Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a professor at the University of Houston, sued the University under the Texas Whistleblower Act. Plaintiff alleged that the University retaliated against him for reporting that his supervisor violated state civil and criminal law and internal administrative policies located in the University's System administrative Memorandum (SAM). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because the SAM's administrative policies constitute "law" under the Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) the SAM's administrative rules do not fall within the definition of "law" under the Whistleblower Act because there is no evidence the University's Board of Regents enacted the SAM's administrative rules pursuant to authority granted to it in the Texas Education Code; (2) there was no evidence that Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable belief that his reports of the alleged violations of state civil and criminal law were made to an appropriate law enforcement authority; and (3) therefore, the University's sovereign immunity was not waived in this case.View "Univ. of Houston v. Barth" on Justia Law

After the St. Louis Public School District (SLPS) became unaccredited in 2007 and was operated by the Transitional School District of St. Louis, some parents sought to have their children obtain Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131 transfers that would enable the children to attend school in the Clayton school district. The parents (Plaintiffs) also requested that the transitional school district pay for their children's education in Clayton. The trial court held in favor of the school districts (Defendants). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 167.131, the "Unaccredited District Tuition Statute," was applicable to the transitional school district and required that it pay Plaintiffs' children's tuition costs for attending Clayton. On remand, the trial court allowed taxpayers from Clayton and SLPS to intervene. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, holding that section 167.131 was unenforceable as applied to Defendants because (1) it violated the Hancock Amendment of the Missouri Constitution, and (2) Defendants' compliance with the statute was impossible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 167.131, as applied to Defendants, did not violate the Hancock Amendment; and (2) the trial court erred in finding it would be impossible for Defendants to comply with the requirements of the statute. Remanded.View "Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved the use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes following the Supreme Court's February 2008 decision interpreting the Georgia Constitution's Educational Purpose Clause in "Woodham v. City of Atlanta," (657 SE2d 528 (2008)); the subsequent amendment to the Constitution's Redevelopment Powers Clause in November 2008; and the repeal and reenactment of the statutory Redevelopment Powers Law in April 2009. Appellant John S. Sherman argued that the Court's holding in "Woodham" violated the Educational Purpose clause, rendered the resolutions, redevelopment plans, and intergovernmental agreements approving the City's Perry-Bolton and BeltLine tax allocation districts ("TADs") unconstitutional in their entirety, void ab initio, and unamendable. Appellees the Atlanta Independent School System, City of Atlanta, and Atlanta Development Authority, argued that Woodham invalidated only a particular bond issuance for the BeltLine project and had no effect at all on the constitutional validity of the local government approvals for the BeltLine TAD, much less the Perry-Bolton TAD. Upon review of the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees were wrong. "It is clear that, under the law when we decided Woodham in February 2008, the local government approvals for the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs would have been ruled unconstitutional to the same extent that this Court held that the proposed funding for the BeltLine bonds was unconstitutional; at that time, local school taxes could not be used for general redevelopment purposes. But Sherman is also wrong . . . because the subsequent constitutional amendment and revision of the statute governing TADs changed the applicable law, and those changes were expressly made retroactive with respect to the county, city, and local board of education approvals needed to use school taxes for redevelopment purposes. Thus, Sherman's constitutional challenges to the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs lack merit." Sherman's other arguments, were also found meritless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees and its denial of partial summary judgment to Sherman.View "Sherman v. Atlanta Independent School System" on Justia Law

The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the trial judge erred in issuing a temporary injunction. The substantive issue in this appeal was whether the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA) acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner when he imposed a forfeiture penalty against Wright City Public School (Wright City) for violation of OSSAA's 22-game limit baseball rule. On April 30, 2013, the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association determined that the Wright City Public School violated the Association's rules when the varsity baseball team played the Idabel junior varsity team and the Valliant varsity team. The Executive Director imposed the penalty, requiring the Wright City team to forfeit the next two games. The penalty eliminated Wright City from the 2013 Class A state tournament scheduled for May 2 and 3, 2013. On May 1, the district court entered a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. The Supreme Court concluded "[a]ll the players in this controversy" erred: (1) the Executive Director should not have decided the alleged rule violation with Wright City's request for reconsideration pending and without allowing Wright City a meeting with the investigator; (2) Wright City should not have sought district court relief before the OSSAA Board of Directors denied it any relief; and (3) the district court should not have entertained the petition for injunctive relief before it had proof that the OSSAA Board of Directors refused to rule on the alleged rule violation and refused to extend the baseball season to allow Wright City to exercise its rights under the due process procedure in the OSSAA Constitution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dissolved the district court's temporary injunction and remanded the case to the district court with directions to stay this proceeding until Wright City had an opportunity to challenge the allegations of rule violation before the OSSAA Board of Directors pursuant to OSSAA's Constitution.View "Wright City Public Schools v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Assn." on Justia Law

