings, including an action before the Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division (OAH). The OAH concluded that Cal. Educ. Code 56041 applied, and because Garcia's mother resided within the boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District (L.A. Unified), L.A. Unified was responsible for Garcia's special education while he was incarcerated in county jail. L.A. Unified sought relief from the OAH's decision with the federal district court, which affirmed. On appeal, the court of appeals asked the California Supreme Court to decide a question of state law. The Supreme Court answered that Cal. Educ. Code 56041 - which provides generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for special education services - affixes responsibility for providing special education to a qualifying individual who is incarcerated in a county jail. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State Board of Education voted to classify the Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS) district as "unaccredited", which required accredited school districts to accept transfer of KCPS's students pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131. Taxpayers in five accredited school districts filed this action against KCPS and the State, asserting that section 167.131 violates the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution because it mandates that, in educating the transfer students, the school districts perform a new or increased level of activity. The trial court (1) concluded that the statute mandates a new activity but found that to violate the Hancock Amendment the activity must result in increased costs; and (2) entered judgment in favor of three school district taxpayers and against two school district taxpayers. While the case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court issued Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, which held that section 167.131 merely reallocates responsibilities for educating students among districts, which the Hancock Amendment does not prohibit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part based on Breitenfeld, holding that section 167.131 does not mandate a new or increased level of activity but merely reallocates responsibilities among school districts. View "Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Kentucky Board of Nursing placed the Sullivan University System’s (Spencerian) Applied Science in Nursing (ADN) program on probationary status. Spencerian filed suit, alleging that the Board’s decision was erroneous because it retroactively applied newly-enacted 2009 regulatory amendments to Spencerian. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board improperly applied the amended administrative regulations to Spencerian’s conduct that predated the amendments. During the pendency of this appeal, Spencerian instituted numerous changes to its ADN program, which resulted in the Board placing the ADN program on full approval status. Therefore, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court dismissed the Board’s appeal as moot and vacated the rulings of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth, Ky. Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees are former Community College of Beaver County students who, according to their allegations, enrolled in and completed substantial work in CCBC's police training program. Their academic progress was cut short when, in 2002, CCBC’s alleged malfeasance caused state officials to decertify the program, thereby rendering their educational and financial investments largely worthless. Appellees filed actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, asserting claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 's (UTPCPL) provisions providing a private cause of action for "persons" injured by other "persons'" employment of unfair trade practices. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the UTPCPL defined a "person" subject to liability as including both private entities and political subdivision agencies. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that the UTPCPL defined a "person" as including private entities, but not political subdivision agencies. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment on this issue and remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on whether the Pennsylvania School Code's compulsory school age and attendance provisions applied to children under eight years old whose parents voluntarily enrolled them in public kindergarten programs made available by school districts. The trial court and Commonwealth Court both held that once a child who meets a district's minimum entrance age is enrolled in a district's public school kindergarten program, the child is subject to compulsory school attendance, meaning continuous and consistent attendance without excessive unexcused absences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Kerstetter" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court about the constitutionality of OCGA 20-2-73, which enumerates the circumstances for the suspension and removal of members of local boards of education. Georgia law does not require that local school systems be accredited, but it permits school systems to seek accreditation from certain private accrediting agencies. The DeKalb County School District was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools ("SACS"), a private accrediting agency. In December 2012, SACS placed the DeKalb School District on "accredited probation" for reasons related to the governance of the DeKalb County Board of Education, which endangered the DeKalb School District's accreditation. After hearings, members of the DeKalb Board who were serving at the time SACS put the DeKalb School District on probation were suspended, and six replacements were appointed. In the meantime, Dr. Eugene Walker, the chair of the DeKalb Board and one of the suspended members, filed suit in the federal district court, alleging OCGA 20-2-73 violated both the United States and Georgia Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief to Walker, finding that Walker had failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on his claim that the statute violated the United States Constitution. As to the Georgia Constitution, the District Court certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Court concluded that OCGA 20-2-73 did not violate the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, the Court answered the District Court's questions in the negative. View "Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Georgia State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist/ No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd. of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law