Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Board and School District appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Reg. I.Q. Reg. I.Q. governs the "extended use" of school facilities outside of school hours by outside organizations and individuals. The district court found that enforcement of Reg. I.Q. to exclude religious worship services would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle Bronx Household to a grant from the Board of a subsidized place to hold religious worship services; the Supreme Court's ruling in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that invidiously discriminatory ordinances targeting a religious practice of a particular religion were subject to strict scrutiny had no application to Reg. I.Q.; if the Board has a reasonable, good faith concern that making its school facilities available for the conduct of religious worship services would give rise to a substantial risk of violating the Establishment Clause, the permissibly of the Board's refusal to do so did not turn on whether such use of school facilities would in fact violate the Establishment Clause; and therefore, Reg. I.Q. did not violate plaintiffs' rights to free exercise of religion, whether or not it was subject to strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the district court erred in concluding that Reg. I.Q. violates the Establishment Clause because it compelled the Board to become excessively entangled with religion by deciding what were religious worship services. The court considered Bronx Household's other arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the injunction barring enforcement of Reg. I. Q. View "Bronx Household v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

In this nearly fifty-year-old desegregation case, the United States appealed the district court's order implementing a freedom of choice plan intended to desegregate the formerly de jure African-American middle school and high school in the Cleveland School District. At issue was the district court's adoption of a plan that abolished attendance zones and a majority-to-minority transfer program and implemented a freedom of choice plan that allowed each student in the district to choose to attend any junior high or high school. The court concluded that, given the available statistics that not a single white student chose to enroll at the schools after the district court's order, and that historically, over the course of multiple decades, no white student has ever chosen to enroll in the school, the district court's conclusion that a freedom of choice plan was the most appropriate desegregation remedy at those schools certainly needed to be expressed with sufficient particularity to enable the court to review it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a more explicit explanation of the reasons for adopting the freedom of choice plan, and/or consideration of the alternative desegregation plans proposed by the parties. View "Cowan v. Bolivar County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a minor, challenged the district court's orders upholding the OAH's partial denial of reimbursement for educational costs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in No. 12-55715 and granting in part and denying in part a related motion for attorney's fees in No. 12-56796. The district court affirmed the OAH's finding that the school districts denied the student a free appropriate public education for the 2007/2008 school year when they failed to comply with a previous settlement agreement's assessment requirements. The court concluded that the private placement was appropriate. As such, the child should be reimbursed for the cost of tuition. Because the court found that the private placement was an appropriate placement, the child was also entitled to transportation reimbursement; and the district court did not err in partially rejecting reimbursement for the cost of the private aides. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part No. 12-55715. The court dismissed No. 12-56796 for lack of jurisdiction to hear the untimely appeal of the district court's order on fees. View "S. L. v. Upland Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of their child with autism, claimed that the school district violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1482, by denying the child a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in his least restrictive environment (LRE). At issue was whether the LRE provision of the IDEA applied to extended school year (ESY) placements for children who need twelve-month educational programs. The court held that the IDEA's LRE requirement applied to ESY placements just as it does to school-year placements. Therefore, the district court erred in determining that the school district met its obligations under the IDEA by offering the child only an ESY placement in a self-contained special education classroom. The court also held that the district court erred by ordering the school district to pay the full cost of obtaining the child's pendency services through private providers even though the school district had offered to provide the same services itself at a lower cost. Although the school district was wrong to deny the child pendency services in the first place, it nevertheless was not required to pay for the child to remain with the same pendency services providers throughout this entire litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "T.M. v. Cornwall Central School District" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging deliberate indifference by the University to her rape by another student and state law violations including breach of contract, misrepresentation, and negligence following a back injury she received in training for the field hockey team. The district court granted summary judgment to the University. The court concluded that plaintiff had not demonstrated a genuine issue of matter fact as to whether the University acted with deliberate indifference in respect to her rape and its aftermath; although plaintiff's sexual assault was clearly devastating to her, plaintiff had not shown that the University violated Title IX in its response to it or otherwise; plaintiff had not created a genuine issue of material fact on her negligence claim because she had not presented evidence to show the University breached a duty to conform to a standard of care; the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's misrepresentation claims because she provided no evidence that any representations made to her were actually false; plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on her breach of contract claim; plaintiff has not shown that Judge Autrey abused his discretion by declining to recuse where alumni connections were not a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality; plaintiff has not shown error or abuse by the district court or violation of her due process rights where she failed to present her positions as required by the court rules for the orderly disposition of issues; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to extend discovery under Rule 56(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Roe v. St. Louis University, et al." on Justia Law