Eric and Gail Thacker sought to homeschool their children but did not obtain state recognition of their homeschool until October 2011. The Thackers did not enroll their five children in any legally recognized school before then. The county court convicted Eric and Gail individually of five misdemeanor counts for violating Nebraska's compulsory education statute. The district court reversed, contending that Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-201 required the Thackers to ensure that their children attended a legally recognized school every day of that school's calendar year until their request to operate a homeschool became effective. The Supreme Court overruled the State's exceptions, holding that section 79-201 did not criminalize the Thackers' failure to enroll their children in a legally recognized school pending the State's recognition of their homeschool. Remanded with instructions for the county court to vacate the convictions and sentences.View "State v. Thacker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as Spencer Brook Strings (SBS), rented string instruments to students in the Concord-Carlisle Regional School District. In 2011, the school district invited vendors of string instruments to bid to rent instruments to the parents of children in the school district and selected Music and Arts (M&A) as the winning bid. The school district then published on school Web sites a letter advising parents that M&A was the music rental company for Concord public schools. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that, by providing M&A with their "endorsement" and by failing to advertise SBS as a participating music rental company, Defendants had used their official positions to secure for M&A unwarranted privileges not available to similarly situated individuals in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii). The judge denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a finding of a violation of chapter 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii) by the State Ethics Commission after an adjudicatory proceeding and a request for rescission by the municipal agency were prerequisites to the filing of a complaint seeking rescission under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(a); and (2) neither prerequisite was met in this case.View "Leder v. Superintendent of Schs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action in 2005 for declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the current Colorado public school financing system violated the Education Clause because the system failed to provide sufficient funding to support a "thorough and uniform" system of free public schools. Plaintiffs also claimed that local school districts' lack of sufficient financial resources, coupled with the system's restrictions on spending, prevented districts from exerting meaningful control over educational instruction and quality in violation of the Local Control Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the public school financing system complied with the Colorado Constitution, and reversed the trial court's finding that the public school financing system was unconstitutional. View "Colorado v. Lobato" on Justia Law

In 2008, Donte Newsome, a university student, was the innocent victim of murder. In 2009, Newsome's mother, Angela Smith, submitted an application to the court of claims seeking reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund for medical expenses, funeral and burial costs, and student loans owed by Newsome at the time of his death. Smith was granted an award for medical expenses and funeral and burial costs but was denied compensation for the student loans. After a hearing, the court of claims denied Smith's request for reimbursement of her son's unpaid student loans pursuant to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, concluding that student loans are contractual obligations that cannot be reimbursed under the Act. The Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Newsome's student loans were not subject to reimbursement under the Act because they were not loans that Newsome was unable to receive or use, in whole or in part, prior to his death. View "State ex rel. Smith v. W. Va. Crime Victims Comp. Fund" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a middle school teacher involved in a physical altercation with a student. The Iowa Board of Educational Examiners issued a statement of charges against Petitioner alleging student abuse. The Board subsequently imposed a ninety-day suspension of Petitioner's teaching license and permanent revocation of his physical education and coaching endorsements. Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in district court within thirty days of the Board's denial of his application for rehearing but before the Board's final decision on the State's application for rehearing. The district court ultimately affirmed the Board's decision on the merits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's "premature" petition never invoked the district court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the proper time to file a petition for judicial review is within thirty days after the agency's final decision on the last application granted for rehearing; and (2) Petitioner initially appealed prematurely before the Board's final decision on the State's rehearing application, but he later perfected his appeal to the district court.View "Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Examiners" on Justia Law

Without permission and in violation of school policy, a high school student retrieved a wallet and sweatshirt from his pickup truck, which was parked on a public street across from the school. When the student returned to school grounds, the assistant principal searched the student's person, backpack, and wallet, only to discover a cellular telephone and a set of keys. Without the student's consent, the assistant principal then searched the student's truck and found drug paraphernalia. The student was suspended for nineteen days. The school board upheld the suspension. The district court reversed the decision of the board and ordered the suspension and offenses expunged from the student's school record, holding that the search of the truck violated the Fourth Amendment, as the assistant principal lacked probable cause to expand the search to the truck. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search of the student's truck violated the student's right to be free from unreasonable searches.View "J.P. v. Millard Pub. Schs." on Justia Law