Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In this school-funding dispute, a school district (District) filed an action on its own behalf and on behalf of its taxpayers to enjoin state actions in violation of state law and the Arkansas Constitution. The District alleged two claims against Appellees. The District then voluntarily nonsuited the special-and-local legislation claim so it could immediately appeal the adequacy claim in the "Beebe" case. The District brought the special-and-local-legislation claim as a separate case in the "Kimbrell" case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Beebe case for a lack of finality. The circuit court subsequently consolidated the Beebe case and the Kimbrell case. After the circuit court decided the cases, the District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and mooted in part, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that some of the District's claims in the Beebe case were barred by res judicata but did not err in dismissing the District's other claims as barred by res judicata; (2) the circuit court did not err in striking the District's amended and supplemental complaint; and (3) the District's claims in the Kimbrell case were moot.View "Deer-Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell" on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law

A student athlete asked for a permanent injunction against the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA) to block it from enforcing its sanctions against the athlete following its determination that the student athlete, school, and others violated the OSSAA's rules and policies. The athlete appealed, challenging the applicable standard of review and alleging that the OSSAA's actions were arbitrary and capricious. In 2012, the OSSAA received a copy of a newspaper article concerning the school's successes attracting the attention of college football recruiters. Based on comments made in the article, the OSSAA became concerned that the school might have violated what the OSSAA considered to be its long-standing prohibition on member schools paying for their student-athletes to attend individual athletic camps. The OSSAA notified the school of its concerns and asked for confirmation as to whether it had paid for selected students to attend individual camps. The OSSAA alleges it received no response prior. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review, and that under any standard, the OSSAA's actions were arbitrary and capricious.View "Scott v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a referendum that statutorily directed the Legislature to annually increase the base level of the revenue control limit for K-12 public school funding. The measure was codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-901.01. For several years, the Legislature adjusted the base level and transportation support level annually for inflation, but the 2010-11 budget (HB 2008) included an adjusted to the transportation support level only. Subsequent budgets likewise did not include base level adjustments. Several school districts and other parties sued the State Treasurer and State, alleging that HB 2008 amended or repealed a voter-approved law in violation of the Voter Protection Act (VPA). The superior court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim, ruling that section 15-901.01 was not mandatory and that voters "cannot require the legislature to enact a law that provides for the appropriation" prescribed in the statute. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no constitutional impediment existed to the electorate's directive, and legislative adjustments to section 15-901.01's funding scheme are limited by the VPA. View "Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey" on Justia Law

Appellants filed four separate cases stemming from the Arkansas Department of Education's (ADE) administrative supervision of the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) after the district was found to be in fiscal distress. In each of the cases, ADE filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Appellants' claims for relief were barred by sovereign immunity because the complaints were brought against ADE regarding matters allegedly done in furtherance of ADE's official duties. The circuit court granted the motion in each of the four cases. Appellants appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in dismissing ADE from their actions because the complaints alleged exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting ADE's motions to dismiss, as none of the recognized exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine applied in these cases.View "Fitzgiven v. Dorey" on Justia Law

The Atlanta Independent School System (APS) and the Atlanta Board of Education deducted a $38.6 million unfunded pension liability expense before calculating the amount of local revenue funds to be distributed to start-up charter schools within APS. The stated purpose for the change in funding was APSÕs need to pay down a large, unfunded pension liability for current and former APS employees that has been accruing since the 1980s. In response, start-up charter schools filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel appellants4 to distribute local revenue to the start-up charter schools without any deduction for APSÕs unfunded pension liability. The trial court granted the requested mandamus relief, finding the statutory funding formula set out by statute did not authorize appellants to subtract the $38.6 million from its calculation of local revenue. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of mandamus relief, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Atlanta Independent School System v. Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School, Inc." on Justia Law

The Louisiana legislature established the Scholarship Program in 2012 to provide funding to low-income parents with children in failing schools so that they may have the option of sending them to better schools, including private schools, of their own choosing. Parents seek to intervene in this litigation between Louisiana and the federal government over the state's voucher program. The court concluded that the parents met the requirements for intervention as of right and reversed the district court's denial of their motion to intervene. View "Brumfield, et al. v. Dodd, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against OCCC, alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of a "perceived disability" and retaliation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court concluded that plaintiff, who was enrolled in OCCC's medical Laboratory Technology program, failed to establish that OCCC perceived his shaking hands to substantially limit a major life activity, and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of OCCC as to the ADA discrimination claim. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of OCCC on the retaliation claim because plaintiff had not presented any evidence that OCCC's good faith belief that plaintiff had falsified documents was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the disciplinary referral. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that OCCC perceived him as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity; plaintiff failed to demonstrate that OCCC's explanation for its decision to bring disciplinary proceedings against him was pretext for retaliation; and plaintiff's remaining arguments were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Widomski v. Orange County Community College" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents in this case. The case was dismissed after respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP. Because the Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that needed to be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "The circuit court and respondents [relied] on a single sentence found in 'Bradley v. Cherokee School Dist. No. One,' [470 S.E.2d 570 (1996)]: A law that is special only in the sense that it imposes a lawful tax limited in application and incidence to persons or property within a certain school district does not contravene the provisions of Article III, section 34(IX)." In this case, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's complaint centered on an impact fee, not a tax, and one that is placed on only some persons and not others. Moreover, since 'Bradley' was decided, the Court clarified that all challenges to education-related special legislation were subject to the test set forth in 'Kizer v. Clark,'(600 S.E.2d 529 (2004)). The Supreme Court found that appellants' complaint alleged facts which, if resolved in their favor, would result in a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The order granting respondents' Rule 12(c) motion was therefore reversed.View "Home Builders Association v. School District No. 2 of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against an elementary school principal who did not allow him to distribute religious material to other adults at his son's in-class winter party. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his constitutional claim based on qualified immunity. The court found that plaintiff failed to establish that a right to distribute religious gifts was clearly established for the purpose of qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, plaintiff's allegations were not sufficient to overcome the principal's qualified immunity defense. The district court did not address the actual constitutionality of the principal's conduct and the court concluded that it need not reach the question. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Morgan, et al. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law