Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed."View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a superior court order affirming the University of Vermont's denial of his application for in-state tuition status. He raised a host of challenges to the court's ruling, arguing primarily that it was inconsistent with the court's finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Vermont. Plaintiff moved to Vermont in 2007 to enroll as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont ("University" or "UVM"). He paid the out-of-state tuition rate through the first three years of his undergraduate studies, and first applied for in-state tuition status in June 2010. In his application he stated that, although he first came to Vermont to attend UVM, he chose to permanently relocate to Vermont because he loved the area and intended to reside in Burlington after graduating. UVM denied the application, citing several pertinent provisions of UVM's In-State Status Regulations. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff reiterated that he came to UVM because of the reputation of its pre-medical program and medical school, and he explained that during his freshman year he was accepted into a premedical program that leads to automatic acceptance to UVM medical school for students who complete the program. Plaintiff also explained that, although he needed only one more course to complete his graduation requirements, he was seeking in-state tuition status to enable him to take additional electives in the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011 to become "a more diversified medical school applicant." UVM denied his administrative appeal. In light of the review standards the University used in denying Plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff's reliance on the superior court's "finding" was misplaced: "[f]or our purposes here, the critical findings are those of the University, not the trial court. UVM was the adjudicator of the facts in this matter, and the record is clear that it employed the original version of Regulation 3, which both parties agree governed plaintiff's application." Moreover, UVM made no finding as to plaintiff's common-law domicile, but rather concluded on the basis of its review of the record that plaintiff did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for in-state tuition. The Court concluded that the record contained ample competent evidence to support the University's determination, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Roberts v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Relators in this case were instructors who were hired to instruct students in the Jefferson County's virtual learning academy (VLA), a cyber school for grades K-12. In 2008, the State Teachers Retirement Board of Ohio (STRS) determined that the VLA instructors were independent contractors instead of employees and refunded all contributions made by Jefferson County Educational Service Center Governing Board (Jefferson County ESC) on the VLA instructors' behalf. Relators sought writs of mandamus to compel the STRS to accept employer and employee contributions to its retirement fund and to compel the Jefferson County ESC to make employer contributions to the retirement system on their behalf. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relators failed to establish that the STRS abused its discretion in determining that they were not "teachers" within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 3307.01(B)(5) because the instructors were independent contractors, and not employees, of the Jefferson County ESC. View "State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Ret. Bd. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Petitioners were paraprofessionals employed in the New York City schools and were defendants in civil suits brought by students who alleged that Petitioners hit them. Petitioners did not dispute the actions they were found to have committed violated a rule of the Board of Regents prohibiting corporal punishment. Both petitioners asked the City of New York to defend the lawsuits for them. The City refused in both cases. Petitioners brought these proceedings to annual the City's determinations, and the lower courts dismissed the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the challenged determination, holding that employees of the New York City Department of Education who are sued for using corporal punishment are entitled to a defense provided by the City even though the employees' conduct violated a State regulation. Remitted for further proceedings. View "Sagal-Cotler v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal.View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several Indiana taxpayers, brought an action challenging Indiana's statutory program for providing vouchers to eligible parents for their use in sending their children to private schools. Plaintiffs contended that the school voucher program violated three provisions of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted Defendant-intervenors' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the enacted program (1) was within the legislature's power under Ind. Const. art. VIII, 1 to provide for a general and uniform system of common schools; (2) did not violate Ind. Const. art. I, 6 by impermissibly providing direct benefits to religious institutions; and (3) did not contravene Ind. Const. art. I, 4 by requiring persons to support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against Plaintiffs' consent.View "Meredith v. Pence" on Justia Law

D.S., who had several disabilities and disorders, was admitted to the Spurwink School for the provision of "necessary emotional, psychological and other therapeutic services and education." In 2004, D.S., then sixteen years old, arrived at school. An educational technician came outside when D.S. arrived, but D.S. shortly thereafter left the property on foot. D.S. was not located, and D.S. later alleged that, after leaving the school property, she was sexually assaulted by two strangers. In 2010, D.S.'s mother, on behalf of D.S., filed a five-count complaint against Spurwink Services. Spurwink Services moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the case was governed by the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) and D.S. failed to comply with the requirements of the MHSA. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Spurwink Services, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over D.S.'s claims pursuant to the MHSA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the provisions of MHSA did not apply in this case, as D.S.'s action did not constitute an "action for professional negligence" as defined by the MHSA.View "D.S. v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law