Public school students with diabetes who cannot self-administer insulin are entitled under federal law to have it administered to them during the school day at no cost. In 2007, the State Department of Education (Department) issued a legal advisory authorizing unlicensed school personnel to administer insulin. The American Nurses Association and other trade organizations representing registered and school nurses (collectively, Nurses) challenged the document by filing this action seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate, asserting that the Department's advice condoned the unauthorized practice of nursing. The superior court declared the advisory invalid to the extent it authorized unlicensed school personnel to administer insulin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that California law expressly permits trained, unlicensed school personnel to administer prescription medications such as insulin in accordance with the written statements of a student's treating physician and parents and expressly exempts persons who thus carry out physicians' medical orders from laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of nursing.View "Am. Nurses Ass'n v. Torlakson" on Justia Law

After meeting with a high-school guidance counselor, a teenaged student said he was feeling alone and unloved, and had attempted suicide. The Counselor talked with the student for four hours; at the end of the discussion, the counselor felt the student no longer posed a threat to himself and sent him back to class. The school did not notify the student's parents of his statements or acts. After the student went home that day, he killed himself. The student's family sued the school district for wrongful death. The district court granted the district summary judgment, finding no duty to the student, and no wrongful act under the wrongful death statute. Plaintiffs appealed, asserting a common law duty based on the special relationship between a school and its students. The Supreme Court found no merit to plaintiffs' appeal except for a negligence per se claim. The alleged violations of the State Department of Education’s and the School District’s mandatory requirements to notify a parent or guardian of the student’s crisis situation state, in the Court's view, a claim of negligence per se. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rogers, et al. v. The Christina School District, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nonprofit public benefit corporation that was granted a charter in 2003 to serve Los Angeles County, had its charter revoked by the County Board of Education in 2007. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the revocation proceedings violated due process and revocation was not based on substantial evidence. The State Board of Education affirmed the revocation. The trial court issued a writ setting aside the revocation of the charter, finding that Plaintiff was not afforded a hearing before an impartial adjudicator because the County Board has an interest in ensuring that funds flowing to charter schools are reallocated to other public schools. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the school failed to establish that the Legislature's chosen procedures denied it the opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" by a decision maker without financial or other bias. View "Today’'s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Educ. " on Justia Law

A vice principal of an elementary school asked a Delaware State Trooper to come to the school give a talk about bullying to four or five fifth grade students who were under “in-school suspension.” The next day, the principal was told that there had been a bullying incident involving an autistic student whose money had been taken from him on the school bus by "AB." The principal told AB’s mother about the incident, and asked her permission to have the officer talk to AB. AB’s mother consented. The officer arrived and was told what happened. The principal and officer went to a room where AB was waiting. The principal was called away, leaving the officer alone with AB. The officer got AB to admit that he had the money (one dollar), but AB claimed that another student had taken the money. AB said that he did not know that other student’s name, but that the student was seated with AB on the school bus. Without discussing the matter with the principal, the officer followed up on AB’s claim despite being virtually certain that AB was the perpetrator. The officer obtained the bus seating chart, found AB's seat-mate, brought the two students together and questioned that student in the same manner as AB. According to the other child, the officer used a mean voice and told him 11 or 12 times that he had the authority to arrest the children and place them in jail if they did not tell the truth. AB finally admitted to taking the money from the autistic student. When he got home from school, the seat-mate told his mother what had happened. The child withdrew from school and was home schooled for the rest of that school year. The mother filed suit on her son’s behalf, as well as individually, against the Cape Henlopen School District, the Board of Education of Cape Henlopen School District, the principal, the State, the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, the Division of the Delaware State Police, and the officer, Trooper Pritchett (collectively, Pritchett). Charges against all but the officer were eventually settled or dismissed; Pritchett successfully moved for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the child, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact on all claims against the officer except a battery claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hunt v. Delaware" on Justia Law